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Abstract 
This thesis aims to develop an embryonic theory of Islamic international 
relations (IR). Rather than attempt to fully articulate an Islamic concept of IR, a 
task that will be argued to be unachievable, the thesis will instead use the case 
of Islamic IR, loosely defined, to challenge certain central concepts in IR that 
are seen as immutable. In this way, the thesis is using the case of Islam as an 
example of a tradition on the margins of IR, to critique the ‘centre’. The research 
will therefore pursue dual themes: 1) Exploring what an Islamic construction of 
IR looks like and 2) Analysing the impediments that an Islamic IR faces when 
interacting with other, more dominant paradigms and concepts in the discipline.  
The above goals are explored by using a two stage analysis. In the first 
stage, the thesis examines the dominant concepts in IR which prevent the 
articulation of religious politics generally and Islamic politics specifically, in the 
international sphere. The thesis will argue that these otherwise immutable IR 
concepts are secularism in the discipline and the continuing centrality of the 
state. The thesis frustrates the immutability of these concepts given the specific 
cultural and religious setting of their genesis. After the first stage of this analysis 
the thesis will have created a space in which alternative theories, which do not 
sit well with secularism or the state, can develop; in the Islamic example this is 
represented by the concept of the umma (community of Muslims). In the second 
stage of analysis the thesis will construct, as much as is possible, a notion of IR 
derived from an Islamic heritage. This construction of IR will be communally and 
rationally based, as opposed to being based on theological guidance or abstract 
rationality. 
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Introduction 
This thesis aims to develop an embryonic theory of Islamic international 
relations (IR). Rather than attempt to fully articulate an Islamic concept of IR, a 
task that will be argued to be unachievable, the thesis will instead use the case 
of Islamic IR, loosely defined, to challenge certain central concepts in IR that 
are seen as immutable. In this way, the thesis is using the case of Islam as an 
example of a tradition on the margins of IR, to critique the ‘centre’. Similar 
critiques could be made by other traditions, religious or otherwise, and Islam is 
chosen as it is a tradition which the author has a degree of intimacy with. The 
research will therefore pursue dual themes: 1) Exploring what an Islamic 
construction of IR looks like and 2) Analysing the impediments that an Islamic 
IR faces when interacting with other, more dominant paradigms and concepts in 
the discipline.  
The above goals are explored by using a two stage analysis. In the first 
stage, the thesis examines the dominant concepts in IR which prevent the 
articulation of religious politics generally and Islamic politics specifically, in the 
international sphere. The thesis will argue that these otherwise immutable IR 
concepts, which will be identified in the following chapter, Islam in International 
Relations Scholarship, as being secularism in the discipline and the continuing 
centrality of the state, to be unfounded given the specific cultural and religious 
setting of their genesis. After the first stage of this analysis the thesis will have 
created a space in which alternative theories, which do not sit well with 
secularism or the state, can develop; in the Islamic example this is represented 
by the concept of the umma (community of Muslims). In the second stage of 
analysis the thesis will construct, as much as is possible, a notion of IR derived 
from an Islamic heritage. 
This introductory chapter proceeds by providing background and context 
to the broad themes presented above, before moving on to present and explain 
the research questions that inform this thesis. Finally, the introduction will 
provide a summary of the remaining chapters of the thesis. 
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Background 
Islam and politics 
Much of the literature on Islamic jurisprudence, or fiqh, and its relation to politics 
- loosely speaking the literature on political Islam - has a very specific focus on 
the domestic rather than international sphere. 1  Much of this dialogue is 
reactionary, with influential Islamist writers such as Sayyid Qutb and Abdul A’ala 
Maududi developing their ideas as a response to the situations in their own 
countries.2  For example, Qutb was writing in the shadow of an oppressive 
Nasserite regime and Maududi was clearly influenced by British rule in India 
and the subsequent partition into a secular Pakistan.3  
The Qur’an itself defines its function to the believer: “And We have sent 
down to thee the Book explaining all things”.4 However, there is debate over 
whether the explanation provided by the Qur’an pertains to every little detail of 
an individual’s ‘temporal life’, or moral norms of behaviour which deal with an 
individual’s relationship with the transcendental or ‘divine life’. In Sunni 
orthodoxy 5  the overarching understanding is that the Qur’an is not a legal 
document, but a source of moral norms.6 This is derived from chapter 2, verse 2 
of the Qur’an: “This is the Book in which there is no doubt, a guide for those 
who are God-conscious”.7 The Qur’an defines its role here as a guide, distinct 
from law or doctrine. Joseph Van Ess argues8 the closest the Qur’an gets to 
being canon is chapter 2, verse 177: 
 
Righteousness does not consist in whether you face the East or West. The 
righteous man is he who believes in God and the Last Day, in the angels and the 
                                            
1
 The thesis takes a loose view of what ‘politics’ means, so not to pre-empt what form Islamic IR 
might look like. As a starting point, the thesis adopts the perspective of Dale Eickelman and 
James Piscatori when they describe politics as the setting of boundaries. The setting of 
boundaries between secular/religious and obligatory/forbidden will be particular locations of 
interest as the thesis develops. For more, see Eickelman, Dale and Piscatori, James: Muslim 
politics, (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1996), pg. 18 
2
 Ayubi, Nazih: Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World, (London: Routledge, 
1991), pg. 64 
3
 Ibid., pg. 128 
4
 Qur'an, 16:89 
5
 Defined as rulings from the 4 Sunni madhahib (Hanifi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali). 
6
 Rahman, Fazlur: Islam, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1979), pg. 37 
7
 Qur'an, 2:2 
8
 Van Ess, Josef: The Flowering of Muslim Theology, (London: Harvard University Press, 2006), 
pg. 14-15 
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Book and the prophets; who, though he loves it dearly, gives away his wealth to 
kinsfolk, to orphans, to the destitute, to the traveller in need and to beggars, and for 
the redemption of captives; who attends to his prayers and renders the alms levy.
9
 
 
Again, the Qur’an is general about what it is that constitutes belief. Such 
general, normative advice lends itself to the argument that the Qur’an is a 
source of moral norms, rather than law. Another contributor to Islamic law is the 
sayings of the Prophet Muhammed, ahadith (singular: hadith). This catalogue of 
Prophetic actions and sayings help the jurisprudent extrapolate the sometimes 
abstract guidance in the Qur’an and ‘fill the gaps’ of Qur’anic content. Ahadith 
are considered the second most important source of Islamic knowledge, behind 
the Qur’an10. 
For all that they do cover, neither the Qur’an nor ahadith contain explicit 
guidance on the state or international relations. Ayubi notes that the very notion 
of an Islamic state is a ‘novel’ idea, conceived in the early twentieth century by 
Rashid Ridda and the Muslim brothers. The concept of the Islamic state 
developed as a “response to the dissolution of the Turkish caliphate and in 
reaction to the pressures put on Muslim societies by the Western powers and 
by the Zionist movement”11, not by Qur’anic imperative. 
The lack of explicit guidance has not stopped Muslims in their quest for a 
government informed by religion rather than the secular nation-state model 
inherited from Europe after decolonisation (though the thesis will show in 
chapter 2 how the very notion of a ‘secular nation-state model’ can be 
contested). Such belief is articulated in the phrase din-wa-dawla, translated as 
religion and state. However the belief that Islamic guidance spans from the 
otherworldly concerns of worship to the temporal concerns of governance is 
hard to substantiate. As Qamaruddin Khan notes, “if the first thirty years of 
Islam were excepted, the historical conduct of Muslim states could hardly be 
distinguished from that of other states in world history”.12 Rather than explicit 
guidance or a separate body of law, international relations in Islam is an 
extension of law regarding Muslim and non-Muslim interaction at a personal 
                                            
9
 Qur'an, 2:177 
10
 Hourani, Albert: A History of the Arab Peoples, (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), pg. 69-71 
11
 Ayubi, Nazih: Political Islam, pg. 64 
12
 Khan, Qamaruddin: Political Concepts in the Qur'an, (Lahore: Islamic Book Foundation, 1982), 
pg. 74 
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level. So strictly, “there is no Muslim law of nations in the sense of the 
distinction between modern municipal (national) law and international law based 
on different sources and maintained by different sanctions”.13 
Even if the din-wa-dawla slogan was true, one would still be hard 
pressed to find any information on the how an Islamic state would participate in 
the international system. Indeed, political Islam is very much concerned with the 
domestic, defining what it is and not how it would fit into or implement an 
international order.14 In classical Islamic thought the world is simply demarcated 
into dar-al-Islam and dar-al-harb, the domains of peace (or Islam) and the 
domain of war, though a later addition by the Ottoman Empire saw the creation 
of dar-al-ahd, the domain of treaty. 
Majid Khadduri’s exemplary work on war and peace in Islam posits the 
problem of a ‘deficient’ conceptualisation of international relations in a different 
way. Khadduri states that “[s]imilar to the law of ancient Rome and the law of 
medieval Christendom, the Muslim law of nations was based on the theory of a 
universal state”15. In short, “[t]he Muslim law of nations recognizes no other 
nation than its own”.16 Failure to even recognise polities outside of its borders 
helps us to understand why the Islamic body politic is so embroiled in itself, its 
definition, capacities and functions toward its citizens, not the international 
system. 
Warming Up: The State vs. The Umma 
The dominant political structure post World War II has undoubtedly been the 
liberal-democratic state that has dominated Western political philosophy.17 This 
state was prescribed upon the rest of the world following decolonisation. As 
Jeffrey Herbst notes of African states, “[i]t was immediately assumed that the 
new states would take on features that had previously characterized 
sovereignty [in Europe], most notably unquestioned physical control over a 
                                            
13
 Khadduri, Majid: War and Peace in the Law of Islam, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 
1955), pg. 46 
14
 Butko, Thomas: "Revelation or Revolution: a Gramscian Approach to the Rise of Political 
Islam", (British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.  31, No. 1, 2004), pg. 60 
15
 Khadduri, Majid: War and Peace in the Law of Islam, pg. 45 
16
 Ibid., pg. 44-45 
17
 Kymlicka, Will: Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pg. 88 
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defined territory”.18 Unquestioned control of territory here reads as adopting the 
state system. In Herbst’s African example, those communities were only 
accepted into the international system because they accepted what Turan 
Kayaoglu refers to as the ‘Westphalian narrative’; this narrative “maintains that 
Westphalia created an international society, consolidating a normative 
divergence between European international relations and the rest of the 
international system”.19  
 If the modern state creates a bias in IR whereby only those who accept 
this European normative heritage are to be accepted into ‘international’ society, 
to what extent is that society international? Kayaoglu argues that the society of 
states is a European society extended over the entire globe. Much in the way 
the Islamic polity (or the Roman or medieval Christian polities) did not recognise 
those power structures beyond its borders, so too has the state system become 
universalised in such a way that no alternative is tenable. 
 Nicholas Onuf posits that the condition of anarchy is not a falsifiable 
assertion; one must be told that they live in a condition of anarchy, it cannot be 
proved. In constructing the conditions in which the state developed as a system 
of order, “it is by no means clear that the Western state system is the only 
concrete instance of international relations available for study”.20 With this as a 
point of departure, in analysing what it is about the umma construct that makes 
it incompatible with the state system, the research will highlight some of the 
deficiencies in IR theory and/or the umma concept.  
  The historical Islamic polity (the pre-World War 1 caliphate) is described 
by Sami Zubaida as a ‘political model’, he stops short of calling it a state.21 Of 
primary importance in this distinction is the practice of rule over people, not 
territory. The modern state exercises control over territory, such unquestioned 
control being one of the cornerstones of state sovereignty. 22  In the umma 
however, illustrated here however imperfectly in reference to the Ottoman 
                                            
18
 Herbst, Jeffrey: "Responding to State Failure in Africa", (International Security, Vol.  21, No. 3, 
1996), pg. 121-122 
19
 Kayaoglu, Turan: "Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory", (International 
Studies Review, Vol.  12, No. 2, 2010), pg. 193 
20
 Onuf, Nicholas: World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International 
Relations, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), pg. 16 
21
 Zubaida, Sami: Islam, the People & the State, 2nd ed. (London: IB Tauris, 1989), pg. 130-140 
22
 Herbst, Jeffrey: "Responding to State Failure in Africa", pg. 121-122 
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Empire, “law was still... personal rather than territorial”.23  Despite this quite 
fundamental difference, some still think of the umma construct as an equivalent 
to the state24 when rather, it is an alternative.  
 Turning to chapter 2, verse 143 of the Qur’an to substantiate the 
particularity of the umma construct: “Thus have we made you an umma justly 
balanced, that you might be witnesses over the nations, and the Messenger a 
witness over yourselves”.25 In the same verse both the words umma and ‘nation’ 
(nas) are used, indicating the distinction between the two in the Islamic tradition. 
Beyond this, as already mentioned, the umma is concerned with legislating over 
people, regardless of location, while the state legislates over territory.   
 As Islamic traditions of political organisation were dismantled during the 
colonial era to be replaced with modern state units,26 IR, which uses the state 
as its unit of analysis, requires that contemporary political Islam define itself in a 
similar way in order to be accepted by the discipline. A return to what Michel 
Foucault describes as a ‘pre-liberal’ voice, that is, Islamic statecraft, may prove 
impossible given the “totalizing discourse of Western, capitalist modernity”.27 
However, this research will attempt to locate those “genealogical fragments” of 
Islamism, and the umma in particular, which may challenge the ‘best practice’ of 
IR. 
The Main Event: Liberalism vs. Islamism vs. Poststructuralism 
For Michael Barnett regional order in the Arab world is not only achieved by “a 
stable correlation of military forces, but also because of stable expectations and 
shared norms”.28 His emphasis on shared norms is peculiar as normative theory 
is not generally considered a legitimate topic in IR, the discipline instead “[takes] 
                                            
23
 Davidson, Roderic: "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth 
Century", in Hourani, Albert, Khoury, Philip, and Wilson, Mary, (eds.): The Modern Middle East: 
A Reader, (London: IB Tauris, 1993), pg. 62 
24
 Ayubi, Nazih: Political Islam, pg. 1-10 
25
 Qur'an, 2:143 
26
 Donner, Fred: "The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War", in Kelsay, Johm and Johnson, 
James, (eds.): Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace 
in Western and Islamic Traditions, (London: Greenbridge, 1991), pg. 58 
27
 Shani, Giorgio: "De-colonizing Foucault", (International Political Sociology, Vol.  4, No. 2, 
2010), pg. 212 
28
 Barnett, Michael: Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998), pg. 6 
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for granted that the aim should be primarily descriptive and/or explanatory”.29 
This section of the research, in dealing with ideology and ‘meta-narrative’ will 
explicitly challenge the bias in IR towards objective explanation and against 
value judgements; “[n]ormative questions are not answered by pointing to the 
way things are in the world”.30  
There exists the popular notion that to the norms of the liberal state Islam 
is “repellent and strange... The notion commonly associated with it is the 
Sharia... which would seem to be incompatible with the rules of enlightened 
reason”.31 Political Islam may overlap geographically with liberal ‘spheres of 
influence’, but operates “relatively independently of the circuits and networks 
that define the structure of global liberalism”32. Indeed, Fiona Adamson calls 
political Islam and liberalism a competing set of ideologies.33 This will not come 
as a surprise to some, like John Schwarzmantel, who contend that as a 
pervasive hegemon of ideology, liberalism is bound to conflict with any other 
belief system. He elucidates: 
 
While Liberal-democratic systems might in theory [have allowed] a wide range of 
political ideas to be departed and considered so that nothing was forbidden, in 
practice the span of effective political opinion was constrained by a dominant 
ideology which limited political debate to a set of questions concerned with 
managing the established system, and which blocked by various filter mechanisms 
any more systematic questioning or challenging of that system.
34
 
 
While this thesis does not seek to argue that liberalism is not as dominant as 
supposed by Schwarzmantel, the relationship between liberalism and political 
Islam is analysed further. In an attempt to peel back the reasons for the 
antipathy between liberal and Islamist positions (acknowledging that there are 
substantial overlaps between these positions at times35) the thesis introduces a 
                                            
29
 Frost, Mervyn: Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory, (Cambridge 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pg. 12 
30
 Ibid., pg. 2 
31
 Van Ess, Josef: The Flowering of Muslim Theology, pg. 1 
32
 Adamson, Fiona: "Global Liberalism Versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological 
Frameworks in International Politics", (International Studies Review, Vol.  7, No. 4, 2005), pg. 
548 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Schwarzmantel, John: Ideology and Politics, (London: Sage publications ltd., 2008), pg. 11 
35
 Kurzman, Charles: Liberal Islam: A Source Book, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 
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poststructural critique of liberalism specifically, and Enlightenment philosophy in 
general. While the poststructural critique breaks down the constitutive elements 
on both sides of the debate, allowing the thesis to explore the foundations of 
this problematic dialogue, it creates an interesting question about 
poststructuralism and religion which will be covered in later chapters; religious 
adherents, specifically those of the Abrahamic faiths, believe in a foundational 
truth: God. Poststructuralism however, is premised on a profound scepticism 
over any such foundational truths. A more detailed discussion over the definition 
of poststructuralism and its usage in this thesis will occur in chapter 2, as it is 
related to the analytical framework of the thesis. The same is true of the 
concept of Constructivism, which while also discussed in more depth in chapter 
2, is briefly overviewed here.  
 Political Islam has, in a similar way with its dialogue with sovereignty, 
failed to make use of contemporary Constructivist debates in IR. More 
traditional IR theory would contend, in accordance with Realist or neo-Realist 
theory, that ideologies are merely “useful adjuncts to political power and are 
nurtured for that purpose”36 by the actors of the neo-Realist international system, 
states. The Constructivist approach however, contends that “the role of shared 
ideas” is an “ideational structure constraining and shaping behaviour”.37 Rather 
than framing forms of Realism and Constructivism as competing paradigms, the 
latter can be used to emphasise the human aspect of existence; the state does 
not exist in a vacuum but is maintained and administered by the individuals 
within it. As individuals are given greater prominence in Constructivism, so too 
can the Muslim achieve greater prominence in the society of states. It is this 
conclusion that violent proponents of political Islam fail to grasp, believing that 
they are unable to affect change without coming into a zero-sum conflict with 
the dominant liberal culture of international society. 
                                            
36
 Bill, James A. and Springborg, Robert: Politics in the Middle East, 5th ed. (New York: Addison 
Wesley Longman, 1999), pg. 25 
37
 Copeland, Dale: "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay", 
(International Security, Vol.  25, No. 2, 2000), pg. 189-190 
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Research Questions 
Having explored the conceptual debate surrounding what some regard as the 
ambivalent relationship between political Islam and IR, this thesis sets out to 
address the following primary research question: 
 To what extent is an Islamic notion of international relations tenable? 
To answer this primary research question, it is broken down into three 
secondary research questions, with the first secondary research question 
broken down once more into two subsidiary questions: 
 How extensive is the guidance offered in Islamic source texts with 
regards to international relations?  
o How does one differentiate between Islam and Political Islam? 
o What are the defining or contentious features of an Islamic IR?  
 What challenges does the concept of the umma, as an alternative to the 
state, pose to the discipline of international relations? 
 To what degree is there a synthesis in poststructural and Islamic 
critiques of IR? 
Academic contribution and originality 
This thesis contributes to two distinct academic arguments. The first relates to 
the subject of enquiry while the second derives from the analytical framework 
employed.  
 The first contribution is to the literature on IR, wherein the thesis 
questions the nature and influence of religion in IR. Rather than examine 
Islam’s place in IR, the originality of the thesis is in how it examines IR’s place 
in Islam, revealing how IR’s dominant interpretations fall short of the schema of 
Islam. Specifically, the centrality of the state and liberal individualism in IR are 
argued to derive from specific socio-cultural backgrounds, and so do not satisfy 
the needs of an Islamic IR. Such an analysis is only made possible by 
articulating what in fact constitutes Islamic IR for the purpose of this thesis. To 
be clear, the thesis does not define what Islamic IR is, but points out that 
whatever form it might take, it would be derived from communal sources, not 
abstract and universal reason, as is the case with dominant IR paradigms. This 
distinction between the abstract and the communally derived is one of the 
10 
 
locations of friction between IR and Islam, and more broadly, religion in general. 
As such, the thesis argues for a greater reflexivity on the part of IR scholars to 
not take for granted value neutral and universal claims within the discipline. 
 The second contribution is to the literature on political Islam. Here the 
thesis argues that political Islam struggles to articulate a notion of IR because it 
aligns itself to theology in a prohibitive way. Theology and the Islamic source 
texts are too broad and abstract to provide guidance on the contemporary 
international sphere. This is not unexpected however, as guidance on politics is 
argued to be distinct from guidance on how to develop a relationship to God. 
Moreover, Islamic source texts are argued to be texts that provide guidance, as 
opposed to canon, and always require interpretation with regards to temporal or 
mundane life. As such, the thesis builds on work that ‘brings rationalism back in’, 
supplementing theological guidance with other strands of Islamic thought. The 
originality of the thesis here however, lies in the way in which the thesis 
balances a poststructural framework with that of a foundational faith such as 
Islam. This balance is distinct from a synthesis between the two positions; 
rather, the thesis employs value pluralism to manage the incoherencies 
between the two positions (one foundational and the other anti-foundational), 
while these positions work together in a common critique of political modernity. 
Distinct form the commonly perceived threat that poststructuralism brings to 
Abrahamic (and other universal) faiths, undermining their belief in God, the 
thesis attempts, uniquely, to demonstrate how these incommensurable 
positions affirm the nature of value pluralism, and need not (indeed cannot) be 
rationally resolved. 
Chapter Outlines 
This research will be multidisciplinary, using concepts and theories drawn from 
both IR and theology. As a conceptual work it will be based entirely on 
secondary sources. The secondary research questions build upon one another 
to answer the primary question and constitute the different sections of the thesis, 
dealt with below. 
 The first chapter of the thesis attempts to frame much of the debate that 
will develop from the second of the secondary research questions: What 
challenges does the concept of the umma, as an alternative to the state, pose 
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to the discipline of international relations? Chapter 1 examines the major works 
that have applied IR to the Middle East, looking specifically for indication as to 
how those studies treat religion in the region. IR studies of the Middle East are 
chosen as once more, this is the geographical region which the author is 
familiar with. Any reference to Islam or Islamic practice will invariably be drawn 
from the Middle East region and while there might be considerable overlap with 
similar concepts drawn from other Muslim majority regions (South East Asia 
being the most obvious), the chapter does not speak to that overlap, or 
generalise away from the Middle East setting. Chapter 1 will argue that none of 
the IR approaches applied to the Middle East deal with religion on its own terms, 
instead subsuming religion into pre-existing categories of analysis (‘culture’ 
being the prominent category). The chapter will also glimpse here the 
beginnings of the debate between foundational and anti-foundational forces 
within IR, specifically with regards to the assumptions around liberal 
individualism, a theme that will be returned to in later chapters of the thesis. 
 In addition, chapter 1 will embark upon answering the first of the 
secondary research questions: How extensive is the guidance offered in Islamic 
source texts with regards to international relations? Here the chapter will make 
an important differentiation between Islam as it pertains to worship, Islam-as-
faith, and Islam as it pertains to politics, Islam-as-politics. It is here the chapter 
will introduce the term Normative Political Islam, that is, the variant of political 
Islam which will be extrapolated upon in deriving a notion of Islamic IR. Using 
the term Normative Political Islam highlights the fact that the thesis is not 
speaking about a univocal tradition, or claiming to speak for how all Muslims are 
required to view the international sphere (a claim the thesis would refute in any 
instance). Rather, the thesis is differentiating its notion of Islamic politics from 
other variants. In doing so, the thesis is not making any claims to ‘greater 
legitimacy’ for, as will be seen in later chapters, it is important to acknowledge 
how IR might mean different things to different communities. 
 Chapter 2, Exploring the Interaction Between Islam and IR: A Conceptual 
Framework, will develop the tools needed to deal with the issues that chapter 1 
will highlight. Chapter 2 will focus on explaining the methodology of the thesis in 
depth, expanding on the two stage analysis forwarded in the current chapter, 
and placing the study in the broader context of the study of religion in IR. The 
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thesis will define here its epistemological foundations as deriving from 
poststructuralism, that is, a scepticism towards meta-narrative and universalism. 
This chapter will purposefully leave the ontological position of the thesis 
somewhat ambiguous, as resolving the ontological position of a believer in God 
and a poststructuralist informs the discussion of the third research question, 
covered later in the thesis: To what degree is there a synthesis in poststructural 
and Islamic critiques of IR. However, chapter 2 does make some headway in 
regards to the third research question, in that the chapter will explain what 
synthesis there is between poststructuralism and Islamic critiques of IR, leaving 
discussion of the differences in these approaches to later chapters.  
 Chapter 3, Sovereignty and Normative Political Islam, takes on the task 
of the more constructive elements of the thesis, giving shape to Normative 
Political Islam. This chapter will finish answering the first of the secondary 
research questions: How extensive is the guidance offered in Islamic source 
texts with regards to international relations? While earlier chapters will have 
earlier arrived at a conclusion that Islamic source texts do not contain enough 
guidance to inform Islamic IR, chapter 3 will explore what can guide such a 
concept. The chapter will here identify sovereignty as a key marker of difference 
between Islamic notions of IR and more dominant, secular variants. Trying to 
resolve the question of Islamic sovereignty will lead the chapter to revive the 
exoteric, rational aspect of the Islamic message. The chapter will show here 
how exotericism fell out of favour in Islamic history, and why bringing it back in 
helps deal with the constitutive elements of Islamic IR which theological 
guidance (Islamic source texts) are silent or ambiguous on. Using rationalism, 
chapter 3 is able to be sensitive to the communal and societal origins of values 
that individuals hold. Chapter 3 concludes with a dual contract for deriving 
sovereignty which plays once more to the split made earlier between Islam-as-
faith and Islam-as-politics. 
 Having given some substance to a nascent Normative Political Islam, 
chapter 4, Islamic Community and International Relations, attempts to show 
how the principles that inform Normative Political Islam relate to IR. The chapter 
will here specifically be dealing again with the second of the secondary 
research questions: What challenges does the concept of the umma, as an 
alternative to the state, pose to the discipline of international relations? Chapter 
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4 identifies the abstract universalism that liberalism is based upon; then, linking 
that universalism to the philosophy that resulted from the European 
Enlightenment, the chapter then argues that IR has also inherited that tradition 
of abstract universalism. The ramifications of this are discussed in the chapter, 
leading the chapter to argue that communitarian sensitivity to the role 
individuals and society play in the construction of values is better placed than 
abstract universalism to give agency to Normative Political Islam in the 
international sphere. The chapter shows that articulations of the umma in IR can 
range from thick to thin, giving more and less credence to the concept of the 
state. Lastly, chapter 4 demonstrates the shortfalls that these two positions, 
thick and thin-umma, have with regards to the international system and the 
umma respectively. 
 Chapter 5, Pluralism Not Polarisation, explores the ramifications of the 
communitarian IR elaborated in chapter 4. In addressing the secondary 
research question, what challenges does the concept of the umma, as an 
alternative to the state, pose to the discipline of international relations, the 
chapter explores the way different communities might articulate different values 
in IR, and whether that will inexorably lead to conflict between competing value 
systems. Here the chapter posits value pluralism as the solution to this question, 
arguing that managing conflict is a more just solution than attempting to 
eradicate conflict, the latter solution being one which the chapter ties to the 
Enlightenment philosophy critiqued throughout the thesis. The final part of 
chapter 5 puts to rest the final secondary research question of the thesis: To 
what degree is there a synthesis in poststructural and Islamic critiques of IR? In 
answering this question the chapter makes the claim that bounding 
poststructuralism is the only way to prevent it becoming a meta-narrative itself. 
At the same time, it is not inconsistent for a Muslim, believing in God, to utilise 
poststructural analysis in the construction of Normative Political Islam, as 
poststructuralism helps to remind the Muslim of the limits of divine guidance in 
this temporal world. 
 The final chapter of the thesis forwards the final conclusions on each of 
the secondary research questions, as well as concluding the primary research 
question: To what extent is an Islamic notion of international relations tenable? 
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Chapter 1: Islam in International Relations 
Scholarship 
This chapter will problematise existing IR scholarship of the Middle East through 
the lens of (Sunni) Islam. The chapter will look to Islam, a religion believed by 
some Muslims to provide the basis of their social order, for guidance on the 
international sphere. In doing so, the chapter will articulate the nature of this 
guidance, and define political Islam for the purposes of the following discussion, 
addressing the secondary research question: How extensive is the guidance 
offered in Islamic source texts with regards to international relations? Following 
a definition of political Islam, the chapter will scrutinise existing IR scholarship 
on the Middle East region through this Islamic perspective. Rather than ask how 
Islam might surface to find compatibility with a world view defined by the 
European Enlightenment, the chapter will examine how the contemporary 
system is deficient in reference to an Islamic world view, addressing the 
secondary research question: What challenges does the concept of the umma, 
as an alternative to the state, pose to the discipline of international relations? 
This analysis will show that the two predominant reasons for the deficiency of 
current scholarship areː 
1. The territoriality of the international system, briefly outlined here as an 
incongruence between ‘state’ and ‘umma’ (community).  
2. The incoherence in expecting liberal individualism to cater for the 
aspirations of the umma. 
The two reasons outlined above fall into two distinct but interrelated areas of 
analysis; the international (state vs. umma) and the theoretical (liberal 
individualism vs. communitarianism). Thus, following the current introductory 
section, this chapter will be split into 3 sections which reflect these different 
themes. Firstly the chapter will interrogate political Islam to arrive at a working 
definition that will allow it to secondly; scrutinise IR scholarship of the Middle 
East as it relates to Islam, which will highlight thirdly; the problems that 
community and the umma place on liberal individualism. 
The discipline of IR has traditionally treated religion as an adjunct to 
analysis. Religion played a role in the politics of different eras, but in the modern 
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world the international sphere is ruled by different sensibilities. Painting IR 
theories in broad brush strokes, the lack of space afforded to religion in the 
study of the Middle East,  is seen in the politics of Realism, where material gain 
and a more abstract ‘power’ are the key influences on behaviour, over and 
above the power of norms or ideas, religiously founded or otherwise. In liberal 
thought vast structures of economic interconnectivity steady the hand of world 
leaders; if counter ideologies (depicted religiously through Islam) exist, these 
are only contested within the ideational boundaries defined by liberalism. 
Classical Marxist analysis (as distinct from neo-Marxism which will be discussed 
in later chapters) also places much weight on the material influences of 
behaviour; where ideology is accounted for, it is done so to reinforce its material 
analysis through ‘false consciousness’. Constructivism begins to move away 
from such ideologically (and therefore religiously) dismissive analyses, looking 
to show how identity and discourse, religious or otherwise, play a powerful role 
in the international system. Such insights into identity help make Foreign Policy 
Analysis (FPA) a strong explanatory force in the wider Middle East as it blurs 
the lines between domestic and international, showing how the internal 
dynamics of states affect their international relations. However, even in identity 
based IR analysis, religion is placed on the backburner as it is deemed an 
ideology that does not play out at a regional or international level but at a 
domestic level only.38 Indeed, of all the work on political Islam, there are only 
three specific studies on the role of Islam in the contemporary international 
sphere.39  
Of the three studies that explicitly focus on Islam in the international 
sphere, one is written by James Piscatori40 and two by Peter Mandaville.41  
Piscatori’s book - a study of Islam’s place in the modern system of states - is 
not an explanation for events, as Islam has no place in the international system, 
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at least as this system is currently conceived in IR scholarship (as an ideal). 
Piscatori’s work then is normative, rather than analytical, and narrative and 
historically based, rather that paradigm based. This narrative/historical focus 
highlights a fault line between IR and study of the Middle East, what Louise 
Fawcett calls an “International Relations – Area Studies divide”42; as Piscatori’s 
study is specific to the particular historical narrative of Islam, its use in IR 
scholarship is not to produce (indeed it does not attempt) a paradigm that is 
applicable outside of its specific narrative, that is, the Islamic Middle East. 
Rather, much like this thesis, Piscatori’s work broadens the field of enquiry for 
IR scholars, using the example of Islam and Muslim history to reflect on IR. 
Peter Mandaville’s work is more of a paradigm work, however the subject 
matter, global religious affiliation, moves Mandaville away from the centre of the 
IR discipline. Much like Piscatori, Mandaville must work hard at showing how 
Islam can be relevant for study in the international sphere; in doing so, 
Mandaville in 2001 posited religion, as is often done, as a challenge to the 
dominant political experience. Specifically, he posits a global Muslim community 
(umma), as a challenge to the statist politics of the international system.43 
However six years later his opinion relaxed, the idea that the umma was a spent 
concept permeated his work; religion was no longer a challenge to the status 
quo, but had learned and must continue to learn to operate within the status 
quo44, a position that is far more comfortable for IR as a discipline. 
Counter to Mandaville’s reading of Islam on the international stage, this 
chapter will argue that the relegation of religion to the peripheries of IR is 
problematic for the theories that purport to be applicable to the Middle East 
specifically, and the Islamic world more generally, and is indicative of a wider 
problem in the discipline of IR regarding the place of norms, ideas and religion. 
Before moving on to a more thorough analysis of IR theory and Islam, the 
chapter will now define that key term, Islam, and its specific relation to politics. 
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Defining political Islam 
That Islam offers guidance on the political is potentially a dubious assertion. For 
some scholars, like Josef Van Ess, the Islamic faith is not explicitly political, and 
extrapolation of religious methods would support his view; for example, “[f]rom 
time to time theologians or muhaddithun (specialists in the traditions or saying 
of the Prophet, hadith) did write professions of faith (‘aqa’id) that can be 
compared to Christian creed, but these texts entailed no obligation and 
remained valid only for a circumscribed time and place”. 45 This spatial relativity 
does not lend itself to a state encompassing all Muslim peoples, but does not 
deny smaller Islamic polities the potential to exist; in early or ‘classical’ Islam, 
Van Ess maintains that the prevailing wisdom of the time derived from the 
Qur’anic verse 2:256 which states that there shall be “no compulsion in 
religion”.46  
Unlike Christianity, it is not the ‘narrow path’ that leads to salvation but 
simply the shahadda (declaration of faith); it was considered that the wide path 
would save Muslims in the hereafter.47 Such a relaxed posture is echoed by 
Qamaruddin Khan, who argues that the argument of the din-wa-dawla 
adherents, that is, the inseparability of the faith of Islam from politics, is not one 
substantiated by the early history of Islam. Indeed, “if the first thirty years of 
Islam were excepted, the historical conduct of Muslim states could hardly be 
distinguished from that of other states in world history”.48 Khan’s statement is 
astute, if missing the point slightly. That the first thirty years of Islamic history 
were unique is the call of many modern Islamists. For such Islamists (placed in 
the broad category of salafism), the age old practice of taqlid, imitation, has 
failed them and as such the many changes and accommodations made by 
Muslim jurists since the time of revelation are not worth imitating. As such, it is 
no use in pointing out, as Khan does, that the Islamic polity behaved in much 
the same way as non-Muslim polities a thirty years after the revelation of Islam. 
This is something both sides of the debate agree upon. For the one side it is 
cause to point out how misguided Muslims have become following the passing 
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of the rashidun, Rightly Guided Caliphs49, for the other, it is cause to show how 
novel the idea of an Islamic state is. As such, both sides of the debate talk past 
each other, never addressing the points or grievances of the other. Engaging 
with such an on going debate is problematic as there is little chance to rest 
conclusively on one side or the other. However, attempting to do so is a 
necessary pursuit if the chapter is to arrive at a position that can then be used 
to examine IR.  
 Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori infer that the constant differentiation 
between the rashidun and their successors implies a cleavage between religion 
and state. Going further, perhaps this division happened at the Prophet 
Muhammed’s death as he was the seal of the prophets, and thus no one could 
succeed his religious authority.50 A similar yet different argument claims that the 
separation of religion and state happened during the reign of Abbasid Caliph 
Ma’mun (813-833). Ma’mun was sympathetic to Mu’tazilite theology and, to put 
it crudely, adopted it as a ‘state’ religion. This was rejected by the majority of 
Muslims, the Hanbali school in particular, effectively freeing religion from state. 
Going against the Caliphate in this way distinguished the limits of its authority, 
especially with regards to religion; “[h]enceforth, the Caliphate was no longer 
the sole identifying symbol or the sole organizing institution, even for those 
Muslims who had been most closely identified with it”.51  
These arguments do not claim that Islam and politics did not co-exist at 
one time; whether that ended with the death of the Prophet, the passing of the 
rashidun or the reign of Ma’mun, does not matter. Rather, for one side of the 
argument, that of the unspectacular nature of Muslim politics, the separation of 
religion and state represents a precedent that means modern Muslims are able 
to live in and interact with political systems ostensibly ‘foreign’ to them. The 
opposing side of the debate, the din-wa-dawla advocates, see the cleavage 
between religion and state as a sign that modern Muslims have lost their way, 
emulation of the early Muslims is the key component of politics for these 
ideologues. Such emulation, for them, includes an Islamic State and distinct 
political system. A third position, and the position that this chapter will pursue, is 
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an approach that allows a synthesis of Islam and politics, but challenges the all-
encompassing and literal exhortations of din-wa-dawla advocates.  
But why is Islam the basis of this culturally specific normative foundation? 
Why not Arabism or some other ethnic affiliation? The thesis argues that Islam 
is peculiar, though not unique, in its ability to incorporate many differing axes of 
identity into its ideology. One can be a student, male, female, a parent, elderly, 
nomadic, sedentary, upper class, lower class, Moroccan, Egyptian, Afghani, 
and still be Muslim.52 In addition, Islam has been articulated as a project that 
strives for anything, from upholding the politics characterised by modernity, to 
mass emancipation within the boundaries of contemporary politics, all the way 
to a rejection of the system and complete revolution. For example, Youssef 
Choueiri claims that Said Qutb, Maulana Maududi and Ruhollah Khomeini 
articulated their political Islams as revolutionary; “[t]o them, change had to be 
total, comprehensive, and revolutionary”.53  
Khaled Abou El Fadl does not share the idea that revolution is the ‘true’ 
articulation of political Islam. Rather, it is a possible source of emancipation for 
Muslims from Orientalism, Westernisation and modernity, by taking control of 
power and its symbols.54 However, what is specifically jarring to the Muslim 
world about the West or political modernity is not defined by Abou El Fadl. 
Indeed, it often is not defined by authors trying to debunk essentialist accounts 
of Islam. This mistake is sometimes referred to as Orientalism in reverse, 
Occidentalism, whereby the author essentialises ‘the West’ for the purpose of 
their argument. Regardless, what El Fadl emphasises is that the pursuit of 
power by political Islam carries with it a potential emancipatory character, 
bringing power to Muslims where power currently rests in non-Muslim hands, 
though the nature of this power is entirely undefined beyond finger pointing to 
‘the West’.  
Bryan Turner deals with Islam’s emancipatory nature in a much more 
articulate way. Here too is the assertion that political Islam, over an ethnic 
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affiliation or nationalistic projects, represents the potential global political system. 
Crucially, Turner articulates Abou El Fadl’s ‘West’ as cultural baggage that 
accompanies modernisation, namely, “a post-Enlightenment system of 
thought”.55 Rather than using the language of emancipation, Turner prefers to 
use ‘opposition’ as his key word; “[Islam] can operate globally as an 
oppositional force”.56  This is a developed and nuanced position; for Turner 
political Islam is an ideology with the potential to contest the very Enlightenment 
rationality that current political structures are founded upon. The methods of this 
challenge are not so well defined; it is neither a revolution as described by 
Choueiri, nor, clearly, an ideology working within the boundaries of the 
contemporary political system. Beyond describing political Islam as filling an 
oppositional void left by the collapse of Communism, Turner, like many other 
writers on political Islam, does not attempt to explain what political Islam is for, 
but rather defines the concept by articulating what it is against.  
Despite the problem of defining what political Islam stands for, the 
argument presented here is that political Islam, over and above ethnic affiliation, 
nationally or regionally focused identity, presents a strong challenge to the 
discipline of IR. Briefly, that challenge is conceptualised as an Islamic politics 
based on a specific normative basis derived from the Islamic faith. To get to this 
position, the chapter must first deal with two competing visions for Islam in 
politics, that of the unspectacular nature of Islamic politics on one end of the 
spectrum, and the unique inseparability of religion and politics on the other end 
of it. The next section will begin by looking at the unspectacular nature of 
Islamic politics. 
Unique Politics in early Islam? 
Fazlur Rahman believed that the Prophet Muhammed, through revelations and 
his religiously authoritative personal guidance, was the sole religious and 
political guide for Muslims during his lifetime. With his death this guidance was 
cut off, but the first four Caliphs, those who knew the Prophet best, “met the 
ever-arising new situations by applying to these their judgements in the light of 
the Qur’an and what the Prophet had taught them”.57 Only after the passing of 
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the rashidun did the first theological sects emerge. While Rahman shows why 
many Muslims revere this period of Islam’s history, a period before any 
infighting occurred between the Muslims, this chapter argues that he 
inaccurately portrays the Prophet Muhammed as the sole political guide for 
Muslims in this era, a case put forward by Ali Abd al-Raziq.  
Al-Raziq claims that there is a difference between ‘kingly and ‘prophetic’ 
rule.58 Prophets, according to al-Raziq, have a special nature that cannot be 
emulated; “[the] Messenger may tackle the politics of his people as a king would, 
but the Prophet has a unique duty which he shares with no one”59, that is, 
delivering the message of God to humankind. This is not a characteristic that 
can be replicated after the passing of the last of the Prophets, Muhammed; no 
one can hope to reproduce this prophetic authority and as such the period of 
Muhammed’s rule is politically unique, and cannot be replicated. Now 
considering al-Raziq says a prophet may tackle the politics of a king, it is 
necessary to clarify how a prophet exercising kingly authority is not as unique a 
situation as a prophet delivering a religious message. Carrying a religious call 
demands of a prophet leadership skills. These are skills which may also make a 
prophet a capable ‘king’, in al-Raziq’s language. But were a prophet to exercise 
kingship, as Muhammed undoubtedly did in commanding the hijra to Medina, 
his negotiations with the various communities at Medina and his generalship at 
the battle of Badr and Uhud60, these actions may not be inspired by God. Such 
‘worldly’ matters often fall beyond the prevue of prophets. In exercising political 
authority, a prophet would draw upon his high status within a community, not his 
unique relationship to God (though the two are undoubtedly related). This 
however, is not the only line of reasoning that al-Raziq takes. Rather, he seeks 
to further define Muhammed as a unique figure in history:  
 
[T]he authority of the Prophet, peace be upon him, was, because of his Message, a 
general authority; his orders to Muslims were obeyed; and his government was 
comprehensive... This sacred power, special to those worshipers of God whom He 
had raised as messengers, does not hold within it the meaning of kingship, nor does 
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it resemble the power of kings, nor can the [authority of the] sultan of all sultans 
approximate it.
61
 
  
If one wants to call the community of Muhammed’s followers a state, and 
Muhammed their king, then this is a matter of semantics to al-Raziq. The 
important point is that the politics practiced by the Prophet was grounded in his 
religious message, and as such is not a system of politics that can be replicated, 
nor should one try. The difference between prophets and kings is that the 
former governs over the heart while the former over material things; “[t]he 
former is a religious leadership, the latter a political one – and there is much 
distance between politics and religion”.62 Muhammed Khalaf-Allah, defines the 
roles of prophets as “explanation and analysis of Qur’anic texts – especially that 
which deals with beliefs, worship, and [social] interactions”.63 This is a role that 
the ulema, Muslim religious scholars, have taken on with the passing of the last 
of the Prophets. That being the case, Khalaf-Allah states it is an error, in the 
contemporary world, to look to ulema for guidance on politics; as the practice of 
politics was not the primary role of the prophets, so “religious scholars cannot 
do what the prophets, peace be upon them, could not do”. 64 
 So, the politics practised by Muhammed was unique by virtue of his 
divine guidance in those matters, which no other can replicate. Also, the 
Prophet’s politics was concerned only with delivering the message, and any 
governance he conducted “was only a means that the Prophet, peace be upon 
him, would seek for the strengthening of his religion, in support of the call”.65 Al-
Raziq does not answer the question as to why the Prophet’s successors could 
not pursue politics with a similar aim; what is particular of the call to Islam that is, 
for al-Raziq, incongruous with politics? Interestingly this is the same question 
that is not answered by IR scholars. Indeed, it is not even asked by the field, 
what is it that makes Islam incompatible with politics? As the second section of 
the chapter will show, the predominant reason IR of the Middle East is deficient 
is the Eurocentric assumption that the relationship between religion and politics 
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that played out in Europe, happened the same way the world over, or should 
play out in this mould.  
However there are some very real reasons that assuming a coherent and 
distinctive Islamic politics is not achievable, namely the fractious reality of the 
religion. As Piscatori observes, “[i]n practical terms, although not in theology, 
there are as many Islams as there are Muslims”66; the lack of unity within the 
faith makes it unfeasible and unnecessary to unite politically. The 
aforementioned lack of unity is not posited here as a negative thing, an issue 
that needs resolving. Rather, differences within the faith of Islam are taken to be 
a divine mercy, as chapter 10, verse 99 of the Qur’an states: “If your lord had 
willed it, all the people on the earth would have come to believe, one and all”.67 
As demonstrated earlier in the chapter, there is something distinctive to Islamic 
politics, specifically the politics of the Prophet Muhammed, but what this is and 
whether it is applicable after the death of the Prophet Muhammed remains to be 
seen. Before proposing the content of this Islamic distinction, the chapter will 
look at the most vehemently argued nature of this distinction, that of din-wa-
dawla, the inseparability of religion and politics. 
Taking Issue with din-wa-dawla 
Eickelman and Piscatori take great pains to highlight the problems regarding 
din-wa-dawla. For them: 
 
The presupposition of the union of religion and politics, din wa-dawla, is unhelpful 
for three reasons... First, it exaggerates the uniqueness of Muslim politics... Second, 
the emphasis on din wa-dawla inadvertently perpetuates “orientalist” assumptions 
that Muslim politics, unlike other politics, are not guided by rational, interest based 
calculations... Third, the din wa-dawla assumption contributes to the view that 
Muslim politics is a seamless web, indistinguishable in its parts because of the 
natural and mutual interpretation of religion and politics.
68
 
 
That the din-wa-dawla assertion is unhelpful cannot be denied. As already 
noted in this chapter, Muslim politics is not so unique that it fails or failed to 
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interact and integrate with international systems now and through history. But 
the other points raised by Eickelman and Piscatori are not so easily 
substantiated. The Orientalist problem is interesting as this is not a problem that 
cannot be overcome; ‘inadvertent’ ignorance is not a problem of the din-wa-
dawla position, but of students of political Islam and as such is not a criticism 
that can be levied towards the position itself. In addition, it was noted earlier 
there is something distinct about Islamic politics, but whether that leads to 
difference and an Orientalist understanding remains to be seen. Indeed, 
Eickelman and Piscatori’s criticisms of the din-wa-dawla position radiates with 
assumptions about secular rationality, “that Muslim politics, unlike other politics, 
are not guided by rational, interest based calculations”69, suffers itself from a 
problematic assumption; why can a synthesis of religion and politics not be 
rational and interest based? The third part of Eickelman and Piscatori’s criticism 
is the most interesting of all. That a combination of religion and politics that is 
indistinguishable of its separate parts is an issue at all highlights some of the 
limits of IR.  Din-wa-dawla Islamists recognise little, if anything, which separates 
humanity other than faith. The state, that most fundamental of building blocks in 
IR, unacceptably divides the unity of believing Muslims and so is problematic to 
such Islamists. This is presumably one of the types of the inseparability of 
religion and politics that Eickelman and Piscatori allude to with their final 
criticism of din-wa-dawla adherents, and is one that previous work has tried to 
overcome by analysing how Islamism might be conceived in such a way as to 
‘fit’ seamlessly with the discipline of IR, notably in James Piscatori’s work Islam 
in a World of Nation States.70 Rather than assume that secular rationality is 
inherently superior to a religious rationality, as Eickelman and Piscatori seem to 
do, this chapter will instead proceed by critiquing the din-wa-dawla position as 
being theologically unsound, as defined by Islamic precedent itself rather than a 
comparison to Western understandings of politics and religion. The thesis will 
save further discussion on the nature of secular rationality in IR for the following 
chapter, which will deal explicitly with the analytical framework employed. 
 If the call to Islam is not totally congruous with politics it is because unlike 
more spiritual elements of the religion which are explicitly dealt with in the 
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Qur’an and sunna (catalogued sayings and practices of the Prophet 
Muhammed), politics and other such ‘worldly’ matters are not. With regards to 
Qur’anic guidance, the Qur’an comments on the nature of political community; 
in chapter 49, verse 13, it says that God had “made you as nations and tribes 
so that you may come to know each other”.71 Another far more explicit excerpt 
states that “if God had willed, He would have made them one community”.72 
This could be interpreted as either, ‘He would have made the Muslims one 
community’ or ‘He would have made humanity one community’. Either way, the 
meaning is explicit when applied to political unity. But of course the Qur’an, like 
historical precedent, can be interpreted to support both those who do and do 
not conform to the practice of the state. For example, a non-conformist, din-wa-
dawla position which would argue that the state system is one that 
unacceptably divides the Muslim community can cite chapter 3, verse 103, 
which commands believers to “hold fast all together the rope which Allah 
stretches out for you, and be not divided among yourselves”.73 
Regarding the sunna and its relation to Islamic law, during the Prophet’s 
time guidance on politics was not an issue as the Muslim community then could 
seek divine guidance on such matters. The need to codify law was mute when 
the Prophet held de facto authority (which de jure was vested in God) on 
religion. Religious law, shari’a, only coalesced approximately 100 years after 
the death of Prophet Muhammed.74 Islamic law, then, is developed through 
readings of the Qur’an, the sunna, qiyas (analogy) and ijma’ (consensus). This 
is a system that was developed by Imam Shafi’i in the ninth century AD but later 
was adopted by all Sunni Muslims. When referring to Sunni Muslims the theses 
is referring to the four schools (madhahib) of Sunni orthodoxy, the Hanifi, Maliki, 
Shafi'i and Hanbali schools, named after Abu Hanifa, Malik, al-Shafi'i, and Ibn 
Hanbal respectively. The first of these madhahib, that of Abu Hanifa, was 
formed in the eighth century AD and the last, that of Ibn Hanbal, near the end of 
the ninth century.75 In the time immediately after the death of the Prophet each 
provincial capital was itself a seat of learning, leading to differences in doctrine 
                                            
71
 Qur'an, 49:13 
72
 Ibid. 48:48 
73
 Ibid. 3:103 
74
 Rahman, Fazlur: Islam, pg. 43 
75
 Ibid. pg. 81-83 
26 
 
between Mecca, Basra, Kufa and Medina and so on; each of these cities could 
conceivably have possessed their own madhab and orthodoxy.76  
Eventually, in the ninth century AD, geographical location lost its 
importance and instead allegiance to a teacher became the way one would 
associate with a madhab.77 There is no play for dominance between these 4 
madhahib and all are considered orthodox in their views. Matters of ritual, 
prayer and the like are explicitly covered in the Qur'an and sunna and so 
differences between the madhahib on these matters are negligible. In other, 
more 'worldly' matters, the madhahib represent mere interpretations and 
extrapolations of the principles found in the Qur'an. The madhahib cannot and 
do not claim to be as authoritative as the word of the Qur'an and so each can 
accept the others as legitimate interpretations of the same source text. This is 
easily explained by remembering that the Qur'an “is primarily a book of religious 
and moral principles and exhortations, and is not a legal document”. 78 
Conversely, advocates of din-wa-dawla would “claim to speak for a univocal 
body of legislation which is not grounded in the vast historical experience of 
Muslims... [and] also speak in terms of explicit and demonstrable commands 
deriving from scriptural statements”.79 That the ‘singular’ stand point of Sunni 
orthodoxy is itself comprised of four different perspectives points to the fallacy 
of a univocal body of legislation, as din-wa-dawla advocates would claim.  
When the period of the rashidun passed there was still “no fully 
developed system of doctrine or law”80 and only then did theological divisions in 
Islam begin to appear, the emergence of the Kharijite sect during the time of the 
last rashid, Ali, being a notable exception.81 Piscatori in Islam in a World of 
Nation States argues that the presence of theological division marks the 
practice of Muslim polities acknowledging territorial pluralism, even if the dogma 
of some (din-wa-dawla) would reject it. Speaking of theological tradition, Van 
Ess observes that for Muslims, “orthopraxy is more important than orthodoxy”82, 
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a point that Piscatori forwards to highlight the validity of ijma’ al-fi’l, consensus 
of action, understood here as an approximate term to historical precedent. 
 That there is the urge for Muslims to unite, either a unity amongst 
themselves or amongst all of humanity, does not take away from the fact, which 
Piscatori defends, of “the actual non-universality of the Islamic community, and 
thus of ideological and political – and perhaps territorial – divisions”.83 Evidence 
for such plurality is not exclusively historical.  What is apparent with both 
historical precedent and Qur’anic guidance is how inconclusive such arguments 
are when relating to the state and IR. Evidence for both sides of the debate can 
be found, and the weight of evidence only begins to fall on the side of state 
conformists the further away from the Prophet’s time examples are drawn. For 
this reason the chapter argues that history does not actually form any precedent 
as far as din-wa-dawla adherents are concerned; if examples of plurality and 
realpolitik cannot be found in the Prophet’s time then for these ideologues the 
argument is already won. To cite Umayyad, Abbasid, and Ottoman examples of 
plurality, as for example Piscatori does, only strengthens the argument of non-
conformists that after the time of the Prophet the Muslim community has gone 
astray. This chapter would echo such a sentiment, though not to the extent that 
din-wa-dawla advocates do; calls for an Islamic polity united by the same 
call to faith as experienced during the Prophet Muhammed’s time are doomed 
to fail as with no definitive dogma to guide Islamic politics one must ask: To 
which Islam should such a polity adhere?  
There certainly exists a core concept of faith which Sunni orthodoxy and 
even Shi’a and Wahhabi creeds can adhere to. This core would centre around 
the basic tenants of the faith, commonly referred to as the ‘5 pillars’ of Islam; 
Belief in God and his Prophet Muhammed; prayer; fasting; charity; and 
pilgrimage. With this limited unity in mind Pakistani founder of the jamaat-e-
Islami, Maulana Maududi, comments that the Shari’a is not a method of 
governance but rather “has always aimed at bringing together mankind into one 
moral and spiritual frame-work”.84 The political lies beyond the unifying spiritual 
framework that Maududi mentions, and so rather than asking to which Islam an 
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Islamic polity should call to, the correct question would be to which political 
Islam the call should be made?  
The Third Perspective: Normative Political Islam 
Accepting then that political Islam is distinct from Islam-as-faith, then politics is 
not an articulation of the faith, as din-wa-dawla ideologues would have it. Rather, 
political Islam is the pursuit of politics that adheres to Islamic norms and values 
and facilitates the practice of the religion. What this signals for the argument of 
the thesis is a distinction between Islam-as-faith and Islam-as-politics. The 
former references the link a believer might have to the transcendental, the 
articles of faith. The latter refers to the practice of politics, which is argued to fall 
outside of the explicit guidance of Islam-as-faith, but might still influence and be 
influenced by faith, depending on interpretation. In this way, political Islam may 
well be wholly compatible with the international system if interpreted as such. 
Equally, political Islam could present an alternative to the international system 
as it stands, if it is possible to interpret it in that way. The distinction between 
Islam-as-faith and Islam-as-politics is one that the thesis will return to and 
elaborate further in chapter 3, Sovereignty and Normative Political Islam. For 
now, this chapter continues by returning the discussion to IR, and discussing 
the unit of analysis in the discipline, and its relationship to the unit of analysis in 
Normative Political Islam’s IR, that is, the relationship between the umma and 
the state. 
Driven by their ideological world view of how the world should be, some 
political Islamists take issue with the structure of the international system, 
especially the centrality of the state. For them, Islam sees little that divides 
persons except faith. In this world view political association to a state which 
divides the unity of believing Muslims is problematic. Their solution: the umma, 
typical of Medieval Islam, whereby one is affiliated to a political construct based 
on their faith. The umma, then, is distinct from the ‘Islamic state’, which 
articulates itself in the language of any secular state, having no ‘Islamic’ 
character on the world stage; Arab/Muslim states having, by-and-large, 
accepted the existing juridic and political state system.85 So Political Islam, in 
regards to the umma/state discussion, is “an attempt to link religion by way of 
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resisting it – political Islam is thus still on the whole a protest movement (with 
the partial exception of Iran)”.86 In asking how the umma might interact on the 
international stage this thesis posits the umma as a different form of political 
affiliation than the Islamic state, and the two should not be confused in this 
exposition.  
Nazih Ayubi describes the European state as having developed through 
individualism, law and justice while the Islamic equivalent, in contrast, 
developed on justice, group and leadership.87 These are small differences to 
Ayubi who proceeds to analyse the umma as an equivalent to the state. Rather, 
the umma will be argued in this section to be an alternative to the state. The 
form of affiliation in the umma is based on notions of community (rule over 
people), which is traditionally what the word umma denotes. The modern state, 
conversely, is based on territorial boundaries as formulated by Weber’s 
definition of the state. Islamic tradition, however, makes little distinction over 
territory and instead focuses on individuals. Khadduri’s classic work, War and 
Peace in the Law of Islam, explains how the shari’a bound a community, not 
territory; “the legal position of a territory would depend on the allegiance of its 
people to Islam, not a mere proclamation that it belongs to Islam”.88  
Often used to justify the particularity of the umma is verse 143, chapter 2 
of the Qur’an, in which God proclaims: “Thus have we made you an umma 
justly balanced, that you might be witnesses over the nations, and the 
Messenger a witness over yourselves”.89 In this verse the word umma is used in 
contrast to nations or peoples, nas, highlighting the difference between the two 
concepts. In reference to the contemporary world, the thesis can note the that 
umma might be articulated in any number of ways: from Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) resembling, perhaps, a global network of mosques, to 
global media activity, to state controlled articulation by way of ‘Islamic states’, to 
finally the re-emergence of the Caliphate.90 The list offered here is in no way 
exhaustive, but represents different points on a spectrum wherein ‘spiritual’ 
articulations of the umma are placed at one extreme and ‘political’ articulations 
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at the other extreme. Such a spectrum is not ideal, as it embraces a rather 
arbitrary separation of the spiritual from the political, again foreshadowing the 
discussion of secularism in IR to follow in the next chapter. What the spectrum 
does allow is the discussion of the umma as a unit of political affiliation, and 
firmly place this discussion in the remit of IR. As a unit of political affiliation, the 
umma does not have a separate body of law but rather is an extension of law 
regarding Muslim – non-Muslim interaction, further emphasising the importance 
of rule over people not territory. Khadduri states that “[s]trictly speaking, there is 
no Muslim law of nations in the sense of the distinction between modern 
municipal (national) law and international law bases on different sources and 
maintained by different sanctions”.91 
In this way the chapter designates an umma as a community of believers 
who are bound by the laws of that community irrespective of territorial 
boundaries. It is in this manner that Christians and Jews who partook of 
alcoholic drinks in Muslim territory during the Ottoman period, an otherwise 
punishable act for Muslims, as long as this was not done in public, were 
committing no offence as they were instead bound by the rules of their own 
communities.92 Conversely the state, as derived from the Peace of Westphalia, 
defines itself on the notion of territorial sovereignty 93  and in this very 
fundamental way differs from the umma which has, in theory, no such notion.  
Presuming that the units which constitute political Islam’s concept of the 
international sphere are ummas, not nation-states, then is it necessary for 
political Islam to develop a more substantive theory of international relations, or 
find a place to ‘fit’ within the current discipline? This is a question that the thesis 
will come back to in the next section of the chapter. For now, it is enough to 
have established that one of the centres of contention between Normative 
Political Islam and the current international system is the distinction between 
state and umma. However, this challenge at the international sphere also holds 
challenges for the dominant epistemology and ontology that IR is based upon.94 
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For example the umma, which does not respect territorial boundaries but rather 
communal affiliation over individual liberty, has to address the dominance of 
liberal individualism in IR. As the interplay between secularism and the 
discipline of IR will be discussed in the following chapter, for now the chapter 
will briefly explain the entry point of the discussion of liberalism and political 
Islam, a discussion that is returned to in more depth in chapter 3 and beyond. 
A ‘traditional’ (Orientalist) view of Islam’s incompatibility with liberalism is, 
unfortunately, still common place. This view sees Islam as inherently illiberal, 
due to some undefined yet all powerful characteristic within the faith.95 Gregory 
Gause describes this uninformed yet prevalent position on the politics of the 
Middle East as the idea that: 
 
[T]ribalism and Islam lead to a number of consequences for the political process: 
institutions are meaningless, as all politics are personal; the forms of rule which 
exist now in these states have existed for hundreds of years, if not from time 
immemorial; political participation is not a serious issue; political loyalty is given and 
withdrawn on the basis of religious criteria.
96  
 
Josef Van Ess puts it more succinctly when he states that to the norms of the 
liberal state Islam is popularly considered to be “repellent and strange... The 
notion commonly associated with it is the Sharia... which would seem to be 
incompatible with the rules of enlightened reason”. 97  To such assumptions 
Richard Bulliet replies that Islam has always been a mode of resisting despotic 
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rule, a type of rule which existed in the Middle East long before the trauma of 
colonialism, though he admits, “[t]he merest glance at the history of the Islamic 
Middle East reveals that, in fact, Islam did not effectively prevent despotism”.98 
Regardless, Islam was still a site for protest, and continues to be in the present 
day. The problem, as Bulliet sees it, is that Islam has not dealt with the realities 
of power, as a resistance movement it is defined by what it is not, but has not 
articulated sufficiently what it stands for.99  
Islamism in command of the powers of the state is the unknown that is 
feared and assumed to be inherently despotic. For Sami Zubaida this comes as 
little surprise, for while religion has been stripped of much of its authority and 
social functions in ‘modern’ societies, it remains one of the most persistent 
markers of identity and difference.100 It is little wonder to Zubaida that Islam is 
thus perceived as inherently problematic in the Western world, as it is religion 
and the religious ‘other’ must be different to ‘us’, must be illiberal. The 
assumption that religion, as a marker of difference, is necessarily problematic, 
will begin to be discussed in the final section of the chapter dealing with the 
liberal individualism and the umma. More broadly, the theme of difference in IR 
and how it is conceptualised and then managed is one the thesis will return to 
throughout. Currently, the chapter turns once more to the international sphere 
and specific IR studies of the Middle East, in order to outline the problems that 
IR has in accounting for Islam in its analysis.  
IR Applied to Islam in Middle East Region 
This section of the chapter will highlight the problematic ways religion is (not) 
accounted for in the discipline of IR. Such analysis is a critique of theory, 
dubbed meta-theory, which is distinct to IR theorising on the dynamics of the 
international system. As Alexander Wendt explains:  
 
The objective of this type of theorizing [meta-theoretical] is also to increase our 
understanding of world politics, but it does so indirectly by focusing on the 
                                            
98
 Bulliet, Richard: "Twenty Years of Islamic Politics", (Middle East Journal, Vol.  53, No. 2, 
1999), pg. 192, original emphasis 
99
 Ibid. pg. 196 
100
 Zubaida, Sami: Beyond Islam: A New Understanding of the Middle East, (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2011), pg. 3 
33 
 
ontological and epistemological issues of what constitute important or legitimate 
questions and answers for IR scholarship, rather than on the structure and 
dynamics of the international system per se.
101
  
 
As such, the thesis acknowledges that the ramifications for IR studies in not 
accounting for religion may not affect its analyses of the international system in 
any substantive way (though this depends on the nature of that analysis, as will 
be demonstrated). The stronger claim the thesis can lay claim to, is to highlight 
the way in which certain questions around the nature and influence of religion in 
IR are not considered.  
There are only a handful of IR treatments of the Middle East, all of which 
broadly fall under five methodological categories: Marxist; Realist, English 
School, Constructivist; and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), with cross cutting 
approaches between these categories. The chapter will here will argue that the 
treatment of religion in all these approaches is lacking for two main reasons. 
Firstly, an Orientalist misunderstanding of Islam and its relationship to society 
often leads to the idea that Islam is equivalent to despotism. Secondly, and 
demanding a more reflexive understanding of IR, is the problem of overly 
materialistic or statist accounts of Middle East politics. The studies of this latter 
category are less problematic regarding an Orientalist understanding of Islam, 
but instead reinforce a post-colonial legacy of Westphalian politics, as outlined 
by Kayaoglu in the journal article, Westphalian Eurocentrism in International 
Relations Theory.102 These are two criticisms that will recur numerous times as 
the chapter moves through the broad methodological and epistemological 
boundaries of IR scholarship of the Middle East. 
Marxist Inspired Study of the Middle East 
Of the two studies broadly categorised as Marxist in epistemology if not 
methodology, Simon Bromley’s Rethinking Middle East Politics will be 
considered first. Bromley is very aware and critical of theory that derives from 
analyses of Europe a set of categories, and then applies these to the rest of the 
world. In this way, he holds up Karl Marx’s methodology as avoiding this 
                                            
101
 Wendt, Alexander: "Bridging the theory/meta-theory gap in international relations", (Review 
of International Studies, Vol.  17, No. 4, 1991), pg. 383 
102
 Kayaoglu, Turan: "Westphalian Eurocentrism" 
34 
 
problem, “it does not begin by privileging Western societies and then move on 
to explain non-Western development as a deviation. Rather, it applies a 
common methodology of explanation to all social orders”. 103  Bromley 
wholeheartedly endorses Edward Said’s critique of Orientalism but rather than 
try to take a more nuanced and specific definition of terms like Islam, he would 
emphasise the less abstract and historically precise “social relations and 
material practices that constitute and transform societies”. 104  In essence, 
Bromley seeks to avoid the ‘problem’ of cultural explanations by tying them to 
material ones and making them one and the same; as a result, “Islam remains 
rooted in broader sets of social and material practices, and thus its changing 
forms must also be related to the historically given organization of economy and 
polity”.105 Such an account of religion over emphasises material concerns,106 
and denies the way in which ideas can affect the behaviour of agents in ways 
that might be in contrast to their material interests.  
Furthermore, as Bromley takes on board Said’s critique of Orientalism 
and emphasises the internal divisions of Islam, this becomes another reason for 
Islam to be neglected as a focus for analysis. Curiously, a lack of unifying 
nature means Islam cannot act as “a cultural form operating to block other 
social and historical determinations”,107 the assumption being that if it were a 
unified concept, it might have more of an interaction with material interests. This 
is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, while there are a plethora of Islamic 
sects or schools of thoughts, even between the largest schism, that of the Sunni 
and Shi’a divide, there is a certain continuity of the basic articles of faith (the 
shahadda, declaration of faith). This continuity is largely abstract and theoretical, 
as in practice affiliation to different schools of thought has concrete implications, 
notably represented in recent times by competition for ‘leadership’ of the 
Palestinian struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia.108 Regardless, Bromley is 
incorrect in asserting that there is no unity in the faith, and is unspecific as to 
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the degree of unity needed, and in what areas, before Islam can take a more 
constitutive place in his theory. Secondly, that Islam has geographical and 
theological differences does not mean that religion centred around different 
seats of learning, for example, could not have a more substantial effect on the 
material or social reality of people in the Middle East. ‘Islam’ may not be precise 
enough a term to chart such influence, but maybe the ‘Islam of Baghdad’ had 
considerable influence on the peoples and policies emanating from this historic 
seat of power. Likewise the ‘Islam of Damascus’, ‘Islam of Andalusia’, ‘Islam of 
Fatimid Egypt’ and so on and so forth, surely had a more specific role on a 
specifically defined geographical area, than Bromley gives credit for.  
The second Marxist inspired approach, broadly defined, is that of Fred 
Halliday’s book, The Middle East in International Relations. Like Bromley, 
Halliday emphasises the material interests of actors. However, Halliday takes a 
more nuanced position than Bromley with regards to Islam. Islam is rarely 
directly referenced as it falls under ideology and culture, as defined by Halliday. 
However he goes to great pains to emphasise that timeless terms like Islam or 
an ‘Arab mind’ are not accurate descriptions of such culture or ideology; “[i]t is 
rather a matter of how, under modern political and social conditions, states, 
elites, whole political systems come to operate in broadly similar ways, in other 
words, how they are moulded by modernity and regional context alike”.109 Here 
Halliday identifies the erroneous ways in which Islam has been invoked in 
previous scholarship, and in his effort to avoid similar mistakes, like Bromley, he 
incorporates Islam into other material and social factors effectively subsuming 
Islam into categories of analysis far more comfortable for his historical 
sociological approach, rather than deal with Islam on its own basis, that is, an 
ideology that helps constitute the realities of its believers. In Halliday’s own 
words, “[i]t is often mistaken to assume that a difference of position within the 
international system is necessarily equated with difference of cultural 
perspective”.110  
Halliday leans towards material analysis as the impact of ideas and 
beliefs are, for him, related to understanding in terms of ‘perception’, and 
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distinct from objective, ‘real’ criteria. While a balance must be struck between 
the two, as invariably the perceptions of actors affects their reality, Halliday is 
too cautious about approaches that emphasise ideology, namely Constructivism; 
he explains: “Constructivism and its outriders run the risk of ignoring state 
interests and material factors, let alone old-fashioned deception and self-
delusion”. 111  With this criticism in mind, the chapter will now move to two 
broadly Constructivist analyses of international relations in the Middle East. 
Constructivist Inspired Study of the Middle East 
Two main studies stand out in this category; Michael Barnett’s Dialogues in 
Arab Politics and Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett’s edited volume Identity 
and Foreign Policy in the Middle East. A third work by Gregory F. Gause, Oil 
Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States, also 
runs contrary to the systemic tendencies of Marxist based theories though he 
does not argue an explicitly Constructivist epistemology. Barnett’s solo work 
has more exposition on the Constructivist method than that found in the other 
two works, so this section will begin with Dialogues in Arab Politics. Barnett 
explains that: 
  
Building on various strands of sociological theory, constructivism posits that the 
actions of states, like individuals, take on meaning and shape within a normative 
context, that their interactions construct and transform their normative 
arrangements, that these norms can in turn shape their identity and interests, and 
that the “problem of order” is usually solved through social negotiations and a 
mixture of coercion and consent.
112
 
 
A Constructivist approach places much more emphasis on process rather than 
structure in explaining behaviour. The move away from structure distances 
Constructivism from more Marxist inspired theory, which classically focuses on 
a global structure which allows the continuity of a “universal History”.113  
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The lack of focus on structure leads Barnett to completely relegate Islam 
out of his analysis of inter-state behaviour in the Middle East. Indeed, the term 
‘Islam’ appears only 3 times in the index of his book. Unlike the work of Halliday 
and Bromley, who subsume Islam into structural factors in their analysis, 
Barnett explicitly ignores political Islam, as for him its primary challenge is to the 
domestic level rather than the regional or international level.114 This reading of 
political Islam can be linked to the lack of structural focus in Constructivism; by 
paying little heed to structure Barnett is unable to see that when he argues that 
political Islam is preoccupied with the domestic, as this is the sphere which it is 
able to influence, it is in fact the structure of the international system and of IR 
scholarship that ensures that political Islam does not challenge the international 
sphere. Political Islam does compete in the international sphere through the 
concept of the umma (vs. state), as argued in the first part of the chapter. 
However the challenge is hard to articulate without reference to the structure of 
the international system and scholarship, namely the Westphalian narrative, 
which Barnett cannot attempt due to his inability, or unwillingness, to account 
for structure in his Constructivist approach. 
Moving to Telhami and Barnett’s work, the focus is still on Constructivist 
methods, but more nuance is applied to the apparent rejection of systemic 
analysis. Telhami and Barnett state that the prevalence of identity politics in the 
Middle East region helped to make the region seem unique to scholars. 
Systemic IR theory removes the ‘uniqueness’ of the region, allowing IR to 
ostensibly explain it, and this is the reason Telhami and Barnett use to explain 
the popularity of systemic IR analyses of the region.  What separates Telhami 
and Barnett from the dangers of cultural and narrative based explanations of the 
Middle East is the constitutive nature of culture that they constantly 
emphasise.115 Rather than a monolithic Islam or a peculiar and standardised 
‘Arab mind’, the authors emphasise the fact that terms such as Islam or 
                                                                                                                                
interests. However, by and large such a perspective has not had bearing on Marxist study of the 
Middle East. 
114
 Barnett, Michael: Dialogues in Arab Politics, pg. 22-23 
115
 Telhami, Shibley and Barnett, Michael: "Introduction: Identity and Foreign Policy in the 
Middle East", in Telhami, Shibley and Barnett, Michael, (eds.): Identity and Foreign Policy in the 
Middle East, (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2002), pg. 18 
38 
 
Arabism do not have a causal standing in the behaviour of Arab states, but 
“conditions the possible and the actual”.116 
While Constructivist theory affords much more space and power to the 
world of ideas, Telhami and Barnett struggle to separate and define clearly the 
difference between religion, culture and identity. In actuality very little attempt is 
made to understand religion except as related to culture, and then primarily only 
as a reaction to the forces of globalisation. 117  The lack of Constructivist 
theorising on religion highlights where future research might go, and certainly 
an application of Constructivist theory to political Islam will be central to this 
thesis. However, space must be made for a political Islam (in the form of the 
umma) on the international level, which can only be done after recognising and 
deconstructing the structures in place that reinforce the narrative of states in 
international relations. Acknowledgment of systems in this way can be dubbed 
as ‘soft’ Constructivism. Such theory does not ignore the state or material 
interests, as Halliday feared, but rather “the environment in which agents/states 
take action is social as well as material”.118 Such a view acknowledges the 
material focus of systemic theory, but seeks to supplement it rather than 
displace it. This synthesis of material factors and Constructivist theory is 
apparent in Gregory Gause’s work. In Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security 
Challenges in the Arab Gulf States, Gause demonstrates a far more developed 
understanding of Islam as a factor, divorced from culture, which has bearing 
upon politics. 
Briefly, Gause claims the constitutive role of Islam (to which he ascribes 
a level of social and political constructivism) is reliant upon the state; “the 
institutions of Islam are now much more dependent upon the state, and much 
more a subordinate part of the state apparatus, than was the case in the 
past”. 119  Gause describes Islam as ‘tamed’, and as such it becomes an 
important part of the state, “providing institutional support and ideological 
legitimation”.120 In this way Gause is emphasising that the role Islam plays in 
Muslim countries is by no means politically unimportant, as other Constructivist 
                                            
116
 Ibid. pg. 7 
117
 Ibid. 1-13 
118
 Checkel, Jeffery: "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory", (World Politics, 
Vol.  50, No. 2, 1998), pg. 325 
119
 Gause, Gregory: Oil Monarchies, pg. 11 
120
 Ibid. pg. 14 
39 
 
theorists would have it. Neither is Islam purely a contest on the domestic level, 
as ideological competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, involving the concept 
of political Islam, has regional implications in the Persian Gulf, for example.121 
The interplay between political Islam and the state is what is important, the fact 
the state attempts to control the meaning of political Islam as a method of 
legitimising its rule does not mean that the concept is not contested. That this 
contestation is possible is testament to the power of Social Constructivism, and 
the interplay between the power of ideas and the power of material concerns. 
Further analysis of Constructivist theory at large will be found in the next 
chapter which develops the analytical framework of the thesis. Presently, the 
chapter returns to another study of the Middle East which constitutes somewhat 
of a fusion between the two approaches already mentioned, Constructivism and 
Marxism. 
Roger Owen’s State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern 
Middle East endeavours to analyse state-society relationships in the Middle 
East, and this emphasis on the dynamics of state-society interaction is why it is 
placed loosely in a Marxist tradition. While Middle Eastern states appear to 
function like European states, Owen argues that in most cases Middle Eastern 
states have quite different relationships with their citizens, which then affects 
their behaviour. 122  The Constructivist influence is apparent with Owen’s 
emphasis on identity. Like Telhami and Barnett, Owen ties up religion with 
identity, but distinguishes it from culture. Rather, religion has a prominent place 
in the building of the state as it is “inextricably involved with central questions of 
identity and of communal values”. 123  He applies some depth to his 
understanding of religion, identifying that it is not religious experience, theology, 
or law that is relevant, only those aspects of the religious that provide “motives 
and programmes for political action”.124 This is important as the thesis moves 
forward, as the distinction between Islam-as-faith and political Islam is a 
distinction which holds the key to the applicability of a transnational Islamic 
umma, while a transnational faith or theology remains impossible. Additionally, 
Owen identifies the problem political Islam has in defining itself in oppositional 
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terms; in doing so he reinforces Bulliet’s notion that Islam in power is an 
unknown entity, with some notable exceptions like the wilayat al-faqih of Iran, 
Hamas in Gaza, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Omar al-Bashir and Hassan al-
Turabi’s implementation of shari’a in the north of Sudan, and most recently the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda government in Tunisia. As Owen 
states: 
  
[T]here is a general air of uncertainty about what a Muslim, or Jewish, polity would 
look like. And this in turn helps to explain some of the widespread opposition to 
religious movements which might conceivably seize state power without anyone 
being able to know in advance how exactly they would put it to use.
125
 
 
Owen’s approach is a positive step forward, acknowledging structural factors 
more than Constructivist theory, yet taking heed of the power of ideas to shape 
reality more so than classical Marxist oriented theory. However, Owen still 
operates within a bounded reality whereby the state as a unit of analysis on the 
international stage is uncontested. He comments that for Islamists, “the gap 
between religion and politics, religion and the state, impiously opened up by 
Western interference, had to be closed without delay”.126 Here is the implicit 
assumption that the wish to close the gap between religion and politics is the 
quest to close the gap between religion and state. The question of the state’s 
significance to religion, to Islam, is not even present. This is a fundamental 
problem of IR scholarship which the chapter will return to later. 
Theoretical Pluralism: FPA and Realist Inspired Study of the Middle East 
The remaining IR works applied to the Middle East region adopt a theoretically 
pluralist approach, incorporating much of what has already mentioned, 
alongside more FPA and Realist theory. The first study is that of Gerd 
Nonneman’s edited volume titled Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and 
the Relationships with Europe. Nonneman describes his approach as 
theoretically eclectic, though his emphasis remains on FPA which “must be 
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multi-level and multi-causal, as well as contextual”.127 Nonneman’s use of three 
levels of analysis, domestic, regional and international, allows him to 
incorporate the structural or systemic theories of Marxist inspired theory at the 
international level, while giving credence to the constitutive power of ideologies 
and religion at the domestic and regional levels. 128  Islam is rendered as a 
transnational ideological issue, and thus only becomes a foreign policy 
determinant on the regional level. Its power has reduced as state identities have 
consolidated, but much in the same vein as Gause, Nonneman states that 
“[n]ever the less, [Islam] may become more problematic in times of crisis, not 
least because of popular pressure”.129  Most interestingly, Nonneman begins 
suggest a possible bias in IR and FPA scholarship regarding North-South 
politics. This bias sets the agenda for study as ‘Euro-MENA (Middle East and 
North Africa)’ relations, for example, while the other perspective of ‘MENA-Euro’ 
relations remains neglected. The opportunity teased at here, which will be 
examined in this thesis, is identifying the reason why political Islam does not 
play out at the international level of analysis. The chapter will argue that the 
answer is a by-product of the North-South relationship which Nonneman is 
referring to, in this instance played out through a Westphalian narrative that 
perpetuates the state as the only form of social organisation on the international 
level.  
Louise Fawcett’s edited volume, International Relations of the Middle 
East, echoes the critique of Western-centric scholarship of the Middle East 
made by Nonneman. Fawcett remarks, optimistically, that “International 
Relations scholarship has increasingly freed itself from its Western origins: it 
has slowly become ‘globalized’, with more and more critical voices getting 
heard”. 130  Unfortunately, like Nonneman, she unwittingly reinforces this 
Western-centric view by failing to recognise the foreign systems of influence 
that prop up the state system in the Middle East, instead naïvely stating that 
“[d]espite its contested, and at times fluid properties, the state system in the 
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Middle East has proved remarkable for its survival and durability”. 131  Barry 
Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez’s edited book, International Society and the 
Middle East also adopts a problematic take on the perceived ‘neutrality’ of the 
international system (of states), when applied to the Middle East. This work 
broadly identifies as an application of the English School of International 
Relations to a regional subsystem, in the tradition of Buzan’s revival of the 
English School in recent years. Unlike Fawcett, however, the neutrality of the 
state system in Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez’s work is not an unspoken 
assumption but is actively argued in Halliday’s contribution, in the first chapter 
of International Society and the Middle East, an argument the chapter turns to 
presently.  
Initially it would seem that much of the nuance of Halliday’s The Middle 
East in International Relations carries over to his contribution to this English 
School treatment of the Middle East. For example, he talks about the double 
challenge in applying any paradigm to a specific region, whereby the theory 
must attempt to explain “a particular history, state or region”, but also see “how 
far this specific case… itself challenges the theory”.132 Halliday’s statement here, 
in a way, encapsulates the broad thrust of this thesis, an examination of the way 
political Islam challenges the IR theories used to explain it. However, while 
Halliday acknowledges the way in which pan-Islam might challenge territorially 
based analyses, he does not seek to explore how that challenge plays out with 
the English School. Rather, he pushes pan-Islam into a conceptual box that ‘fits’ 
within the state based analysis of the English School.133 Too much, Halliday 
claims, is made of religious and cultural difference; “[i]n no supposedly different 
cultural or religious context are such universal principles as the right of nations 
to self-determination or the sovereignty of states formally or even implicitly 
rejected”.134 It appears Halliday himself struggles to believe this statement, as 
later he contradicts himself when writing: 
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The European ‘state system’ did indeed spread across the world, but in large 
measure by defeating, subjugating, forming and deforming the societies and polities 
with which it came into contact. The difficulties the modern world has with the non-
European world are, therefore, not the result of an incomplete spread of 
Westphalian values, or the resistance of undemocratic, or Islamic, or Asiatic 
societies and polities to democratic values, but to the very character, and violence, 
of that spread itself.
135
 
 
The two positions shown here, between on the one hand an assertion that the 
spread of the state system is unproblematic, resting on universally accepted 
principles of sovereignty and self-determination, and on the other hand an 
acknowledgement that the spread of these ‘universal’ principles involved 
violence, are ones that this English School treatment of the Middle East 
struggles to reconcile. Halliday attempts to circumvent this tension by 
emphasising the difference between the state system that spread from Europe 
(which for him is universally acceptable), and the nature of that spread, referring 
to, presumably, the violence associated with colonisation and decolonisation 
which gave birth to many of the states in the Middle East. Without further study 
as to the relationship between the use violence and coercion involved in the 
spread of the state system, and the nature of the system itself, the assertion 
that there is a qualitative difference between the two is somewhat weak, as it 
infers that violence in the spread of the system has no wider bearing on the 
normative grounding of that system. Put another way, Halliday’s emphasis on 
the distinction between the spread of the system and the nature of the system, 
reads as a belief that ‘yes coercion was regrettable, but those Middle Eastern 
states would have adopted the same system on their own eventually. Now that 
they have adopted the state system it affirms the universality of the system.’ 
Regardless of the narrative Halliday uses to inform his history of the state 
system, he is accepting that Islam bears little relevance to the international 
system. Before the chapter moves onto establishing some of the commonalities 
between all the surveyed applications of IR theories to the Middle East, this 
section will analyse one final case, that of Hinnebusch and Ehteshami’s edited 
work, The Foreign Policies of Middle East States. 
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Hinnebusch defines his approach as a modified Realism; “Realist 
solutions to the problem of order remain more relevant in the Middle East than 
elsewhere because… transnational norms restraining interstate conduct are the 
least institutionalized there”. 136  The reason a modified Realism is used by 
Hinnebusch is an acknowledgement of the particular circumstances Middle 
Eastern states were established in, after the First World War. Given the 
arbitrary nature of state boundaries, irredentism, “dissatisfaction with the 
incongruity between territorial borders and “imagined communities””, 137  is 
especially prevalent in the Middle East, though it is by no means a phenomenon 
unique to the region. Hinnebusch observes that the “state system was imposed 
on a pre-existing cultural and linguistic unity that more or less persists”;138 more 
explicitly put, he is saying that the existence of a pre-existing trans-national 
identity, whether it be an Arab or Islamic one, combined with a legitimacy deficit 
for Middle Eastern states, requires Realism to adapt; the peculiar dynamics of 
irredentism in the Middle East frustrates the national interest traditionally 
assumed by Realism. 
Unfortunately, Islam is not dealt with as a religion that helps constitute 
the reality of its believers. Instead it is treated as a surrogate for Arabism,139 or 
is only mentioned as an oppositional force – opposing increased Western 
intervention in the Middle East. The problematic way in which Islam in perceived 
here is evident where the terms ‘Middle Eastern’ and ‘Islamic’ are used 
interchangeably; in doing so, Hinnebusch is not identifying, as Owen does, the 
ways in which Islam, even in the narrow confines of a trans-national ideology 
which Owen places it in, operates in different ways to culture. The adoption of a 
Realist epistemology and methodology, even modified ones, leads to an over 
emphasis of the power of the state, for ideas are only entertained that play 
within the boundaries and use the vocabulary of ‘the state’.  
Having reviewed the ways in which Islam is side lined or subsumed into 
material factors by existing IR scholarship of the Middle East, it becomes 
apparent that further study of Islam in IR requires a different or at least modified 
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analytical framework to adequately pay heed to the constitutive power of the 
faith. The development of this framework is the focus of the following chapter; 
for now, the next section will return to the underlying problem that Islam faces 
when articulated on the international level: the legacy and power of the state 
system. 
The Westphalian Narrative in International Relations Scholarship 
The study of the Middle East in IR, using as its unit of analysis the nation-state, 
demands that political Islam define itself in similar terms to be accepted by the 
discipline. Piscatori notes that Muslim elites were keen to accept and adopt the 
nation-state system as it granted them supposed immunity from external 
powers and legitimacy externally;140 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his reforms to 
the Turkish republic being a prime example. The concerns of greater Muslim 
unity paled in comparison to the threats faced by Imperial Europe. Put crudely, 
political Islam must ‘play the game’, at least a little, to be considered a 
‘legitimate’ theory.  
 Such a position of necessity is one echoed by Maududi, who while 
scornful of the nation-state, saw it as necessary for his native India to be able to 
gain independence from Great Britain. The nation-state however, was not to be 
an end point in and of itself. Instead, having achieved independence the Muslim 
states could begin to unify again without interference from colonial powers.141 
While the first part of his vision was realised, and independence was gained, 
the second phase never really materialised. Muslim states, as Ayubi notes, give 
no special treatment to fellow Muslim states, territorial sovereignty is adhered to 
and there is no preferential treatment between Muslim states in economic 
terms. 142  Given the advent of supranational organisations, especially, for 
example, the European Union (EU), it may be possible to talk of a European 
umma already existing. A group of nation-states in this instance united on 
common normative grounds (which would be the unity easiest achieved in a 
Muslim umma) as well as, substantially, economic and some judicial grounds. 
This being the case, is may be possible for a Muslim umma to coalesce from 
the state centric foundations in IR that have been evidenced in the preceding 
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review of IR studies of the Middle East, an assertion the thesis will explore in 
later chapters. 
 In the discipline of IR the predominance of power, self-interest and 
material factors often closes the doors to other, less well articulated themes in 
the relations of states. Globalization represents a contemporary challenge 
whereby “sovereignty and nation-states are undergoing severe delimitation and 
mutation”.143 Former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, wrote his 
now infamous Agenda for Peace in 1992, within which he highlights the 
predicament for the ‘old’ Westphalian ideal. He stated that:  
 
The foundation-stone of this work [maintenance of international peace and security] 
is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity 
are crucial to any common international progress. The time of absolute and 
exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed.
144
 
 
Rather than claim, as Boutros-Ghali did, that the time of absolute sovereignty 
has passed (if indeed it ever existed in practice), the starting point of this thesis 
is to recognise that at the least, the world exists in a period of flux; as notions of 
sovereignty are changing the opportunities for alternative theory are many, and 
the chance to bend conceptual boundaries and reshape the discipline, if only 
slightly, is far more achievable than was so when Maududi envisioned a Muslim 
umma sprouting from the various nationalistic projects at the end of Empire. 
Indeed, Mandaville’s assertion that “the authority of statist politics is currently 
under threat from a variety of... transformations which serve to disembed 
political identities from national contexts and also stretch social relations across 
time and space”145, reads almost exactly as the challenge the umma construct 
brings to IR.  
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The Legacy of Westphalia  
While the Western state system appears to be the dominant mould to conduct 
international relations, it is not the only instance of IR available for study. As 
such, it is worth analysing, briefly, how the state system became the prevailing 
instance of IR. Political modernity was achieved, so the story goes, with the 
advent of the modern state system, which coalesced in the seventeenth century 
with the Treaty of Westphalia. This development came with far more than the 
idea of territorial sovereignty; the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
saw “the birth of modern capitalism, modern science and technology and 
[Christian Protestantism]”.146 In this narrative of development, political modernity 
is seen as progression, “from the mythical to the scientific, from the barbaric to 
the rational/democratic, from the constrained, ordered subject to the utilitarian 
individual “free to choose””.147 Taking these binary distinctions as staple in IR, a 
community is looked down on that does not develop or articulate its politics in 
the mould that Europe did in the seventeenth century. Jim George speaks of the 
“post-Kantian sovereign man” 148  who represents the rationale for states in 
Hobbes’ anarchical world. For him, this is the moment where the absolute 
pursuit of rationalism, ‘logocentrism’, became embedded in Western thought.149 
This logocentrism is apparent in IR especially, which Assis Malaquias describes 
as “fundamentally a scientific attempt to explain – and, if possible, predict – the 
behavior of states in the complex relationships with each other”.150 Here the 
logocentrism is twofold: firstly is the emphasis on scientific explanation, and 
secondly is the emphasis on states, a far more subversive example which 
typifies the state-centrism in IR theory in broad terms, and Realism more 
specifically. As such, “the Kantian moment represents not just Enlightenment 
progress, potential, and openness but also devastating closure, the closure of 
critical, historical, and social reflection upon critiques, histories and societies”.151 
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Turan Kayaoglu argues that if the peace of Westphalia created an 
international society, it did so by creating a normative divergence between 
these ‘civilised’ states and the rest of the world; “[n]on European states, lacking 
this European culture and social contract, remained in anarchy until the 
European states allowed them to join the international society”.152 In this way, 
‘international relations’, with its suppositions about sovereignty and secularism, 
is not truly ‘international’. The legacy of Westphalia, perhaps, is the legacy of a 
lack of global pluralism in the discipline. IR, according to Kayaoglu, should 
abandon the Westphalian narrative for four reasons: 
1. It misrepresents the emergence of the modern international system. 
2. Its state centrism can lead to misdiagnoses of many aspects of IR. 
3. It prevents the theorising of cross civilisational interdependencies as 
many ‘international’ norms are posited as transcendental. 
4. It prevents the development of global pluralism in the discipline.153 
Points 3 and 4 are the most relevant to this thesis, as if the attempt at 
articulating an Islamic IR is to be attempted, a key component will be the ‘cross 
civilisational’ dialogue between, in this example, the state and umma. The term 
‘cross civilisational’ is problematic however as it resonates with essentialist 
character, which the chapter will now briefly explore. 
 Essentialism posits that there is an essential element to entities that 
“determine[s] or limit[s] the possibilities of their social and political 
developments”. 154  Oliver Roy critically summarises this essentialist view of 
Islam as a closed, specific and timeless system that is “the major obstacle 
prohibiting access to political modernity”.155 However Islam is an unsatisfactory 
term. It does not explain, for example, Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade 
Kuwait, so there is more than an ‘Islamic character’ at work in the Middle 
East. 156  Equally, there is no ‘West’ with which to grapple with, Western 
normative authority can emanate from Australia just as easily as it can from 
Europe or the American continent. The plurality of theorising within this 
normative block is also underplayed in Islamist literature. Bobby Sayyid’s 
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account of the War on Terror, is a prime example of this. Sayyid states that 
“[t]he crusade on Islam(ism) demonstrates the failure of legitimacy, and the 
difficulties Western cultural practices and values have in trying to pass 
themselves off as universal and natural”. 157  Here Sayyid’s use of the word 
crusade incorrectly lumps the entirety of ‘Western’ culture with the actions of 
Roman Catholics in the Middle Ages, giving that ‘timeless quality’ to the term 
that Roy criticises. Also, in claiming that Western cultural practices find no 
currency in Muslim countries, Sayyid also incorrectly depicts the two positions 
as zero-sum, all or nothing. While it is true that the struggle against the cultural 
dominance of the 'West' has found currency with the populations of many 
Middle Eastern, Muslim countries, this animosity is tempered by the fact that the 
governments in these countries still buy weapons, medicine and develop 
significant economic ties with Western states. 158  Often things are far more 
complex than Islamist writers may profess. One need not balk at the notion of 
‘Western’ cultural notions when there is nothing intrinsic to many of these 
notions that prevent the practice of the religion of Islam. 
 That is not to say there is no cause to reject the notion of European 
norms relating to the state, if the arguments to this end attempt more than 
playing towards an essentialist, ‘us’ verses ‘them’ mentality. Rather than broad 
sweeping statements, Peter Mandaville is far more nuanced and specific when 
he claims that: 
 
As the sovereign nation-state system began to reproduce itself in parts of the world 
culturally and historically distinct from Europe – settings possessing their own 
understandings of how religion and politics do or do not fit together – it was inevitable 
that tensions would flare around the question of secularism.
159
 
 
Reconciling a place for religion in IR will be one of the main challenges of this 
thesis, but rather than a broad statement about reconciling ‘Islam’ with the 
‘West’, the thesis will attempt to specifically reconcile the umma and the state. 
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Beyond this, a second challenge the umma poses, if indirectly, to the 
international system, is the notion of the community over the individual. It is this 
dichotomy that this third and final section of the chapter now addresses. 
Liberal Individualism, the Umma and Communitarianism 
Liberalism is a term that is not well defined in IR, though it is a term that 
permeates the discipline. Michael Doyle wrote in the late 1980s that “[t]here is 
no canonical description of liberalism”. 160  Yet, the entire Western political 
system is founded on its principles, that is, the principles of the European 
Enlightenment. 161  The fundamental pillar of liberalism is the respect for 
individual autonomy. 162  This respect leads to a collection of rights that 
differentiate liberal states from other, non-liberal states; these include, but are 
not limited to, “equality before the law, free speech and other civil liberties, 
private property, and elected representation”.163 As noted earlier in the chapter, 
there exists the notion that to the values of the liberal state Islam is “repellent 
and strange”, 164  political Islam and liberalism are perceived to provide 
competing discursive opportunities.165 To assess the validity of such positions 
this section will look at the ontological groundings of liberalism, followed by its 
criticisms. 
 According to contemporary liberalism “it is the rights and duties of 
citizenship which constitute the shared bonds of political community”.166 The 
idea of Kant’s sovereign human being, a rational actor fully able to articulate 
and realise their own wants and needs, heavily underpins liberal thought. This 
sovereign person, in creating civil society, would bring the world to a state of 
perpetual peace.167 Kant says specifically, when “men come nearer to their 
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principles, as consequence of progress in their civilisation, the difference of 
language and of religions leads to and secures a well-founded peace”.168  For 
Kant, as societies develop they will share certain characteristics, the most 
important being that the population exercise more power over their lives, that 
they develop a democratic, or in his terms, republican mode of government. 
Since Kant believes that war only benefits the rulers of the population and not 
the populace themselves, a democratic government will always seek to avoid 
war. The lowest common denominator in such a liberal world view is the 
individual. When free, these individuals can come together and form society 
later. For Islam the modus operandi is reversed: society is assumed to exist 
already, an Islamic society that is, and its aim on the social level is to bring 
individual Muslims into that society.169 
 Maureen Ramsey sees Kant’s ‘abstract individual’ as a fallacy; it is not 
true to reality to believe in the existence of an “asocial, atomistic, solitary and 
self-sufficient individual”.170 The idea of individuals as “sole generators of their 
wants and preferences”171 is misleading as individuals are, at the very least, 
influenced by their surroundings as much as they constitute them. For Ramsey 
a liberal theory that pursues individual freedom with such a “radical 
conviction”172 may undermine the cause of justice; such is the debate between 
positive and negative liberty. Negative liberty is characterised by a freedom 
from oppression. Isaiah Berlin notes that freedom in this schema is the area in 
which one can act “unobstructed by others”; if an individual is prevented from 
doing what they want to do, then they are not free.173 Positive liberty, on the 
other hand, would see the highest goal of society to prevent any external factor 
impinging on an individual’s decisions. As such, a transcendental authority is 
required to coerce society towards some goal “which they [society] would, if 
they were more enlightened, themselves pursue, but do not, because they are 
blind or ignorant or corrupt”.174 
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 The former, negative liberty is perhaps best exemplified by John Mill, 
who states “that there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and 
discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it 
may be considered”.175 Such a view point, with such uninhibited proclamation of 
what it is to be free, is described as “comprehensive” liberalism, which can be 
contrasted to the “softened” liberalism of John Rawls.176 Rawlsian liberalism 
represents the positive liberty standpoint of this on going debate. Whether one 
agrees with Rawls or not, his theory “dominates the field”, as writers on 
liberalism who disagree with Rawls have to justify why. 177  Contemporary 
debates on liberalism centre on agreement or disagreement with Rawls’ 
concept in Political Liberalism.178 
 Rawls’ position is deemed to be representative of positive liberalism as in 
his conception of the individual he acknowledges that some individuals have 
access to greater resources than others. Access to resources, education and 
wealth, for example, affect social justice. 179  Therefore, some measure of 
redistribution is required by way of the state, which impinges the absolute 
freedoms of Mill so to provide equity in society. In essence, Rawls’ theory aims 
to provide a ‘level playing field’ for all individuals of society, so that those less 
advantaged might achieve their worth. So this concept of freedom “directly 
derive[s] from views of what constitutes a self, a person, a man”.180 
 The two variants of liberalism are indicative of another dichotomy, that of 
moral and political liberalism. Mill’s liberalism has a transcendental quality to it, 
in that the rights of the individual stem from some outside source, irrefutable, 
universal, to all humanity. This is characterised as moral liberalism. Political 
liberalism, on the other hand, typified by Rawls, is more “neutral”, deriving its 
theory of equality not from a transcendental source of rights, but from the 
rationality of an individual. For Rawls the “original position”, is a sort of fictional 
state of nature, wherein no individual knows their status in society, their abilities 
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or disabilities, ethnicity or gender.181 In this position, when distributing resources 
no one person is able to effect the outcome so to benefit their ‘in group’ as, in 
the original position, behind what Rawls refers to as “the veil of ignorance”, no 
one can know to which in group would they belong. Kymlica elucidates that 
Rawls’ contract theory helps “render vivid our intuitions, in the same way that 
earlier theorists [Mill] invoked the state of nature to render the idea of natural 
equality”.182 
 For Hamid Haidar, Rawls’ liberalism is less secular than Mill’s or Kant’s, 
and so, paradoxically, is more tolerant of alternative ideologies, in Haidar’s case 
Shi’a Islam.183 Removing the secularism from liberalism helps to reconcile it 
with Islam. As liberalism is concerned with “tolerance, individual liberty, and 
rights” and secularism with “separating life or politics from religious concerns”, a 
less secular liberalism may lead to an Islamic liberalism. 184  The absolute 
dominance of liberal ideals in IR scholarship means that the debate is almost 
always one of either ‘how best to raise Islam to a level where by it is compatible 
with liberalism’, or a zero-sum conceptualisation whereby only liberalism or 
Islam can exist in contemporary international relations. This thesis will attempt 
the reverse, much in the same way as the state vs. umma debate; the thesis will 
endeavour to develop a form of political Islam and then assess the ways in 
which liberalism falls short of its schema.  
John Schwarzmantel is very critical of any merging of religion in politics; 
for him, religion and liberalism are challengers for the same ontological space, 
incapable of living together as religion offers “illusionary consolations for poverty 
and misery in the real world which could in fact be cured by human action”.185 In 
the teleological world view of liberalism, ever marching on towards progress, 
religion represents a “reversal of the modernist Enlightenment project”, and 
something to avoid.186 Schwarzmantel’s preference for secular ideologies rather 
than religion lies in the fact he sees religion as a particularly divisive form of 
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cultural identification, undermining the unity offered by secular ideologies.187 So, 
rather than an age of ‘post-ideology’, an age of postmodern rejection of grand 
narratives, Schwarzmantel maintains “[a] more accurate view sees such post-
ideological diversity as existing within and contained by a more pervasive 
dominant ideology of neo-liberalism”.188 Such a teleological view of progress is 
problematic as by singling out religious ideology as being divisive, he does not 
acknowledge the divisiveness of secular ideologies. Haidar’s analysis also 
focuses on secularism as the fault line between political Islam and liberalism. 
This thesis will argue instead that the focus of any perceived incompatibility can 
be more correctly attributed to a notion of universal individualism inherent in the 
liberal ideology, not to secularism. As chapter 5, Pluralism not Polarisation, will 
demonstrate, the notion that liberalism is somehow neutral to competing values 
is problematic. For now, this chapter will continue by highlighting briefly the 
ways in which liberalism can be divisive, problematising Schwarzmantel’s notion 
of liberal ‘progress’. 
If the historical precedent of the Second World War or the Cold War were 
not enough to point out that secular ideologies may come into conflict as much 
as religious ones might, one can look to the critical takes on liberalism in the 
contemporary world, such as Mark Duffield’s Development, Security and 
Unending War.189 For Duffield, even in this post-Cold War era of liberalism’s 
dominance, there exists a sovereign frontier between developed and 
undeveloped peoples which “acts across and blurs the conventional 
national/international dichotomy”.190 This frontier represents the gap between 
those developed states, which enjoy the benefits of the liberal world view and 
those undeveloped states, who fall outside of this schema.  Duffield states that 
“[a] democracy is not necessarily liberal, nor is liberalism of itself democratic”.191 
Liberal states on the one side of the global divide use development aid as a tool 
to govern what Duffield refers to quite disparagingly as “surplus life”, on the 
other end of the divide.192 Here liberalism is portrayed as explicitly divisive of 
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peoples, and yet for Schwarzmantel it is acceptably the pervasive ‘glue’ to hold 
the ideologies of the world together. The absolute priority of the individual 
undermines the cause of social justice, and so Ramsey concludes that “[t]o 
bring forward the emancipatory project liberalism once embarked upon, we can 
retain the respect for the equal worth of each individual, but we must jettison the 
liberal conception of that individual and all that follows from it”.193 
 The contemporary phenomenon of ‘human security’ is for Duffield the 
liberal solution to ‘surplus population’; it is “less an analytical concept than a 
signifier of shared political and moral values”.194 In pursuing the security of 
individuals over the security of states, liberalism has apparently taken 
ownership of the term ‘humanity’. The pursuit of social justice for all people, 
regardless of where they live, is a ‘liberal’ pursuit undertaken by ‘liberal states’. 
When Duffield explains how “sovereignty over life within ineffective states is 
now internationalized, negotiable and conditional”,195 he means that sovereignty 
over life is negotiable with liberal states and conditional upon the ruling of liberal 
states. This is not a huge criticism to bring to the international community; after 
all there are very prudent reasons states and communities do not look to North 
Korea or Zimbabwe to adjudicate on humanitarian crises but rather look to 
(liberal) institutions such as the UN. The point that can be made is that if 
sovereignty over life is a developing feature of study in IR, then political Islam is 
capable of offering its own conception of humanity as an alternative to the 
conception of humanity monopolised by liberalism. However, political Islam’s 
concept of humanity rests on a different understanding of the individual than 
liberalism, as alluded to earlier in this section. This being the case, then to 
engage political Islam with liberalism in the contemporary political environment 
may give Islam a greater degree of agency in IR. Such a dialogue would form 
the ‘glue’ to mesh an Islamic union and secular, liberal union together. 
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Conclusions 
Having highlighted the fact that political Islam has many competing variants, this 
chapter arrived at a working definition of the type of political Islam which will be 
used in this thesis, which was dubbed Normative Political Islam. This definition 
implied a separation between Islam as it is understood as a faith, and Islam as it 
is understood in politics. Such a separation derived from an understanding of 
the Prophet Muhammed’s goal as being the spread of the faith, not the 
establishment of an Islamic empire. Furthermore, the acknowledgement of the 
separation between Islam-as-faith and Islam-as-politics does not necessarily 
deny a unique, transcendental element to the politics of that early Muslim polity. 
Rather, the thesis accepts the limitations of human capacity to replicate the 
polity overseen by The Prophet. The ‘normative’ aspect of Normative Political 
Islam refers to the way in which certain practices are overshadowed by a 
commitment to Islam-as-faith, though this is only true in the broadest sense, as 
will be examined in subsequent chapters. In beginning to give substance to 
Normative Political Islam, this chapter has established a definition that makes 
some progress in answering one of the thesis’ research questions, namely, how 
extensive is the guidance offered in Islamic source texts with regards to IR? 
This chapter has shown that such guidance is limited, but the extent to which 
commitment to the transcendental elements of the faith influences the practice 
of politics has yet to be established, something that chapter 3, Sovereignty and 
Normative Political Islam, will attempt to establish. For now, the next chapter will 
move onto establishing the framework which the thesis will use to construct its 
argument.  
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Chapter 2: Exploring the Interaction Between 
Islam and IR: A Conceptual Framework 
Having outlined the problems with existing IR theorising of the Middle East in 
relation to its poor conception of religion, and Islam specifically, the current 
chapter will now discuss the conceptual framework which will be employed to 
analyse that phenomenon. The chapter will outline the relationship of the thesis 
with IR and Islam, as well as its method of synthesising the two. Briefly, by way 
of summary, this chapter will outline the position of the thesis as second order 
IR theorising, in doing so it will draw on a diverse range of disciplines, not just 
IR but theology, history and philosophy. To make conceptual space for this 
endeavour the ontological and epistemological foundations of the thesis will be 
argued to be poststructural, influenced by the work of Foucault.196 In showing 
Islam and poststructuralism to converge in the critique of IR, but diverge in the 
construction of alternatives, the chapter addresses the secondary research 
question: To what degree is there a synthesis in poststructural and Islamic 
critiques of IR? The chapter then moves on to arguing the reasons for studying 
religion in IR, opening another necessary space with regards to the secularism 
of the discipline. After creating this conceptual space, the chapter will expand 
on the method used to unpack concepts into this newly created space, 
specifically, the use of Constructivism to distinguish Islam-as-politics from 
Islam-as-faith. Finally, the chapter will outline some methodological concerns 
deriving from the problems in defining ‘Islam’, and Edward Said’s warning 
against Orientalism. In this final section the chapter will explain and define the 
limitations of the concepts used throughout the thesis. 
Previous chapters have outlined the overarching aim of this research as 
an analysis of IR theory and the problems that this theory presents in the face of 
Islam’s conception of politics in the international sphere. Such a study is meta-
theoretical, as mentioned in the preceding chapter; that is, this thesis uses 
theory as its object of study, rather than using theory as a tool to make empirical 
data its object of study. Both types of inquiry have a place in international 
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relations scholarship, and serve two distinct purposes. Using empirical data the 
object of study gets to the crux of IR, constructing arguments about, and 
explaining the dynamics of the international system. The study of theory is 
related to those same goals, but rather has a regulatory effect on that first type 
of theory. The two types of study are dubbed first order (empirical based) and 
second order (theory based) theory by Alexander Wendt.197  
The aims of this thesis root it firmly in second order theorising; as such, 
the thesis will be problematising the epistemological groundings of various IR 
theories. Second order theorising requires a certain level of abstraction, but by 
defining ‘Islam’ as centred on Sunni orthodoxy and using the Middle East as its 
location of enquiry, the thesis here outlines exactly what level of abstraction it 
requires. With regards to the term ‘Islam’, the thesis does not use the term in an 
entirely abstract sense; rather, ‘Islam’ refers to Sunni orthodoxy, as mentioned 
in the previous chapter. Beyond this, the thesis uses the Middle East as its 
location of enquiry. As the thesis is engaged in second order theorising, to 
locate its enquiry in the Middle East is not done to make empirical claims about 
the region, but rather to allow discussion of the questions posed in a more 
accessible, less abstract way. Indeed, to make empirical claims on the Middle 
East given the analytical framework presented in this chapter would represent a 
methodological inconsistency, related to Edward’s Said’s critique of reading 
secondary sources as a source of Oriental ‘reality’, in place of actual empirical 
study.198  
The analysis of epistemology, the nature of knowledge, might also be 
categorised as critical theory, in the way Robert Cox defined it in 1981. For Cox, 
critical theory “is critical in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing 
order of the world and asks how that order came about”.199 It is in Cox’s mould 
of critical theory that this thesis attempts to challenge and broaden the research 
agenda of IR, allowing it to pose new questions and thus pave the way to new 
and different first order work. As Wendt summarises, the most important 
contribution of second order questions is the way in which, “making explicit and 
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critiquing the foundational assumptions that structure research agendas they 
[second-order questions] may free up first order theorists to ask more questions 
than they have previously”.200  
If a conceptual framework defines and outlines the ontological and 
epistemological positions of a study, and the methodology explains how a study 
relates to and interacts with its object of inquiry, then the two are analogous in 
this thesis. The ways in which this research might place itself in disciplinary 
terms is a continuing question for the thesis. It is not exclusively IR theory, as 
the thesis draws as much on political philosophy and theology, as it does on IR 
scholarship. It is not area studies, as there is no interest in incorporating non-
Western social constructs into pre-established frames of reference.201  Once 
more turning to Wendt, the chapter notes what he describes as the 
‘insider/outsider dichotomy’. Diagnosing this dichotomy as a holdover of a 
positivist legacy, it is the idea that outsiders explain while insiders understand, 
and the purpose of science, and the purpose of social science, is to explain. IR 
may be a social science, but does that ensure that study which hopes to 
understand is not important in IR? Wendt argues there is a place for both in the 
discipline; insider/outsider explanations often deal with different questions, but it 
is not the case there are always two stories to tell. Depending on the question 
being asked, one account will make more sense than the other. In the case of 
Islam in IR scholarship, it has been argued that the existing treatments do not 
understand Islam, and religion in general, and therefore their accounts do not 
always hold up to scrutiny on these terms. This thesis explains why that is so, 
by attempting to understand the faith as it relates to believers, and thus explain 
more rigorously Islam’s place in the discipline of IR.  
Epistemological Foundations 
To allow Islam, and other religions, to be accounted for in IR, some conceptual 
space needs to be opened up for such alternative concepts to be fully 
articulated and so scrutinised. Addressing the concern that currently political 
Islam is too often defined by what is not, rather than what it may stand for,202 
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this section of the chapter argues the dominant epistemology of the 
Enlightenment, as transmitted to the present day through concepts of political 
modernity, is one of the impediments to the failure of political Islam to articulate 
a theory of IR. Perhaps of equal concern in this regard is the failure of Islam to 
come to terms with the realities of power in the modern world; while Islamists 
revere the system of international politics last operationalized from the medieval 
period to the early nineteenth century Islam,203 this leaves Muslims in positions 
of power confused as to how that ‘ideal’ can in any way come to be in the world 
of nation-states. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to grapple with the nature 
of religious ‘reform’ or ‘re-focus’ that is might be needed for Islam were able to 
take a more constitutive role in IR.204 Instead this thesis focuses on IR theory 
and opening the conceptual space for narratives not tied to the Enlightenment 
to be expanded upon, an Islamic narrative of IR being just one of such alternate 
voices. This is not to say that these alternative voices are any more valid or 
authentic than current theory. Indeed, “we must be extremely wary of sliding 
from references to new possibilities of thinking, acting, and being to a positive 
evaluation of such possibilities”.205 But unless these voices have the space to 
develop, their worth can never truly be evaluated, leading to arguments defined 
by what they are opposed to rather than what they support.  
 The point of departure regarding the epistemology of this thesis will be 
Foucault because, as will be demonstrated later in the chapter, his 
epistemology has informed an already very successful analytical framework 
which is heavily related to the topics of this thesis, namely, Edward Said’s 
Orientalism.. Referring to ‘truth’ as a goal, perhaps the goal of knowledge, 
Foucault elucidates his perspective: 
 
In societies like ours, the ‘political economy’ of truth is characterised by five 
important traits. ‘Truth’ is centred on the form of scientific discourse and the 
institutions which produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political 
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incitement (the demand for truth, as much for economic production as for political 
power); it is the object, under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption 
(circulating through apparatuses of education and information whose extent is 
relatively broad in the social body, not withstanding certain strict limitations); it is 
produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few 
great political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media); lastly, it 
is the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation (‘ideological’ 
struggles).
206  
 
What Foucault is getting at here is the fact that much of what is considered 
‘truth’ is knowledge that has particular motives behind it; his examples are the 
quest for political power, truth as a commodity, truth produced or legitimised 
through certain institutions, and finally truth as ideologically contested. 
Essentially he rejects, in the broadly poststructuralist tradition, the idea of some 
totalising or universal narrative of knowledge.207 There are, following from this, 
culturally specific truths, not a truth. For Fredrich Nietzche, whose ideas 
Foucault used extensively, the nature of human experience is always changing 
and evolving, and relying on truth as a fixed quantity is fallacious.208 Where 
Nietzsche’s insight reminds us of the temporal relativity of truth and knowledge, 
“Foucault emphasized the local character of critique”.209 All of this is not to claim 
emphatically on Foucault’s behalf that an objective truth is not possible. It is the 
ambiguity here between objective truth and anti-foundationalism that is one of 
the reasons some might resist classifying Foucault as a poststructuralist. For 
the purposes of the thesis however, Foucault is the route taken into the debates 
over the status of knowledge production; it is his focus on anti-foundationalism 
and his emphasis on excavating “subjugated knowledges”, that is, “historical 
contents that have been buried or masked in functional coherences or formal 
systemizations”, 210  which aligns Foucault with poststructuralism for the 
purposes of this thesis. Different aspects of Foucault’s ideas, taken in different 
contexts, may well conflict with the poststructural label used here, and such 
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ambiguity betrays the limitations of labels and categorisations and indeed, can 
be attributed to the opaque nature of Foucault’s body of work. As Foucault 
leads us to poststructuralism, which itself is an ambiguous term, the next 
section will spend some time defining that concept. 
A Note on Terminology 
Nicholas Rengger jests that “[p]ostmodernism is one of those words that has a 
tendency to reduce sensible people to a mad scramble for the nearest and 
deadliest instrument of destruction that they can find”.211 The same, presumably, 
can be said for the term poststructuralism, which is employed in this research. 
There is some ambiguity between the terms postmodernism, poststructuralism 
and more besides. This section will briefly try to clear up some of the confusion 
with these terms, as the thesis will proceed to use those terms in this and 
following chapters.  
Bryan Turner makes the distinction between postmodern political theory 
and the ‘postmodern condition’ or ‘postmodernity’. He writes that “[b]y... 
[postmodernism], we should mean the philosophical critique of grand narratives, 
and by... [postmodernity], we should mean the postmodern social condition”.212 
This social condition is defined rather broadly by Jane Bennett as simply “a 
state of fragmentation plagued by a crisis of meaning”213 but is elaborated on by 
Turner to refer to the effects of “information technologies, globalization, 
fragmentation of lifestyles, hyper-consumerism, deregulation of financial 
markets and public utilities, the obsolescence of the nation-state and social 
experimentation with the traditional life-course”.214 The intellectual resistance to 
postmodernism can often derive from the misunderstanding that postmodern 
political theory is somehow linked to or accentuates the postmodern condition. 
Even when the distinction between postmodern political theory and the 
postmodern condition is acknowledged, scepticism about postmodernism might 
also derive from the belief that “the claim that the collapse of representation… 
[has] left us only with the realization that our categories are merely infinitely 
                                            
211
 Rengger, Nicholas: "No Time like the Present? Postmodernism and Political Theory", 
(Political Studies, Vol.  40, No. 3, 1992), pg. 561 
212
  Turner, Bryan: Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism, pg. 14-15 
213
  Bennett, Jane: "Postmodern Approaches to Political Theory", in Gaus, Gerald and Kukathas, 
Chandran, (eds.): Handbook of Political Theory, (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2004), pg. 53 
214
  Turner, Bryan: Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism, pg. 14-15 
63 
 
different and more or less preferable, never better or worse”. 215  Unlike this 
misconception, postmodern political theories do not necessitate a rejection of 
‘rational’ thinking or Enlightenment values, but rather attempts to remove any 
universal grounding to that reason. Rengger speaks of Richard Rorty’s position 
in exemplifying the above assertion; “[f]or Rorty, therefore, there is nothing 
wrong with believing in the hopes of the Enlightenment since our [European] 
societies are largely built on these hopes; we simply do not need a 
transcendental grounding for them”.216  
In Turner’s analysis, poststructuralism would appear to be a synonym for 
postmodernism, and both are distinct from the postmodern condition. Distinct 
from Turner’s usage, this thesis uses the term poststructuralism in the way Jim 
George and David Campbell use the term, as challenging  “the foundationalism 
and essentialism of post-Enlightenment scientific philosophy, [and] its 
universalist presuppositions about modern rational man [and woman]”.217 In this 
way, poststructuralism and postmodernism are differentiated in that the former 
is an ontological statement about the indeterminacy of knowledge (resembling 
Foucault’s position outlined earlier), while the latter refers to the particular set of 
circumstances in the late twentieth century that gave rise to the current 
scepticism of meta-narratives (resembling the tradition of Jean-Francois 
Lyotard’s use of the term postmodern 218 ). Simplified another way, 
poststructuralism would maintain that humanity has not and will not find a 
universal and objective standpoint from which to judge actions, while 
postmodernism would say that humanity is currently unable to lean on a 
universal and objective standpoint because of late twentieth century changes in 
society. While both terms may come to the same ‘end point’, the former is an 
ontological and meta-theoretical statement, while the latter is linked to a specific 
historical narrative. This chapter arrives at this end point through the former 
position, poststructuralism, which in turn is arrived at, however imperfectly, 
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through the ideas of Foucault, and poststructuralism and postmodernism will 
continue to be differentiated throughout the remainder of this thesis. 
It needs noting here that in making an ontological statement about the 
indeterminacy of knowledge, poststructuralism does not embrace an alternative 
ontology, as to do so would represent a truth claim the likes of with it is 
inherently uncomfortable with. Rather, it leaves its ontological position 
ambiguous, maximising the scope for geographical and temporal specific truth 
claims. As such, the term ‘poststructural perspective on ontology’ will be used in 
this thesis, in place of where one might expect the phrase ‘poststructural 
ontology’, to highlight this ambiguity. 
 
 The relation of a poststructuralist epistemology to IR is related to the 
Enlightenment and political modernity, as alluded to earlier. In one 
understanding, political modernity “is understood in developmental terms, as a 
progression – from the mythical to the scientific, from the barbaric to the 
rational/democratic, from the constrained, ordered subject to the utilitarian 
individual “free to choose”.”219 Here the idea that there is but one end point of 
knowledge and understanding of politics, represented on a scale with mystics 
and barbarians on the one hand and democratic scientists on the other, proves 
problematic. The argument of this thesis is not ‘why can there not be mystics 
and barbarians in the contemporary age’, but rather ‘why must modernity be 
defined by only democratic scientists?’ The connection between political 
modernity and the Enlightenment is explained by John Gray, who comments 
that “Western societies are governed by the belief that modernity is a single 
condition, everywhere the same and always benign… Being modern means 
realising our values – the values of the Enlightenment, as we like to think of 
them”. 220  While unfairly brushing all IR paradigms with a systemic brush, 
François Debrix argues that IR is governed by “the idea and belief that there is 
or must be one discourse, one modality of knowledge, and one practice of the 
global and the political to which “we” all participate”.221 This line of reason is 
                                            
219
 George, Jim: Discourses of Global Politics, pg. 42 
220
 Gray, John: Al Qaeda and What it Means to be Modern, (London: Faber and Faber, 2003), 
pg. 1 Original emphasis 
221
 Debrix, François: "We Other IR Foucaultians", (International Political Sociology, Vol.  4, No. 2, 
2010), pg. 198 
65 
 
shown in practice when one looks at the legacy of Westphalia as it relates to the 
non-European world, as outlined in the previous chapter. Poststructuralist 
epistemology helps to resolve the dilemma regarding mystic barbarians and 
scientific democrats; the emphasis on challenging hitherto truths creates exactly 
the space needed to be able to take Islam on its own terms in IR, where it is 
currently constrained by these ‘truths’, to try and articulate itself in the mould of 
scientific democrats or not at all.   
Islam, Postcolonialism and Modernity 
Islamic discourse is also preoccupied with the Enlightenment and modernity. 
The quintessential Islamic reformer, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, talks of science 
and civilisational progress as tied to achieving modernity. Unlike Enlightenment 
rationality, however, this modernity is not a recreation of some European model. 
For him, science is not bound to nations, so the idea of ‘Muslim’ or ‘European’ 
science is a fallacy. 222  This position is reflected in al-Afghani’s student 
Muhammed Abduh, who believed the European history of Enlightenment is an 
Islamic destiny. 223  Such a perspective, even if implicitly critical of the 
Enlightenment sees the solution to Islam’s place in the world as more 
Enlightenment. 224  The chapter now turns to consider two more Muslim 
perspectives on modernity which closer align to poststructuralist epistemology 
as has been defined in this section. 
 Founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna, claimed that the 
first and foremost reason for the creation of the brotherhood was the failure of 
the Western way of life. He explains that:  
 
The Western way of life – bounded in effect on practical and technical knowledge, 
discovery, invention, and the flooding of world markets with mechanical products – 
has remained incapable of offering to men’s minds a flicker of light, a ray of hope, a 
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grain of faith, or of providing anxious persons the smallest path towards rest and 
tranquillity.
225
  
 
Al-Banna here emphasises the technical and scientific nature of his ‘Western 
way of life’. The relation these elements have with day to day life is not the 
focus of this thesis, as it was for al-Banna. Instead, what can be recognised in 
al-Banna’s critique are the same methods with which poststructuralism critiques 
the Enlightenment sciences. The final Muslim voice to consider in this brief 
appraisal of Muslim positions regarding the Enlightenment is Aziz al-Azmeh. 
 Al-Azmeh explains that Islamic political thought should not be thought of 
as analogous to modern political thought. Islamic political theory, according to 
al-Azmeh, “is not so much a coherent , deliberate and disciplined body of 
investigation and enquiry concerning a well defined and delimited topic, but is 
rather an assembly of statements on topics political, statements dispersed in 
various discursive locations”.226 Here again the suitability and power in using a 
poststructural epistemology becomes apparent, as this epistemology proceeds 
from a view that the Enlightenment provided an “oppressive straightjacket”227 to 
social science – that which could not be counted, measured or in essence 
“reduced to numbers” becomes at best suspect but at worse an illusion.228 
Islamic political theory, as outlined by al-Azmeh, falls outside of the ‘straight 
jacket’ of the Enlightenment, and it is little wonder that Islamic ideas have such 
a difficult time unpacking their concepts in IR. Adopting a poststructural 
epistemology helps legitimise use of theological arguments, for example, in a 
discussion of IR theory. That is not to say that poststructuralism is the only route 
to embracing Islam in IR. Postcolonial literature offers a similar engagement 
with ‘modernity’, centred on the Enlightenment.  
Postcolonial Critiques of Modernity  
Gurminder Bhambra attempts to summarise postcolonial approaches as 
“[working] to challenge dominant narratives and to reconfigure them to provide 
more adequate categories of analysis, where adequacy is measured in terms of 
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increasing inclusivity”.229 The similarity with the broad approach of this thesis is 
more than a passing one, as Dipesh Chakrabarty comments:  
 
[I]t would be wrong to think of postcolonial critiques of historicism (or of the political) 
as simply deriving from critiques already elaborated by postmodern and 
poststructuralist thinkers of the West. In fact, to think this way would itself be to 
practice historicism, for such a thought would merely repeat the temporal structure 
of the statement, “first in the West, and then elsewhere”.
230
 
 
Historicism here stands in for the Enlightenment rationalism and 
developmentalism defined previously. Postcolonial studies also attempts to 
engage with dominant political forms linked to political modernity and, like 
poststructuralism, recognises many aspects of that modernity as being 
rooted in a European heritage, thereby opening the door to questions of 
universalism. Turning once more to Chakrabarty for a summary of the 
overlap between postcolonial and poststructural engagement with 
modernity: 
 
European thought is at once both indispensable and inadequate in helping us 
to think through the experiences of political modernity in non-Western nations, 
and provincializing Europe becomes the task of exploring how this thought – 
which is not everybody’s heritage and which affect us all – may be renewed 
from and for the margins.
231
 
 
Furthermore, while the thesis is focused on Islam’s place in IR, certainly an 
endeavour on the ‘margins’, as Chakrabarty explains it, more broadly the 
thesis is concerned with religion’s place in IR. The exploration of religion’s 
place in IR shares much of the critique of postcolonialism, as seen briefly 
here, but does not share the postcolonial context that the study of Islam 
might do. Put another way, the (meta-theoretical) study of religion in IR is 
on the margin of the discipline, but not the same margin that Chakrabarty’s 
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postcolonialism is coming from, even while both might engage with the 
same concept of secularism, for example. As such, this thesis has come to 
the critique of Enlightenment rationalism in IR via poststructuralism, and it 
is poststructuralism that supplies the specific meanings to the terms used, 
and commits the thesis to a certain ontological perspective. Acknowledging 
the above however, does not mean that this thesis cannot utilise 
postcolonial studies at all. Rather, the lines between postcolonial studies 
and poststructuralism can be blurred further by turning to the work of Said.  
 Said developed an analytical framework which pertains to the content 
which this thesis is grappling with. That framework was an analysis of various 
representational practices which he dubbed ‘Orientalism’, and the remainder of 
this section will assess the contribution Said’s work will make to the framework 
of this thesis. Said’s work sits at the boundary of postcolonial and poststructural 
studies, and indeed Said, like this thesis, arrives at poststructuralism via 
Foucault, and uses those concepts in his work. Said’s concept of Orientalism 
critiqued knowledge production on the ‘Orient’ as being tied to the needs and 
presuppositions of those who studied it in the West. One of his responses to 
this was to highlight how categories like ‘East’ and ‘West’ are deficient 
analytically, as they draw upon essentialist, racist stereotypes to give them 
meaning. However, Said drew significant criticism on how when trying to 
remove the ontological categories of ‘East’ and ‘West’, Said unwittingly relies on 
and reinforces these categories.232 Aijaz Ahmed summarises this criticism when 
he states that “Said quite justifiably accuses the Orientalist for essentialising the 
Orient, but his own processes of essentialising ‘the West’ are equally 
remarkable”.233 Ahmed identifies different and irreconcilable uses of the term 
Orientalism in Said’s work. In one reading Orientalism is synonymous with 
colonialism, Orientalism perhaps being a by-product of colonialism but, in 
another reading, Orientalism is a trans-historical process that is apparent even 
in ancient Greek stories.234 John Hobson puts the problems with Said’s use of 
Orientalism down to the reductivist way in which Said’s uses the term; “the 
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widely-used Saidian conception of Orientalism has to perform a great deal of 
leg-movement beneath the waterline in order to keep it afloat”.235  
In an attempt to address these criticisms of Said’s Orientalism, Hobson 
presents a framework for understanding Orientalism which separates various 
types of the phenomenon. To avoid the reductivism in Said’s usage, this thesis 
will employ the adapted framework of Hobson, outlined below.  
Whereas Orientalism bundled together various concepts, Hobson 
attempts to separate these into racism, Eurocentrism, agency, imperialism, 
Western triumphalism, and the standard of civilisation. It is worth here 
replicating in full Hobson’s table outlining the differences between Said’s 
reductive concept of Orientalism and Hobson’s non-reductive conception. 
 
Table 1: Alternative conceptions of Orientalism/Eurocentrism236 
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 Said's reductive conception of 
Orientalism 
'Non-reductive' conception of 
Eurocentric institutionalism & 
scientific racism 
Relationship of 
Orientalism and 
Scientific Racism  
Inherent 
Racism, especially social 
Darwinism and Eugenics, is 
merely the highest expression 
of imperialist-Orientalism 
Contingent 
Racism and Eurocentric 
institutionalism are analytically 
differentiated even if they share 
various overlaps 
The centrality of 
the 'standard of 
civilization' 
Yes Yes 
Agency is the 
monopoly of the 
West 
Inherent 
The West as hyper-agency the 
East has none 
Contingent 
The West always has pioneering 
agency, while the East ranges from 
high to low levels of agency; but 
where these are high they are 
deemed to be regressive or barbaric 
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Table 1 shows that non-reductive Orientalism need not always imply racism, as 
Eurocentric institutionalism would claim that all humans, from any race or 
society, can ‘progress’ into civilisation given the right institutions (modelled after 
European institutions.237 Likewise, non-reductive Orientalism does not always 
imply that the ‘East’ has no agency as when combined with racism, ideas of the 
‘yellow peril’ imply high levels of agency, but racism allows for the distinction 
between progressive and regressive or barbaric agency. 238  Eurocentrism 
combined with another type of racism would see non-reductive Orientalism not 
necessarily synonymous with imperialism, as a fear of racial-contamination 
might lead to a fear of any interaction between ‘East’ and ‘West’.239  
While Hobson continues at length to outline and define the nuances of his 
non-reductive Orientalism, 240  it is sufficient to point out here that in the 
remainder of this thesis ‘Orientalism’ is used as a catch-all term for all the 
different but overlapping concepts of agency, imperialism, Western 
triumphalism, and the standard of civilisation. Where appropriate the thesis will 
differentiate what type of Orientalism is being employed in reference to Table 1. 
One final note on Orientalism is to clarify the usage of the terms ‘East’ and 
‘West’. Given the fact the thesis is engaged in a critique of the distinction 
between East and West, it may seem objectionable to continue to use these 
terms. This section finishes by turning to Hobson one last time to clarify the 
usage ‘East’ and ‘West: 
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I deploy these terms because they are fundamental to the lexicon of 
Eurocentrism/racism and that, as such, what matters is not the geographical 
dimension but the ideational. That is, within Eurocentrism and scientific racism, 
East and West are constructs that are differentiated not by geography but either by 
a rationality/civilizational divide or a rationality/racial divide.
241
 
Poststructuralism and Islam: A Shared Agenda? 
The use of poststructuralism is not without its limitations; Bryan Turner is overtly 
critical of the capacity of such an epistemology to help study the Middle East. 
He states that “[poststructural] epistemologies do not promise an alternative 
orthodoxy and reject the possibility of ‘true’ descriptions of the ‘real’ world. This 
epistemological scepticism does not lend itself either to political action or to the 
development of alternative frameworks”.242 It is true that being critical of the 
concept of truth can lead one to question whether a reformulated notion of Islam 
in IR is any more a representation of the ‘truth’ as the current take on Islam and 
religion in IR. Moreover, Turner here is foreshadowing the discussion in chapter 
5, Pluralism Not Polarisation, about the compatibility of Islam’s call to truth (the 
shahadda being an exemplar of this truth), and the scepticism inherent in 
poststructural analysis.  
The chapter turns first to the point concerning the perceived inability for 
poststructural analysis to provide alternative understandings. While Turner sees 
such a paradox as epistemological scepticism, he is perhaps too involved in 
meta-theoretical pursuits; there is ample cause to attempt a reformulation of 
Islam in IR as first order IR theorists try to analyse and account for increasingly 
Islamised politics in North Africa and the continuing Islamic politics of the 
Persian Gulf region. Turner is correct to highlight the problem here, but it cannot 
become an insurmountable one due to scepticism alone; as Wendt posits, 
“[h]aving once explicated and reformulated such assumptions, however, the 
trick is then to move the discussion off of the level of meta-theory and onto the 
task of constructing substantive arguments about world politics”. 243  To the 
second point concerning the compatibility of a religious truth and poststructural 
analysis, that is not a question addressed in this chapter. Rather, taking a cue 
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from the incongruity presented by the two approaches, the chapter utilises a two 
stage analysis. The first stage exploits the symbiosis in the critique of IR offered 
by both Islamic and poststructural sources. The second stage will explore the 
divergence between Islam and poststructuralism, attempting to reconcile them. 
Having outlined the epistemological foundations of the thesis, and shown how 
Islamic perspectives on modernity can represent different aspects of, and are 
congruous with certain poststructural (and postcolonial) debates on what 
constitutes modernity, the chapter will move on to demonstrate the first stage of 
the thesis’ analysis with a brief scrutiny of the place of religion in IR. 
The Study of Religion in IR 
Religion, whether articulated as fundamentalism or purely as a marker of 
difference, is re-emerging as a prominent factor in international conflict. As seen 
in the literature on IR in the Middle East, Islam is a factor that can rarely be 
ignored when discussing the region (though it need not always be 
accommodated by being subsumed into socio-economic factors). To summarise 
the preceding chapter, Elizabeth Hurd points out that: 
 
[T]he power of this religious resurgence in world politics does not fit into existing 
categories of thought in academic international relations. Conventional understandings of 
international relations, focused on material capabilities and strategic interaction, exclude 
from the start the possibility that religion could be a fundamental organizing force in the 
international system.
244
  
 
Hurd’s study is fascinating, revealing two distinct stands of secularism that 
contribute to IR’s presumed ‘neutrality’; the first is laicism, “[presenting] itself as 
having risen above the messy debate over religion and politics, standing over 
and outside the melee in a neutral space of its own creation”.245 The second is 
referred to as Judeo-Christian secularism, through which secularism becomes 
an extension of religious tradition, exclusively the Jewish and Christian 
religions.246 Both of these varieties of secularism are, for Hurd, present in IR; 
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they are “part of the cultural and normative basis of international relations 
theory… [they] are part of the ontological and epistemological foundation of the 
discipline”.247 Both versions of secularism problematise the place of Islam in IR 
while at the same time ignoring the way that the Judeo-Christian norms 
underlay that very notion of secularism or neutrality. She states that “[i]n this 
[Judeo-Christian] evaluative stance, political Islam is the manifestation of a 
unique, culturally rooted and irrational commingling of religion and politics that is 
distinct from the Judeo-Christian separationist approach to religion and 
state.”248 Here Hobson’s non-reductive Orientalism reveals that Judeo-Christian 
secularism demonstrates the pioneering agency of the West, and while political 
Islam possesses agency enough to refuse that particular mould, its agency is 
regressive and less enlightened than the aforementioned Western position. In 
attempting to renegotiate the place of religion in IR it is necessary to be 
reflexive and recognise that an unquestioned acceptance of a secular 
separation between politics and religion is a source of much of the difficulty in 
accounting for Islam on its own terms in IR. 
 Islam as it relates to politics, that is, political Islam, is for Hurd “a modern 
language of politics that challenges, sometimes works outside of, and 
(occasionally) overturns fundamental assumptions about religion and politics 
that are embedded in the forms of Western secularism that emerged out of 
Latin Christendom.”249  Muhammed Arkoun pre-empted Hurd’s assessment of 
the modern secular space as a reformulation of medieval Christian ideas, and 
goes so far as to refer to modern day ideologies “secular religions”.250 Arkoun 
concludes that the relationship between Christianity and secularism means that 
the latter has common features with all religions (though that relationship cannot 
be asserted outside of the Abrahamic faiths). Specifically, both secular and 
religious society are built on order, it is therefore the nature of this order, the 
nature of power, which needs to be understood vis-à-vis Islam. 251  Beyond 
finding space in secularism, political Islam is poised to find space in IR; in a 
post-Communist era the implication of political Islam (and other ‘alternative’ 
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frameworks such as feminism or humanism, for example) becoming global 
political systems is not impossible. That a space has presented itself for 
alternative theories to develop, 252  may go some way to explaining the 
resurgence of religion in IR, as Hurd sees it. Beyond space for religion and 
Islam in IR, this section will also briefly discuss the space for IR in Islamic 
studies. Bassam Tibi problematises the space Islamic studies affords to IR, and 
it is worth recounting his concerns here as they relate to the dearth of Muslim 
literature on this issue, and adds impetus to the study carried out in this thesis. 
Tibi highlights that “Islamic studies are mostly dominated by disciplines other 
than the social sciences, not to mention international relations… which is almost 
absent from Islamic studies”.253 Having defined secularism, and found space for 
religion in IR, as well as space for IR in Islam, so it becomes necessary to 
further scrutinise political Islam and its meaning in this thesis. 
 Oliver Roy points out the difference between an Islamic fundamentalist 
and a political Islamist or Islamist; the former wants 'a return to the old ways', 
while the latter wishes to develop their societies on the basis of modern 
technology and politics. 254  Arriving at Roy's definition of an Islamist or 
fundamentalist is not as easy as it would seem; John Voll states that “[t]he wide 
diversity of individuals and groups associated with Islamic fundamentalism 
indicates that it is not a monolithic movement and renders a simple definition 
difficult”.255 For example, Henry Munson claims the modern usage of the term 
fundamentalist refers “to anyone who insists that all aspects of life, including the 
social and the political, should conform to a set of sacred scriptures believed to 
be inerrant and immutable”. 256  By Munson's understanding the difference 
between Roy's Islamist and Islamic fundamentalist is trivial as both seek to 
establish God's rule on earth. For Sami Zubaida the term is even broader, any 
modern political movement seeking to establish an Islamic state is in fact 
fundamentalist, 257  and there are differences in opinion besides. For the 
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purposes of this thesis it is necessary to see, as Roy does, a distinction 
between an Islamic fundamentalist and an Islamist. A fundamentalist is, for this 
thesis, one who seeks to establish in this modern world a pocket of the 
medieval Islamic polity, the polity of the Prophet's era and that of his closest 
followers, the rashidun. In this way they are distinct from Islamists, who are also 
trying to establish an Islamic polity but, unlike fundamentalists, are not 
restricting themselves to medieval modes of production or governance, or 
“exclusivist and literal interpretation”258 of Islam. Islamists are akin to reformers, 
trying to give modern concepts of governance and economics an Islamic 
character or develop (rather than replicate, as fundamentalists do) their own 
independent alternative to the dominant Western model.259  
 Having dealt with the ‘political’ of political Islam, it is necessary to deal 
with the ‘Islam’. Here the chapter will draw heavily on the problematisation of 
Islam and IR by Bassam Tibi, who while presenting a similar problem to this 
thesis (though with far more prescriptive aims), takes the alternative, 
Habermasian approach to resolving what he terms Islam’s predicament with 
modernity.260 For Tibi, the ‘religion’ of Islam is articulated as a cultural system. 
In connecting the two, he reinforces Hurd’s assessment of religious resurgence 
in the world. Tibi explains that “under conditions of globalization tensions do 
emerge that are articulated in religious and cultural terms… political, social, and 
economic problems are shaped by a cultural language of religion. This is a 
religionization of these problems, and that is exactly what “Islamic Politics” is all 
about”.261  
In addition to a system of culture, religion can be a marker of identity and 
difference. Such a position echoes Sami Zubaida, who argues that as religion is 
“stripped of many of its social functions and authority, its communal-identity 
aspect has come centre stage nowhere more dramatically than in the case of 
Islam”.262 So Islam-as-faith is not only a religious system of belief connecting 
believers to the transcendental, but plays out in the temporal world as a cultural 
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system, conferring identity and hence is a marker of difference. Having made 
the space for Islam in IR, and before moving to the specific methods this thesis 
will use to begin to coalesce an Islamic theory of IR, this section will end by 
briefly dealing with Zubaida’s assertion that Islam should not be a substantial 
factor in the study of the Middle East.263  
 Zubaida problematises the place of Islam next to modernity much in the 
same way that Tibi does, and finds issue with many of the issues already 
discussed in this thesis: Islamic history perceived as utopian by Muslims; the 
perception of a unitary Islamic politics; the trouble with speaking through religion 
to a secular Western world.264 It is frustrating for Zubaida to see analysis of the 
Middle East so skewed by the above issues, and his solution is to trouble the 
very notion that Islam is a term with any meaning, considering the vast spatial 
and temporal differences in concepts that are lumped together as ‘Islamic’. 
Instead, Zubaida identifies two main styles of politics in the Middle East, “the 
modern politics of ideology and organization, and the universal politics of faction, 
kinship and patronage”.265 Islam is not constitutive of either form of politics, but 
its language is used as a mask for both. Troubling the unitary nature of Islamic 
politics to such an extent as to remove it from the political realm is, perhaps, a 
way to escape the frustrating accounts of the Middle East so prevalent in IR, 
however, this obfuscates the constitutive nature of religion on people. Zubaida’s 
desire to remove it from analysis is in fact overcorrecting when it comes to Islam 
and politics. It is possible to deny unitary treatments of Islam and politics and 
yet still recognise the constitutive role the many Islams of believers can have 
upon their behaviour. 266  What to take from Zubaida is the knowledge that 
attempting to grasp at fundamentals or universals applicable to all Muslims, 
everywhere, for all time, is always problematic. That is not to say that analytical 
endeavours in local or otherwise specific terms are un-valid, and presents a 
methodological imperative for this thesis to avoid invoking a ‘universal’ Islamic 
politics. As the chapter has begun to talk of a more specific methodology, it 
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continues with more on how Islam might unpack its concepts with regards to IR, 
followed by further methodological concerns and limitations. 
Unpacking Political Islam using Constructivism  
Regarding the two stage analysis of the thesis, this chapter provided the critical 
tools necessitated by the first stage, to make space for Islam in IR, but those 
same poststructural tools are complimented by Constructivism in the second 
stage of the analysis. As has been noted briefly, and will be explored later in the 
thesis, the synthesis between Islam and poststructuralism is problematic in the 
formation of ‘alternative orthodoxies’, and it is here that Constructivism helps 
the thesis. IR Constructivism is a perspective that focuses on “the content and 
sources of state interests and the social fabric of world politics”.267 With an 
emphasis on social fabric, Constructivism is a theory that seeks to give a 
greater place to ideas in international relations. The theory, first articulated268 in 
IR by Alexander Wendt, claims that rather than the structure of IR presumed by 
neo-Realism, a structure beyond our control, vested in the nature of man or the 
security dilemma, IR is a social reality we make for ourselves. In this way Wendt 
proposes that “[i]f self interest is not sustained by practice, it will die out”.269 This 
is a contentious claim to say the least, as to presume individuals can shape 
their surroundings with impunity leans too heavily towards the agency side of 
the agency/structure debate. A more nuanced understanding is offered later in 
Wendt’s Social Theory of International Relations, wherein it is explained that 
while individuals are capable of changing their social reality, that reality has 
already shaped the individual to some extent, and so the relationship is more 
cyclic than would first appear270 (see point three, below). The basics of Wendt’s 
theory make it distinct from other IR theorising for three reasons: 
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1. Constructivism emphasises the social aspect of existence; “the role of 
shared ideas as an ideational structure constraining and shaping 
behaviour”.271 
2. The theory gives ideas a role in constituting actors, not just regulating 
their behaviour. 
3. Ideas and actors “co-constitute and co-determine each other”. As alluded 
to earlier, “[s]tructures constitute actors in terms of their interests and 
identities, but structures are also produced, reproduced, and altered by 
the discursive practices of agents”.272 
Accepting these points, nothing need be taken for granted in IR. Relating this to 
political Islam and the umma, for example, Constructivism allows scholars of IR 
to not take the concept of the state as their unit of analysis, if political reality is 
constructed to that end.  
 Nickolas Onuf, another Constructivist theorist, makes the claim that IR 
represents a bounded social reality273; that neo-Realism, for example, holds 
universal explanatory power falsely limits the behaviour of actors; they become 
bounded by this universalism. That a universal and therefore a-historical view of 
IR sees a bipolar world as “the best of all possible worlds”,274 betrays the fact 
the theory was heavily influenced by the time of its dominance during the Cold 
War; a “historical moment has left its indelible mark upon this purportedly 
universalistic science”.275  
 In comparison to Onuf’s more hard line Constructivism, Jeffery Checkel 
sees Constructivism not as a theory but as an approach to bridge the divide 
between ‘mainstream’ and poststructural IR theorists, thus, the Constructivist’s 
point of contention with mainstream theory is ontological, not epistemological.276 
The social aspect of life which Wendt emphasises has indeed broadened the 
contours of the discipline of IR. However Checkel warns that it lacks as a theory 
of agency, often over relying on structures and norms. As such, Checkel is less 
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blunt in his appraisal of the place of ideas in IR. For him, “the environment in 
which agents/states take action is social as well as material”.277 Such a view 
acknowledges the material focus of Realism but seeks to supplement it rather 
than displace it. Checkel’s approach, which builds upon Wendt’s own desire to 
“find a via media between positivism and interpretivism”,278 highlights a dualism 
which on the one hand refuses to accept that ideas are explained solely by 
material interest, but on the other hand asserts that one can know about the 
world through scientific enquiry.279 
 Whether one defines Constructivism as an approach or a theory, Onuf 
would reject the dualism of Wendt and Checkel, and would like IR to move 
away from the idea of scientific endeavour, as for him there can be no paradigm 
theories in the discipline. Base assumptions are something you have to be told 
in IR (in this case anarchy), they cannot be proven, like in the natural sciences. 
Onuf’s hard line Constructivism sees “no one world more real than others. None 
is ontologically privileged as the unique real world”. 280  Such an ontological 
position shares much with the poststructural position outlined above, and 
indeed Onuf relates his Constructivism to the ends pursued in this thesis when 
he states that “while it was claimed that anarchy is the distinctive condition to 
which the discipline responds, it is by no means clear that the Western state 
system is the only concrete instance of international relations available for 
study”.281 
Onuf’s position, representative of hard Constructivism, which shares 
much with the poststructural position outlined earlier, also shares 
poststructuralism’s weakness. Recalling Turner’s critique of poststructuralism 
(which equally applies to hard Constructivism), “epistemological scepticism [of 
the real world] does not lead itself either to political action or to the development 
of alternative frameworks”.282 As explained earlier in the chapter, this tension 
will manifest itself as an incoherence between the assertion of faith by the 
Muslim and the scepticism of such assertions by poststructuralists, and will be 
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dealt with later in the thesis. That being so, it is the dualism283 of Wendt and 
Checkel which the thesis will use to give meaning to the term Constructivism; in 
this way, Constructivism is poised to act as a bridge between the ideational and 
the material. As Ronald Bleiker and Mark Chou put it, albeit when discussing 
Nietzsche and IR: “Acknowledging an inevitable link between form and content 
is not to deny that facts exist in the real world. But it is to acknowledge that 
these facts only make sense through our practices of interpretation”.284 
While Constructivism has “succeeded in broadening the theoretical 
contours of [international relations]”,285 allowing ideology and the realm of ideas 
to play more of a role in how one constructs and implements a world view, 
political Islam fails to keep up in this regard, and for this reason Constructivism 
is uniquely placed to help this thesis construct a concept of Islamic IR. 
Constructivism helps to blur the lines between different disciplines, sociology 
and international relations in particular, helping also to penetrate the barriers 
between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ levels of analysis. Here Constructivism’s 
role in ameliorating the divide between poststructuralism and ‘mainstream’ IR 
becomes apparent. Political Islam’s rudimentary conception of the international 
sphere could thus capitalise on a Constructivist approach to IR, helping it 
‘construct’ a more comprehensive world view from its existing religiopolitical 
foundations. Having outlined the use of Constructivism in the framework of this 
thesis, as a bridge between the ideational aspects of poststructuralism and the 
more material aspects of dominant IR paradigms, the final part of the chapter 
will deal explicitly with some methodological problems and limitations. 
Problems and Limitations 
This research cannot claim to represent the views of the entire global Muslim 
population. The ‘Islam’ referred to in this research, unless stated otherwise, 
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consists of Sunni orthodoxy. That is, the four schools of thought Hanbali, Shafi’i, 
Maliki and Hanifi. Limiting this key term gives focus to the research, whose aim 
is to comment on IR theory, not make comments on theological positions. To 
talk about how the entirety of Islam perceives the practice of IR would be a 
separate project; comparing Islamic notions of IR to the Western notion requires 
the thesis to limit the use of these terms to make the project feasible. Sunni 
Islam is the site of analysis as it is one which the author is most familiar. 
However, other denominations of Islam will be used to illustrate points where 
appropriate, specifically, the thesis will turn to Shi’a thought on politics and the 
state in particular, in chapter 3.  
Even within Sunni orthodoxy, the thesis does not claim there is a 
univocal body of opinion to draw upon; there is no single shari’a code, even in 
the four schools of Sunni orthodoxy, which constitute some sort of ‘canon’ with 
regards to Sunni thought on politics. One of the fundamental differences 
between Sunni Islam and Roman Catholicism, for example, is that Sunni Islam 
has no ‘church’ structure or hierarchy of clergy, in the way Catholics do. While 
Papal decree might be observed to be the ‘definitive’ Catholic view on matters, 
no such authority exists in the Sunni Muslim world. Therefore, the research will 
look at the jurisprudence of all four schools, where necessary, in an attempt to 
glean information about state conduct. If one school of thought offers more on 
this subject than the others that will not lessen the applicability of the research’s 
findings as the four schools together are considered theologically orthodox; that 
some schools may not offer as much guidance on the criteria assessed in this 
thesis does not take away any credibility from these sources. Specifying Sunni 
orthodoxy as the definition of ‘Islam’ for this thesis helps it be precise with 
religious sources. How these sources are interpreted by the author immediately 
removes it from the Sunni orthodox position by a measure of some degree. In a 
sense the position of this thesis becomes just one more Islam amongst many, 
and so boxing it into a denominational, or similar definitional category, would be 
counterproductive. 
 Similarly, when talking about ‘IR’ or indeed ‘Western IR’, the research 
cannot hope to grapple with the disparate strands of theory that make up the 
discipline. Rather the thesis engages with two dominant concepts in IR: that of 
the state, and liberal individualism. 
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 In Sunni orthodoxy Islamic law derives from four sources, including the 
Qur’an, the word of God, and the ahadith, example of the Prophet Muhammed, 
ijma’ (consensus) and qiyas (analogy).286 Qiyas, the use of analogy, or applying 
reason is how jurisprudents, faqih, expanded on the specific matters covered in 
the Qur’an and sunna, to all aspects of life. This “disciplined exercise of 
reason”287 is known as ijtihad. However disciplined, this exercise of reason is 
very subjective, so, “alongside this free, individual legislative activity 
[qiyas/ijtihad], which... produced an uncoordinated body of opinion, went 
another balancing and complementary movement of coordination and 
unification [ijma']”288. Ijma’, consensus, was formalised by ninth century jurist, al-
Shafi’i, as tool to balance the individualistic tendencies of ijtihad. Theorising on 
an Islamic state only crystallised in the early twentieth century with Rashid Rida 
and later the Muslim Brothers of Egypt, effectively modern day attempts of 
ijtihad and reinterpretation of Islamic source texts. In this way, the research 
engages not only with the Islamic source texts but also with the more 
contemporary interpretative scholarship on Islam and politics in modern times. 
At this point the chapter comes up against a Saidian criticism which 
specifically relates to the methods outlined above. This criticism centres round 
the idea that reading into secondary sources temporally distinct from modern 
events always deals with ideals and abstractions, never more pertinent and 
historically relevant factors. 289  Said summarises this critique, claiming that 
“abstractions about the Orient, particularly those based on texts representing a 
‘classical’ Oriental civilization, are always preferable to direct evidence drawn 
from modern Oriental realities”.290 While this research does use classical texts 
to abstract on ideas ostensibly Islamic, as second order theorising the thesis is 
not making any substantial claim as to the applicability of these abstractions to 
the realities of Muslims. As stated earlier in the chapter, any such abstractions 
derived from these sources will be applicable at a philosophical and theoretical 
level. Only after such a position is shown to be tenable theoretically can those 
abstractions be compared to and integrated with the lives of Muslims and 
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‘Oriental realities’, as Said puts it. Going further, the realities of many Muslim 
peoples, in a diverse range of countries from Tunisia to Egypt, to Saudi Arabia 
and Pakistan, is a call to an ‘Islamic state’ or ‘Islamic politics’, a concept of IR 
being part and parcel of any such politics; at the level of ‘reality’ people are 
reaching for a concept that is either missing or insufficiently articulated at that 
second, ‘theoretical’ level, which is where this thesis operates. 
Conclusions 
In summary, this chapter has explained the framework of the thesis as 
consisting of a two stage analysis. In the first stage, the thesis will ‘make space’ 
in IR for the articulation of alternative, in this case religious, specifically Islamic, 
conceptions of IR. This will be done by exploiting the synthesis between 
poststructural and Islamic critiques of the European/Western rootedness of the 
discipline. This rootedness has been argued to lie in the foundational ideas that 
spawned out of the European Enlightenment. 
Poststructuralism was defined broadly as a scepticism towards 
universalising narratives. There is considerable divergence on what the term 
poststructuralism means. However, taking a cue from Said’s framework, the 
thesis comes to poststructuralism through Foucault, and however imperfect the 
label, it is Foucault’s ideas that furnish the term poststructuralism in this thesis. 
For the purposes of this thesis then, poststructuralism is defined as distinct to 
postmodernism, the latter being tied to a historical moment of scepticism, the 
former an ontological statement about the nature of knowledge. The great 
limitation of poststructuralism for this thesis is that while there might be 
considerable similarity in the criticisms made of IR by poststructuralism and 
Islamic sources, they diverge considerably in the construction of alternative 
theories; Islam involves a call to truth (the shahadda), and poststructuralism is 
sceptical towards such a position. The way in which these two positions, 
sometimes diverging and sometimes converging, interact with each other will be 
explored in the later chapters of the thesis. 
If the first stage of analysis is concerned with the synthesis between 
Islam and poststructuralism, the second stage of the analysis concerns their 
divergence. In this second stage the thesis employs Constructivism as a means 
to give agency to new notions of Islam-as-politics that might be created to fill the 
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conceptual gap the first stage of analysis will open up in the discipline of IR. 
Again, the term Constructivism is broad, and the chapter overviewed briefly the 
advent of this mode of thought in IR, starting with Wendt. Wendt’s 
Constructivism was described as being sympathetic to material interests as well 
as ideation ones, which is in contrast to Constructivists like Onuf who argue that 
the ideational takes precedence over all other factors. The chapter concluded 
that the position of Wendt is what the term Constructivism will refer to 
throughout the thesis. Given that the thesis is operating in the second order or 
meta-theoretical level of analysis, it is appropriate to use Constructivism as this 
approach also gives a prominent place to the world of ideas. Indeed, the review 
of Constructivist study of the Middle East identified those studies as coming 
closest to being able to account for Islam on its own terms, and so presents the 
best opportunity moving forward for this thesis. In addition to the meaning 
attributed to Constructivism in this thesis, and the reason it is so appropriate, 
the chapter highlighted the way which Constructivism will be used; resonating 
with Checkel’s usage of Constructivism, the thesis will use the theory as a 
bridge between the ideational world of poststructuralism and the more material 
world of the dominant IR paradigms.  
The ramifications of the Enlightenment and the way in which its ideas 
find their way into modern IR were discussed briefly with regards to the concept 
of secularism. Here the chapter explored the way in which secularism 
represents a development of a specifically Christian tradition, now remade as a 
value free institution. The implications for Islam-as-politics when faced with this 
‘secular bias’ in IR is that it always appears as an aberration. In challenging this 
secular bias the chapter argued that it is incorrect to speak of Islam as a belief 
system binding all Muslims of the world together. Rather, Islam-as-faith 
represents a diverse archive of tools, symbols and norms for (many forms of) 
Islam-as-politics to draw upon.  
When discussing Islam, the chapter narrowed its definition to refer to 
only Sunni Islam as this provides a clear and concise example as the thesis 
interacts with IR; similar analyses could be made with other non-Western 
traditions, but Sunni Islam represents the subject matter the author is most 
acquainted with.  
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Having now dealt with and fully articulated the framework of this thesis, 
the next chapter, Sovereignty and Normative Political Islam, while intersecting 
with all the research questions of the thesis, pays particular focus on how 
extensive is the guidance offered in Islamic source texts with regards to 
international relations. 
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Chapter 3: Sovereignty and Normative Political 
Islam 
Political Islam presents itself in a wide variety of guises. Generally the use of 
the adjective ‘political’ implies a distinct object of analysis from simply ‘Islam’. 
That may be true for, broadly speaking, Western analysts, but making that very 
distinction, or not, is something that can define what it means to be an Islamist. 
As outlined in Chapter 1, Islam in International Relations Scholarship, much of 
what gives Islamism its vitality and appeal is related to the simplicity of salafi 
inspired thought over the inseparability of faith and politics of the temporal world, 
of din wa dawla. To paraphrase Eickelman and Piscatori, din wa dawla 
proponents exaggerate the unique nature of Muslim politics, inadvertently 
propagate the view that Muslim politics is irrational and present Muslim politics 
as a mesh of various world views, due to the ‘natural’ fact of the inseparability of 
faith and politics.291  In contrast to the din wa dawla approach, Carl Brown 
eloquently writes about how “[n]o one suggests a timeless and unchanging 
Christian approach to politics. The same should not hold for Islam. The possible 
difference in its worldly manifestations between the Christianity of Paul, 
Augustine, Aquinas, or Luther is readily accepted. Christianity has a history. So 
does Islam”.292 It is this Islamic history which will be explored in more depth in 
this chapter, in an attempt to answer the secondary research question: How 
extensive is the guidance offered in Islamic source texts with regards to IR? 
Chapter 1 reached a workable definition of political Islam that was neither 
reliant on religious source texts to provide a ‘unique’ slant on Muslim politics, 
nor was it incumbent on a ‘Muslim reformation’ that would separate the 
temporal and otherworldly as happened in Christendom – a result that is highly 
unsatisfactory doctrinally, as, for example, chapter 5, verse 40 of the Qur’an 
demonstrates regarding sovereignty, where it says “Knowest thou not that to 
Allah alone belongeth the dominion of the Heavens and the Earth”.293 Rather, 
this thesis defined political Islam as the pursuit of politics that adheres to Islamic 
norms and values and facilitates the practice of the faith. This definition 
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necessarily distinguishes between the faith, as derived from religious source 
texts, and Islamic norms and values. Reference to this definition of political 
Islam was labelled ‘Normative Political Islam’, and that is the term used as the 
argument of this thesis continues. On top of the fact that this definition is 
exceptionally broad and relatively permissive, deriving a political model is 
difficult as norms and values are far more nebulous and harder to define than 
the tenants of the faith. While norms and values may well be attributed to and 
derive from religious source texts, source texts are not the only source of their 
content, unlike the tenants of faith.  
With a definition in hand the chapter will move to explore the implications 
of Normative Political Islam in the international sphere, leading to a discussion 
on the prime articulation of political Islam, normative or otherwise, on IR: 
transnational Islam and the umma. The essence of the challenge transnational 
Islam poses to IR will be argued to centre on sovereignty, and resolving the 
issue of sovereignty is the primary focus of this chapter.  
The thesis finds two specific reasons for the focus on sovereignty: First is 
the want to ensure God remains sovereign over Muslims, creating tension with 
vesting sovereignty in an individual or institution; second is the nature of 
authority in fiqh (jurisprudence) residing not over territory, as in the state that 
originated in Europe, but rather over people. The second divergence with 
dominant notions of sovereignty in IR, the distinction between rule over people 
rather than rule over territory, has little resonance in the modern world as 
Muslim states by definition, work within the framework of states and territory. 
The importance of sovereignty however, becomes apparent when looking at the 
notion of God as sovereign, as Muslim rulers try, in a variety of ways, to display 
their adherence with this principle to their citizens as a way to shore up 
legitimacy for their regimes. It is this problem then, which the current chapter 
will move to explore, that is, the notion of God as sovereign.  
The need for distinctions between Islam, political Islam and Normative 
Political Islam demonstrates that Islamic source texts are at best ambiguous 
about forms of government, Islamic or otherwise. Ambiguity does not mean that 
there is nothing to be gained from further analysis; Islam-as-faith needs to be 
refined in order to have a constructive impact in politics.  
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This chapter answers the dilemma of how to refine theological guidance 
by outlining the other parts of the Islamic message, namely mysticism and 
rationalism.294 The chapter argues that this is exactly the method used in Iran to 
develop a Shi’a Islamic State. Doing so in that instance relied heavily on a 
gnostic and mystic philosophy that has a prominent role in Shi’a tradition.295 
That being true, the chapter posits that many of the reasons Sunni Islam 
struggles with a coherent notion of Islamic rule in the mould of Iran is because 
unlike Shi’ism, gnostic philosophy is marginal in Sunni Islam, resting primarily 
with Sufi orders. The chapter looks therefore at the ways in which exoteric, 
rationalist philosophy, which has a long, if currently maligned tradition in Sunni 
Islam, might develop and refine the nature of Islam’s role in politics. 
After tracing the rational tradition in Islamic philosophy, the chapter then 
applies this branch of philosophy to resolving the question of maintaining the 
sovereignty of God in a world of nation states. Abu Zayd Abdu al-Rahman ibn 
Muhammed ibn Khaldun al-Hadrami, hereafter referred to as Ibn Khaldun, was 
a prominent historian, sociologist and philosopher in the fourteenth century. He 
applied the rational tradition in his study of Muslim politics and history, and the 
chapter will use his work to access a theory of sovereignty. In addition to the 
theological guidance explored in chapter 1, the chapter will build upon a theory 
of sovereignty that is centred on a dual agreement, as propounded by Majid 
Khadduri.296 Muslims, by virtue of their declaration of faith, agree to the moral 
precepts of the shari’a, and in doing so respect the sovereignty of God. A 
second agreement with a temporal authority is also established, but in order for 
the polity to be considered ‘Islamic’ as per Normative Political Islam, the 
temporal authority must also respect that same commitment to the first 
agreement. The implications of this are twofold: Firstly, a Muslim is perfectly 
capable of adhering to the first contract in territories that do not govern in 
accordance with the declaration of faith. In other words, respect for God’s 
sovereignty, given the ambiguous guidance on politics in religious source texts, 
does not imply a government wherein God is sovereign; secondly, the 
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agreement that relates directly to the temporal world is one that is based on 
rationalism and human ingenuity (which will be shown to currently be a ‘silent’ 
partner of contemporary political Islam), so escaping the need to derive all 
models and theories of politics from theological sources. 
The chapter begins with an overview of political Islam as it relates to the 
state, exploring the differing epistemologies of various theoretical positions, all 
of which rely on kalam (theology) as their means of deriving knowledge of the 
world. The chapter will then discuss two other strands of the Islamic message 
and the ways in which these relate to politicsː the philosophy of mysticism will 
be discussed primarily in relation to the politics of Ayatollah Khomeini and the 
philosophy of rationalism will be discussed in the Arab Sunni Muslim world. 
After this, the rational tradition will be explored, as expounded by Ibn Khaldun, 
and the chapter will posit a theory of sovereignty that satisfies obedience to 
both transcendental and temporal authorities. The current chapter therefore 
employs the two stage conceptual framework of this thesis in firstly breaking 
down existing notions of Islamic sovereignty, and identifying in those existing 
notions areas of knowledge that have been neglected. The second part of the 
conceptual framework is employed in the drawing together of the 
aforementioned neglected components of the Islamic message (rationalism and 
mysticism) to form a notion of sovereignty that can be taken forward into the 
next chapter of the thesis, Islamic Community and International Relations, 
which will deal specifically with Normative Political Islam in the international 
sphere. Resolving the issue of sovereignty for Normative Political Islam is a 
fundamental step in understanding the way in which that polity might behave in 
IR.  
Political Islam and the State 
Despite the fluctuations and metamorphoses of the international sphere in the 
last century, widely referred to as the process of globalisation, the state endures 
as a dominant locus of politics in the international sphere (even as the 
distinction between international and local is challenged). How political Islam 
might interact with the state has been a key debate ever since Muslim majority 
countries began to win independence from their former colonial masters. Claims 
that Islam “offers a single vision for uniting the individual quest for virtue with the 
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social goods of justice and solidarity”297 do not recognise the nuance and the 
differing visions that spin out of the singular message of Islam-as-faith. John 
Esposito elucidates this point when he writes that “[t]hough often described in 
monolithic terms as “the Islamic alternative” or “the system of Islam,” a diverse 
and prolific assortment of Islamic ideologies, actors, political parties, and 
organizations have reemerged in Muslim politics, grouped under the umbrella of 
Islam”.298  
What Esposito’s statement teases at is the distinction between what Islam 
means as a faith, and what it means as politics. This distinction between Islam-
as-politics and Islam-as-faith will inform the remainder of the chapter as it 
pursues a notion of Islamic sovereignty. To begin, the chapter will briefly try to 
highlight the many ways in which political Islam interacts with the state.  
The famous student of Muhammed Abduh, Rashid Rida, saw a place for 
nationalism and the state in Islamic politics. Living through the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire, Rida warned that while a national spirit is compatible with a 
Muslim’s faith, care must be taken to maintain priorities: 
 
In his [a Muslim’s] service of his homeland and his people he must not, however, 
neglect Islam which has honoured him and raised him up by making him a brother 
to hundreds of millions of Muslims in the world. He is a member of a body greater 
than his people, and his personal homeland is part of the homeland of his religious 
community. He must be intent on making the progress of the part a means for the 
progress of the whole.
299
 
 
Is this summation there is a political Islam that happily works with the state 
system, as long as Muslim states working within that system do not put their 
own needs above the needs of the wider Muslim community. The Organization 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) ostensibly carries out the role of ensuring Muslim 
solidarity comes before the needs of individual states; the second statement in 
the OIC’s charter states that its purpose is the “promoting and consolidating the 
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unity and solidarity among the Member States in securing their common 
interests at the international arena”.300 However, while it holds regular meetings 
at a variety of levels, it “has tended over the years to become identified more 
with the rhetoric rather than the practical implementation of Islamic unity”.301 
 The notion of Islam working within and as part of the state, what this 
thesis will refer to as the ‘Islamic state’, is a novel idea initially propagated by 
Rida after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.302 In contrast, Nazih Ayubi in 
fact sees all Islamic theories of government as a novel rather than traditional 
theory303 as in his summation: “although Islam is a religion of collective morals, 
it is not a particularly political religion”.304 Marking a break from Rashid Rida and 
others, 305  scholars like Ayubi “attach more importance to the religious 
relationship with the absolute of God than to the vehement demonstrations of 
political movements”.306 This articulation of political Islam is important as it is 
defined by the lack of the political. Or perhaps, if there is a political element to 
the faith, it is to be defined and implemented by human beings rather than 
divine and otherworldly direction. Such a position is especially prevalent with 
Muslim scholars dealing with issues of human rights and democracy, such as 
Abdullahi An-Na’im307 and S.M. Zafar308. 
 A third orientation of political Islam is heavily inspired by Maulana 
Maududi and sees political Islam working within the state system as before, but 
rather than the state and Islamic considerations being two different concerns in 
a hierarchical relationship, for Maududi the Islamic state would be a natural 
symbiosis of politics and religion. As Roy Jackson puts it, “Maududi’s Islamic 
society is completely in line with nature. In fact, it is nature”.309 Maududi places 
Allah as legal and political sovereign in his state, and talks of laws as divine 
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creations.310 Here the chapter takes a step closer to the din wa dawla position 
of brooking no separation between Islam-the-faith and Islam-as-politics. In this 
summation, the presence of an Islamic state is not a peripheral addition to one’s 
relationship with God, but is central to it – an affirmation of faith in its own right. 
 The overview above is not a complete taxonomy of positions within the 
umbrella of political Islam, but covers the key points of difference between them. 
Only the third variation, that representative of Maududi’s position, bears a direct 
effect on IR as it is commonly demarcated, for it challenges the nature of what a 
state is. Much like the debate around Iran being ‘different’ from or somehow 
‘less rational’ than other states due to its religious character, Maududi’s Sunni 
Islamic state would pose similar questions to IR scholars. The first two positions, 
those characterised by Rashid Rida’s hierarchy of national and Islamic interests 
in the first instance, and Nazih Ayubi’s non-political Islam in the second instance, 
both work within the prevailing international system and so pose far fewer 
questions to the discipline of IR. The former institutionalises the concepts of 
nation and state into an Islamic world view, while the latter takes the ‘political’ 
out of political Islam, emphasising the constitutive power of believers and 
minimising the divine elements of the perspective. 
 Rather than engage with the debate on religious rationality, 311  the 
chapter will now look to a form of political Islam as yet unexplored in this thesis, 
yet posing challenges to IR at least as poignant as those brought forward by 
Maududi’s Islamic State. This strand of political Islam is transnational Islam, and 
it focuses on the politics of the umma. The chapter will look at the ways in which 
the politics of the umma relates to Normative Political Islam, and the challenges 
this brings to IR. 
 In the decline and abolition of the Ottoman Empire, debate raged as to 
the correct form of Islamic politics. As Piscatori notes: “To the question, ‘How 
should the umma be constructed now?’ little agreement emerged, with however, 
the significant exception: the spiritual unity of the umma required political 
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expression”.312 Herein lays the crux of transnational (political) Islam: the notion 
of religious solidarity, loosely defined and centred on community, is its guiding 
principle. Questions around this notion and its compatibility with the state, and 
the depth of solidarity required of the umma, are widely contested. Amr Sabet is 
critical of the ability a heavily contested Islam, political or otherwise, has to 
“illuminate, comprehend or conceptualize”.313 Therefore for the purposes of this 
thesis, if the umma is to have any analytical purchase, it is necessary to refine 
and in some regards define the notions of transnational Islam as related to 
Normative Political Islam.  
 The political expression of the umma in Normative Political Islam mirrors 
much of what the thesis has stated about Normative Political Islam thus far. 
Within Normative Political Islam, the politics of the umma, or transnational Islam, 
is less about the creation of a political union of Muslim peoples, or indeed 
holding such a union as an article of faith. Rather, it is about fostering a culture 
of unity and solidarity, as was discussed in chapter 1, Islam in International 
Relations Scholarship. This is a distinction also made by Piscatori, where Pan-
Islam, “that is, giving concrete form to the idea of Muslim political unity”, and 
pan-Islamism, “the ideology promoting unity” are two different, if often 
overlapping, phenomena. 314  For this thesis, transnational Islam is 
representative of Piscatori’s pan-Islamism. In practice, this would be much like 
the way inalienable human rights, as set out in the United Nation’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, codifies a sense of commonality with far flung 
peoples who are denied these rights; so too would an umma under Normative 
Political Islam codify a sense of commonality amongst Muslims. Likewise, the 
ways in which human rights are challenging the power and internal efficacy of 
the state, so too would the politics of the umma, centred round rule over people 
rather than rule of territory, challenge centrality of the state in IR.  
Peter Mandaville paints in broad strokes a further challenge transnational 
Islam presents to IR: “By locating ‘the political’ within the state, conventional IR 
theory reproduces a set of political structures unsuited to circumstances in 
which political identities and processes configure themselves across and 
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between forms of political community.”315 The state is tied to notions of political 
modernity whereby religion is relegated to the private sphere. Mandaville 
continues: “By reasserting itself in public space, Islam is hence disrupting the 
modernity which lies at the root of the state”. 316  Hence transnational Islam 
‘undermines’ modernity in a way that the human rights discourse, being a 
secular discourse, does not, despite the fact the underlying issue is the same 
(rule over people vs. rule over territory). A unique way in which transnational 
Islam, and the various strands of political Islam more broadly, represent a 
departure from secular debate on the rule of the individual vs. rule over territory, 
is the transcendental element of the Islamic message, specifically, the 
transcendental nature of sovereignty in political Islam, and this is where the 
focus of the chapter lies. The importance of sovereignty is identified by 
Mandaville as the remaining challenge for Islamist parties vying for power in 
democratic processes,317 as the notion of power sharing with God or with the 
shari’a is still controversial in theory, even if it is circumvented in practice by 
many Muslim rulers.318 
The Qur’an explicitly tells believers that all power rests with God: “Say: 
‘To whom belongeth all that is in the Heavens and on Earth?’ Say: ‘To Allah!’”319 
The problem faced by any rulers in an Islamic state is that of legitimacy. If 
sovereignty rests with God then why are Muslim citizens obliged to obey the 
commands of a monarch, president, or other ruler? In the Islamic Republic of 
Iran the Supreme Leader is believed to have a unique relationship with God, 
whereby he is uniquely qualified to interpret His commandments. To disagree 
with the supreme leader is close to, if not actual blasphemy, in the opinion of 
the regime. The situation in Sunni orthodoxy is somewhat different as there is 
no hierarchical clergy system as exists in Twelver Shi’ism. Jurisprudence in 
Sunni orthodoxy is “textual authority to justify what in effect is... interpretative 
license”.320 The acknowledgement of law as being a human interpretation of 
God’s wishes, not his actual wishes, goes some way to explaining the existence 
of 4 separate schools of thought, madhahib (singular: madhab), in Sunni 
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orthodoxy. None of the madhahib can claim to be as authoritative as the Qur’an, 
the word of God, and so they accept each other’s interpretations of matters not 
explicitly covered in the Qur’an and hadith as equally viable (matters explicitly 
covered in the Qur’an and hadith have very little deviance between the 
madhahib, such as prayer, for example).  
Whilst the Qur’an tells Muslims they are God’s vicegerents on Earth, 
legitimising a first amongst equals is problematic. This is an issue where the 
Qur’an, beyond many explicit references to God’s sovereignty, is vague in its 
guidance on legitimising government. On the one hand one can find verses that 
seemingly justify a sort of natural law whereby some individuals are ‘blessed’ 
with more power than others,321 while on the other hand there are verses that 
seem to emphasise the equality of man, and necessity for popular 
sovereignty. 322  While Qur’anic exegesis would look at the context of these 
revelations to discern greater clarity from the verses and resolve any 
contradiction, that is not the purpose of this chapter. Rather, assuming that 
there is no explicit guidance in the Islamic source texts on who should rule a 
Muslim community, the chapter seeks to supplement these texts in order to 
refine and better articulate a position regarding the political sovereignty of God. 
Theology takes us so far, it seems, but no further. To proceed in articulating 
sovereignty and the international relations of Normative Political Islam, the body 
of work the chapter now turns to is Islamic philosophy. 
Islamic Philosophy and Political Islam 
In addition to the normative and in some regards pluralistic elements of 
Normative Political Islam, another marker of difference between it and other 
interpretations of Islamic politics is the recognition of shari’a as only one 
component of the Islamic revelation. Those Muslims that call for ‘a return to the 
shari’a’ assume that the shari’a can offer guidance on all aspects of life. Built 
into that assumption is the idea that Islam-the-faith can be extrapolated out into 
Islam-as-politics, much as the thesis is attempting to do in exploring Normative 
Political Islam. However, shari’a is but one strand of Islamic knowledge, as 
explained by Hossein Nasr:  
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Islam is hierarchic when considered in its total reality and also in the way it has 
manifested itself in history. The Islamic revelation possesses within itself several 
dimensions and has been revealed to humanity on the basic levels of al-islam, al-
iman, and al-ihsan (submission, faith, and virtue) and from another perspective as 
al-Shari’ah, al-Tariqah and al-Haqiqah (the Law, the Path and the Truth).
323
 
 
To cure the world’s ills by ‘returning to the shari’a’ reveals an assumption that 
the shari’a represents the Islamic message. Put another way, shari’a is Islam. 
Here an inherent contradiction is revealed in extrapolating all knowledge, 
specifically vis-a-vis politics, from but one strand of the Islamic revelation. This 
is a trend that Fazlur Rahman notes when he laments the cessation of 
practicing fiqh after the eighth century AD, to simply studying and learning fiqh 
thereafter.324  
Even within kalam (theology), the chosen strand of knowledge for din wa 
dawla advocates and political Islamists more generally, which relates to faith 
and the shari’a in Nasr’s above summary, one can see calls for using other 
elements outside of theology to inform a Muslim’s life. For example, ahadith, 
which are one of 4 key components in Islamic fiqh and shari’a,325 can be used 
to give further credence to the separate strands of the Islamic revelation. Imam 
Nawawi’s authoritative collection of hadith shows the trifurcation of Islamic 
knowledge has prophetic and transcendental weight to it where in the Prophet 
Muhammed explains the difference between submission, faith and virtue326 (al-
islam, al-iman and al-ihsan in Nasr’s above summary). Acknowledging this 
separation in the revelation gives great utility to Normative Political Islam to 
derive an international order from Islamic sources, distinct from those that thus 
far have proven ambiguous in its guidance on politics (traditional fiqh sources). 
Submission and shari’a are related to theology, which has been explored in this 
and previous chapters. Faith and the Path are related to philosophy, while virtue 
and the Truth are related to gnosticism and esotericism (commonly identified 
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with Sufism). This section of the chapter proceeds by exploring the role 
philosophy and gnosticism might play in Normative Political Islam. 
Gnosticism and the Shi’ism of Ayatollah Khomeini 
As well as Shi’a majorities in Arab countries such as Iraq and Bahrain, Shi'ism 
is also the predominant faith of the people of Iran, which represents the only 
example of a successful Islamist revolution. The Islamic state, which functions 
under the stipulations of (Shi’a) shari'a law, provides us with information on how 
Islam-as-faith interacts with the modern state system and the methods used in 
that context to refine and make clearer the so far ambiguous guidance on 
politics within Islamic source texts. To do so effectively a brief overview of 
Shi'ism and Shi’a fiqh follows. 
 Shi’as derive their name from shia'at 'Ali, the party of 'Ali. 'Ali was the 
fourth of the rashidun, the ‘rightly guided Caliphs’, and cousin and son-in-law to 
the Prophet Muhammed. At first the split was political, as the 'party of 'Ali' 
wanted him to become the Caliph after the Prophet's death. Shi’as believe that 
the only people who can legitimately be Caliph are those descended from the 
Prophet, through the line of 'Ali and his wife, the Prophet's daughter, Fatima. 
Because of this, the first three Caliphs are considered 'usurpers' by the Shi’a 
community.327  
 Whereas Sunni Islam has no 'church' or religious hierarchy in the way 
that Christianity does, Shi’a Islam does have such a hierarchy. For Shi’as, as 
already mentioned, the only people worthy of exercising authority over the 
umma are the descendants of the Prophet. Such individuals are called 'imams', 
a word that is also used in Sunni Islam, but to mean a leader of a masjid (or 
mosque, Muslim 'church') or localised community. In Shi'ism, specifically 
mainstream 'twelver' Shi'ism, the imams are without sin, and possess an 
infallible understanding of the Qur'an and sunna, granted to them through their 
unique relationship with God. This relationship is tied to divine intellect, the truth 
of which is only glimpsed through gnosticism. As Tjitze De Boer comments on 
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this esotericism, “[t]hat which the friend of God knows intuitively, remains 
hidden for ever from the discursive intellect of the learned”.328  
There are twelve imams (hence the 'twelver' adjective), the first being the 
Caliph 'Ali and the last being Muhammed al-Mahdi, who disappeared in 874AD. 
Shi’a faith is waiting for the return of this twelfth imam, the mahdi or guided one, 
to bring a reign of justice and establish the perfect society before the end of the 
world.329 The perceived religious purity of Shi’a Imams grants them a similar 
interpretative licence and authority to the Prophet. Being able to hold such a 
religious authority in a way the Sunni successors to the Islamic state were 
unable to do so, goes some way to explaining the Iranian, Shi’a justification for 
that state. Such an argument only holds water if one believes that part of the 
Prophet's mission was political, which the founder of the current Iranian order, 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, firmly believed. He states that “[j]ust as the 
Prophet was charged by God to execute holy decrees and establish Islamic 
order, and obedience to him was indispensable, the just foqaha must be both 
leaders and governors, executing decrees and establishing the Islamic social 
order”.330 However, chapter 1 established the thesis of Ali Abd al-Raziq thesis 
on the separate sources of authority the Prophet Muhammed drew upon, the 
‘kingly’ and the ‘prophetic’. In the face of that argument Khomeini’s assertions 
are a less than self-evident, and so the current section will explore the 
theoretical justifications of the Shi’a state below. 
 Shi’a fiqh differs only slightly in its basic principles next to Sunni fiqh, with 
the issue of hadith and ijma' being contentious. Beyond this, the difference 
between Sunni and Shi’a law is in details only.331 Concerning hadith, unlike the 
Sunni fiqh of the four madhahib, Shi’as only accept ahadith that are transmitted 
in the first instance by the Prophet's family. In addition, the Shi’as have 
incorporated the ahadith of the twelve imams into their source of fiqh and such 
ahadith are elevated to the same status as those of the Prophet. 332  In 
development of their body of fiqh, ijma' (consensus) was far less important, “its 
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place is taken by the authority of the Imam”.333 It is this lack of ijma' that makes 
Shi’a fiqh so noticeably distinct from the Sunni variety. Khomeini is unabashedly 
dismissive of those that claim that Islam has little to say on governance. He 
writes: 
 
They have said that Islam has no relationship whatsoever with organizing life and 
society or with creating a government of any kind and that it only concerns itself 
with the rules of menstruation and child birth. It may contain some ethics. But 
beyond this, it has no bearing on issues of life and of organizing society.
334
 
 
His contempt for such a view point is almost palpable, yet the evidence he gives 
to support his view is simply that the Qur'an and hadith books are superior to 
theses written by religious legists and commentators. This is considered a 
correct and orthodox opinion of the source texts, as demonstrated earlier, but it 
does not take away from the fact that these texts need interpreting, and such 
interpretations are human, fallible endeavours. Khomeini's argument that “[t]he 
belief that Islam came for a limited period and for a certain place violates the 
essentials of the Islamic beliefs”335, is a just one. However, the answer does not 
have to mean, as Khomeini advocates, that Islam has prescribed a form of 
government for all peoples for all time. Instead, as Abdul Karim Soroush argues, 
the principles contained in the source texts, if continually reinterpreted, can yield 
different and differing answers to modern day problems.336 
 Above all else, it is the Prophet's authority that gives birth to Iran's 
Islamic state. This authority could not be replicated by the Sunnis but has been 
successfully co-opted by the Shi’a Imams. Khomeini states that the Prophet 
“was appointed ruler on earth by God so that he may rule justly and not follow 
whims”.337 While the accuracy of this statement could be argued, the fact of the 
matter is that Shi’as believe it to be true, and in a similar way they also believe 
that it is God that appoints the Imams, hence the name 'Ayatullah', literally 'sign 
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of God'. Khomeini himself elucidates, “[t]o the Shi'i the Imam is a virtuous man 
who knows the laws and implements them justly and who fears nobody's 
censure in serving God”.338 In essence, one man's interpretation of the source 
text (the Imam's) becomes canon and so, if he is looking for evidence of Islamic 
government and finds it, no one can dispute his finding. Theologically speaking, 
such a method of interpretation, while making use of qiyas (analogy), has no 
limits placed on it, limits that early Sunni thinkers had developed by way of ijma'. 
While the power of the Imam is ostensibly explained due to his singular ability to 
interpret the source texts, the case of Iranian political Islam is not akin to Sunni 
varieties which unwittingly equate shari’a with the totality of Islam-as-faith; Shi’a 
Iran in fact uses a second strand of Islamic knowledge, al-ihsan 
(virtue/gnosticism), to help construct its method of politics. This was glimpsed at 
when briefly discussing the Shi’a Imams’ unique and esoteric relationship with 
God, and the chapter will now explore this further through the example of 
Ayatollah Khomeini, who in many respects was the architect (or arbiter) of the 
fusion of religion and politics at the inception of the Iranian republic. 
 In Khomeini’s thought, “there are two essential qualities of leadership: 
first, knowledge of Islamic law; second, justice”.339 Already a divergence from 
Sunni political Islam appears, where knowledge of Islamic law is knowledge of 
justice, or the route to that knowledge. For Khomeini though these are two, 
separate wisdoms. The first, Islamic law, relates to al-islam, the second, 
knowledge of justice, relates to al-ihsan. Ayatollah Khomeini strove to acquire 
knowledge of justice and al-ihsan through mysticism and gnosis. These 
disciplines fall broadly under the banner of hekmat (literally ‘wisdom’) and had 
found refuge in Persia after an attack by theologians’ on philosophy, broadly 
understood, in the eleventh century AD. In this Persian context it was Mullah 
Sadra who came to define the study of hekmat and his work greatly influences 
Khomeini.340 
 For Khomeini, the recourse to hekmat was an attempt to “transcend the 
standard offerings of jurisprudence and systematic theology”341 given by the 
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Shi’a clergy. This field of thought is very esoteric and inward looking, and 
Khomeini contrasts his thinking in this regard to that of ‘the West’ when he says, 
“[l]et them go to Mars or anywhere they wish; they are still backward in the 
sphere of securing happiness to man, backward in spreading moral virtues and 
backward in creating a psychological and spiritual progress similar to the 
material progress”.342 While he rejects rationality, that is, humanity’s intellectual 
capacity, in his inner search for God, Khomeini uses reason extensively in his 
theological and formal arguments for clerical rule in Iran.343 
 In reaching beyond the traditional theological offerings of religious 
orthodoxy, Khomeini was able to refine and articulate the ambiguous guidance 
on politics found therein, and propose his take on Islamic politics. The 
conclusions on the content of that guidance and the veracity of his specific 
method will not be the subjects of this chapter’s continuing enquiry. Rather, the 
procedures used by Khomeini point to something not tried in Sunni political 
Islam; the reach beyond theology and shari’a to inform their conception of 
politics, while still remaining in the Islamic tradition. Such an undertaking in the 
Shi’a context, and the resulting order it established, was equally 
“unprecedented in the history of Shiism in Iran”.344 Baqer Moin elucidates this 
novelty in Khomeini’s approach when he comments on the rigidity of Shi’a 
orthodoxy (a claim equally applicable to Sunni orthodoxy), “[o]f the three paths 
to God, the only one they accept is that of total obedience and devotion. The 
other two, the rationalism of philosophy and the illumination of mysticism, have 
always been viewed as incompatible with what was revealed to the Prophet”.345 
The following section will examine the claim that ‘the rationalism of philosophy 
and illumination of mysticism’ have always been divergent paths from theology, 
shari’a and orthodoxy in the Sunni context. In examining that claim the chapter 
will attempt to clarify the so far ambiguous theological guidance on politics 
offered by Normative Political Islam by reaching beyond the theology and 
shari’a which have become synonymous with the totality of the Islamic message. 
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Exotericism in Sunni Islam 
Having explored al-islam earlier in this chapter, as well as in chapter 1, and 
having surveyed al-ihsan in the preceding Shi’a example, the remaining branch 
of knowledge to investigate is al-iman (faith), related to philosophy. Here the 
chapter refers explicitly to exotericism and (Aristotelian) rationalism, in contrast 
to the esotericism and mysticism of Khomeini’s approach. The relationship 
between rationalism and mysticism is a complicated one in the Islamic tradition, 
and those familiar to philosophy as it developed in the European and broadly 
Western context can easily, and incorrectly, define only the rational tradition as 
philosophy in the Islamic setting. In fact, the term falsafah in Arabic refers both 
to hekmat, as the tradition came to be defined by Mullah Sadra, and the 
rationalism of Aristotle that was the purview of the Mu’tazilite group. In this 
thesis, the term philosophy will refer to rationalism specifically, while falsafah 
will refer to both hekmat and rationalism in the Islamic context. When 
contrasting falsafah with kalam, it is important to note the ways in which these 
traditions have an intertwined historically and have substantially co-constituted 
each other. Taking Hossein Nasr’s overview of the subject, this chapter 
identifies 4 or 5 different ‘eras’ of the relationship between falsafah and 
kalam.346 The first is in the early ninth century AD, when the Mu’tazilite school 
dominated both kalam and falsafah. This period of time is described by Nasr as 
one “of close association between falsafah and kalam in an atmosphere of more 
or less relative mutual respect”.347  
During the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates the rise of Ash’arite 
theology began a gradual incorporation of certain philosophical elements into 
kalam, while at the same time separating falsafah from more orthodox forms of 
knowledge.  
A third period of this relationship was near the end of the Abbasid 
caliphate and was a period of intense opposition of falsafah by theologians, 
while at the same time borrowing heavily from the former.348 This relationship is 
epitomised by Abu Hamed Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali, 349  an 
Ash’arite theologian who wrote his tahafut al-falsafah (The Incoherence of the 
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Philosophers) in the eleventh century AD. Even while doing so, Nasr comments 
that “kalam became even more “philosophical,” employing both ideas and 
arguments drawn from falsafah”.350  
Once the ‘dominance’ of kalam was established in the Sunni world by al-
Ghazali, a more peaceful existence between falsafah and kalam continued 
through to this day. A major development in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries was the thought of Mullah Sadra, who represents a fifth stage in the 
relationship between these schools of thought. With Mullah Sadra, in the 
Persian setting, falsafah began to eclipse kalam, causing theology to become 
less important in that setting, as seen earlier in the example of Ayatollah 
Khomeini. 
It is apparent that “the theological movement in Islam was strongly 
influenced by Philosophy”.351 What is important to emphasise here is that in 
reaching beyond theology to inform Normative Political Islam, the thesis is not 
participating in anything alien to the Islamic tradition, for what that statement is 
worth. The summary provided shows that the history of theology so vehemently 
defended and lauded as the ‘true’ Islamic way by din-wa-dawla adherents, is 
one that is not a product of immaculate, divine conception, but the result of 
much human endeavour and co-constitution with falsafah.  
The previous sections and chapters have explored an Islamic order 
based on gnosticism (al-ihsan) in Khomeini’s Iran and abstracted polities based 
on theology (al-islam) in the variations on political Islam. The third approach is 
that of al-iman, rationalism and philosophy as understood in the Western 
context. In the Muslim world rationalism is strongly tied to the introduction of 
Greek philosophy, which is commonly attributed to the Mu’tazilites and 
personified in the person of Abu Ya’qub al-Kindi. Al-Kindi was an early 
Peripatetic and grappled with expressing the work of Aristotle in Arabic, as well 
as what would become a central problem of philosophy in the Islamic world, the 
“harmonization of faith and reason” 352  (an endeavour that bears a passing 
resemblance with Wendt’s pursued synthesis of science and interpretivism in 
his Constructivism, a resemblance that is returned to in later chapters). 
Moroccan philosopher Mohammed ‘Abed al-Jabri sees this mission, the 
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exploration of faith and reason, to be key in expressing an Islamic modernity, 
and this chapter argues that the use of philosophy and rationalism is the key to 
expressing a coherent concept of politics in Normative Political Islam. ‘Abed al-
Jabri states that in carrying out this task “[w]e [Muslim Arabs] could thus rid our 
conception of tradition from that ideological and emotional charge that weighs 
on our conscience and forces us to perceive tradition as an absolute reality that 
transcends history”.353  
The exotericism of the Mu’tazilites was to be rekindled some decades 
after al-Kindi by Abu Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muhammad Farabi, hereafter 
referred to as al-Farabi.354 Al-Farabi lived in the late ninth, early tenth century 
AD, a time of fragmentation of Muslim political power. As such, his philosophy is 
overly concerned with unity, and “with some attempt at adaptation to the Muslim 
faith, he seeks to demonstrate that Plato and Aristotle harmonize with one 
another”.355 In the tenth century AD Abu ʿAli al-Husayn ibn ʿAbd Allah ibn Sina, 
hereafter referred to as ibn Sina,356 lived as both a rationalist and a gnostic, 
personifying the spirit of falsafah in Muslim lands. De Boer claims the common 
perception that ibn Sina pushed beyond al-Farabi to a ‘purer’ Aristotelianism is 
incorrect, as ibn Sina and al-Farabi differed on many metaphysical issues, 
specifically around the nature of the soul.357 While both men employed reason, 
ibn Sina was far more interested in mysticism than al-Farabi. When falsafah 
was criticised by theologian al-Ghazali, in the Arab Middle Eastern setting, 
perhaps beyond repair, ibn Sina’s mix of rationalism and mysticism was the 
straw man used to do so.358  
The main thrust of al-Ghazali’s critique of falsafah was the refutation of 
reason as a means of understanding faith. Paraphrasing Fazlur Rahman’s 
summary of a Mu’tazilite position, while al-Farabi or ibn Sina might say that 
“God has forbidden killing because it is bad; it is not bad because God has 
forbidden it”359 (and reason is the means of divining why it is bad, and thus 
confirms the divine message), al-Ghazali would say the opposite. As De Boer 
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summarises, “in contradiction to the Dialecticians and Philosophers, al-Gazali 
everywhere lays stress upon experience”. 360  While al-Ghazali incorporates 
much philosophy while simultaneously refuting it, he never-the-less brought 
about the dominance of theology in the Arab Middle East as the sole carrier of 
exoteric method; as ‘Abed al-Jabri elucidates, “[i]f indeed – as it has constantly 
been reiterated – philosophy never was able to recover from the blows dealt to 
it by Ghazali, this was only true in the case of the Arab Middle East”.361 It is in 
the West of Muslim lands, in al-Andalus especially, that exoteric philosophy 
continued to thrive.  
Al-Andalus was the refuge of the Umayyad Caliphate after its fall to the 
Abbasids, and the spokesperson for the cultural and ideological project of that 
caliphate in the eleventh century AD was Abu Muhammad ʿAli ibn Ahmad ibn 
Saʿid ibn Hazm. Ibn Hazm’s focus on rationalism was in absolute contrast and 
an attempt to erase “the imprint of Shi’ite and Sufi “illumination””362 from Sunni 
thought. Ibn Hazm is very critical of esotericism, and says that “God’s (praise be 
to Him) religion is purely exoteric and is by no means esoteric. It is entirely 
obvious and hides no latent secret. It is entirely based on proof and nothing in it 
is left to chance”.363 The Almohad dynasty, some 50 years after ibn Hazm’s 
death, carried on his exoteric doctrine in the person of Abu al-Walid Muhammad 
ibn Ahmad ibn Rushd, 364  who the Almohad court sponsored to compile 
commentaries on Aristotle.365 Ibn Rushd was “above all a fanatical admirer of 
the Aristotelian Logic”,366 and sought to show that truths are only relevant and 
‘true’ in their own frames of reference. Therefore those conclusions of Aristotle 
that are not compatible with Islam can still be true, but not universal or absolute; 
“[t]heir veracity is conditioned by the system from which they are derived”.367 
Aristotelian rationalism is thereby conceived as compatible with the Islamic 
message; Ibn Rushd, in the tradition of al-Farabi, argued that “[p]hilosophy and 
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the religion of Islam do not therefore contradict each other. They express the 
same truth in different forms”.368 
Exotericism and Politics 
Having outlined the tradition of exoteric thought and rationalism in the Muslim 
world, it now falls to operationalise the abstract notions of rationalism into a 
conception of politics that might inform Normative Political Islam. ‘Abed al-Jabri 
states that the achievements of the European tradition will remain foreign to 
Muslims detached from their history and tradition. Referring to an Arab-Islamic 
future, al-Jabri is adamant that such a future must be constructed “from our own 
reality, from the specificity of our history and the constituents of our personality, 
its historical consciousness”.369 The importance of overviewing the lesser drawn 
upon aspects of the Islamic message, exotericism and gnosticism, which 
preceded this section, was to show the ways in which rationalism, gnosticism 
and theology are constitutive elements of an ‘Islamic personality’. Given that 
theology and the shari’a provide only limited or ambiguous guidance on politics, 
when the thesis proceed to look at intellectual traditions outside theology, it did 
not stray beyond the Islamic message (which after all is constituted by al-islam, 
al-iman and al-ihsan concurrently). This chapter continues by building on the 
exotericism of the Sunni tradition in an attempt to refine and add to the 
theological guidance on politics. The route taken into operationalising this 
tradition is via another who has already done so, Ibn Khaldun. 
 Ibn Khaldun became acquainted with the exotericism of Ibn Sina and Ibn 
Rushd in the court of the Marinid Sultan in Fes.370 Ibn Khaldun wrote his treatise, 
the Muqaddimah (an Introduction to History) in the fourteenth century AD and in 
it acknowledges, in agreement with ‘Ali al-Raziq, that the time of the Prophet 
was an atypical time in history with regards to politics, a rare instance where the 
divine played a role. With the passing of the rashidun it is humanity that defines 
politics and in this way Ibn Khaldun’s theories are humanist, if not secular.371 If 
political Islam “draws much of its strength from a conviction that there is no 
need for a detour through the labyrinths of Western history, before one can 
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arrive at a vision of the good life and a just order”,372 this chapter will lean 
heavily on Ibn Khaldun as a Muslim thinker who avoided such a ‘labyrinth’. In 
fact Khadduri, when explaining that the state (an approximation for authority in 
the Muslim schema) is essential for society’s survival, and that without the state 
humanity’s evil nature would ruin society, he points out that this Hobbesian 
position was grasped some 300 years before Hobbes, by Ibn Khaldun.373 
 Returning to the debates concerning transnational Islam, Normative 
Political Islam, and the sovereignty of God, this section of the chapter will now 
use the work of Ibn Khaldun to help derive a theory of Islamic sovereignty. 
Sovereignty being the remaining impediment for Islamism coming to power, in 
Mandaville’s summation. As Mandaville sees it, in circumstances where the 
modern nation state model is accepted, “the issue of shari’ah and the question 
of political power sharing… represent the sole outstanding issues that cause 
problems with regard to Islamist participation in democratic politics”.374 Whether 
sovereignty is the sole impediment to Islamist participation in democratic politics 
is contentious given the events that have transpired since the publication of 
Mandaville’s Global Political Islam in 2007. Indeed, Mandaville made that 
assertion in the year after Hamas came to power in Gaza, and five years before 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Mosri came to power in Egypt.  
While the empirical reality might be fluid with regards to Islamism dealing 
with the realities of power, this thesis has established that the theoretical 
problems with regards to holding God as sovereign must still be resolved. 
Specifically, the thesis has yet to explore the ways in which accepting the nation 
state system might undermine or limit the ways in which the sovereignty of God 
might be articulated. Hamas has felt the repercussions of the incongruence 
between theory and practice, suspending the implementation of an Islamic state 
after the 2008 war with Israel in order to deal with the aftermath of that conflict. 
As Max Rodenbeck and Nicolas Pelham state, “Hamas has become captive to 
its own success as it struggles now to reconcile the pressing needs of day-to-
day governance with the ideology it preached in opposition”.375 To avoid the 
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same fate for Normative Political Islam, this chapter will be using Ibn Khaldun’s 
exoteric method, and in combination with the guidance of kalam, derive a notion 
of sovereignty that might be more satisfactory to both din wa dawla advocates 
on the one hand, and Muslim secularists on the other. The analysis of its 
position vis-a-vis the discipline of IR will be left for the subsequent chapter. For 
now, it is enough to extrapolate a theory from the methods stated, though 
comparisons will be made throughout to Western theories and theorists when 
pertinent.  
Ibn Khaldun, Exotericism and Sovereignty in Islam 
Ibn Khaldun shows the necessity of social organisation in his explanation of 
human behaviour, left unchecked by external influence, in an approximate ‘state 
of nature’: 
 
Each [individual] will stretch out his hand for whatever he needs and (try simply to) 
take it, since injustice and aggressiveness are in the animal nature. The others, in 
turn, will try to prevent him from taking it, motivated by wrathfulness and spite and 
the strong human reaction when (one’s own property is menaced). This causes 
dissention. (Dissention) leads to hostilities, and hostilities lead to trouble and 
bloodshed and loss of life which (in turn) lead to the destruction of the (human) 
species.
376
 
 
Rather than a ‘state of nature’, as humanity in anarchy or without society is 
referred to in Social Contract Theory, Ibn Khaldun’s condition ends with the 
destruction of humanity, and as such cannot be described as ‘natural’. In this 
way, government or society is instead the ‘natural’ condition of humanity, as 
without it we would cease to exist; as Ibn Khaldun explains, “[p]eople, thus, 
cannot persist in a state of anarchy”.377  
In the Western liberal tradition, the impingement of the individual’s rights 
is a central debate as the ‘natural’ state of being is contested; is humanity’s 
natural state one of total freedom, where the individual will consent to only the 
minimum of government interference necessary to allow society to function? In 
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the Islamic tradition transmitted by Ibn Khaldun, this is not the case. Following 
from the ideas of the rationalist al-Farabi, who was mentioned earlier, Khadduri 
sees the history of Muslim societies as group centred. The individual counts for 
little, as “[o]nly through the family, clan or civtas to which the individual 
belonged, could he claim the right to protection by means of custom or social 
mores”.378 Considering the fundamental difference between dominant Western 
and Islamic conceptions of the natural state of humanity, the term: ‘state of 
nature’ would seem to no longer apply. If used in the Islamic worldview, the 
state of nature would imply that the destruction of the species is humanity’s 
natural condition, when in fact it is group relations and society that is more 
common. Therefore, the chapter will adapt the terminology of John Rawls, who 
rather than use a state of nature, employed the term ‘original position’. For 
Rawls, individuals in the original position “[act] in ways best suited to achieving 
their ends”,379 and in this way were self interested, as would coincide with Ibn 
Khaldun’s conception of human nature. So rather than refer to Rawls’ original 
position, this chapter will refer to the ‘Khaldunian original position’ to make 
reference to the condition of humanity without society, in this Islamically derived 
world-view.  
 The Khaldunian original position is one where humanity, in its self-
interest and vice, would destroy each other. It is a condition where such 
anarchy is untenable, and would result in the destruction of humanity. Hence, 
the ‘natural’ position derived from that assumption is one of individuals in a 
societal structure, 380  rather than the atomised individuals of liberal social 
contract theorists. With this in mind, the next section will move to construct the 
final part of the puzzle, as it were, for Normative Political Islam; the remainder of 
the chapter will address the issue of sovereignty by examining the transition 
from the Khaldunian original position to a society based on Muslim norms, with 
an emphasis on the issue of sovereignty in such a society. 
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Synthesising the Sovereignty of God and Exotericism in Normative 
Political Islam 
Muslims, like the ancient Greeks before them, envisioned human kind living 
together, as members of a society. However as mentioned already, “the 
individuals rights and obligations were always defined in terms of (though 
subordinate to) the community’s interests”. 381  Ibn Khaldun derives his 
conclusions on the place of the individual in society from proto-sociological 
rigour; humanity, at least in the deserts of North Africa and the Arab peninsula, 
is unable to obtain the food necessary for survival on its own, and also cannot 
protect its belongings in such a condition. This leads to Ibn Khaldun’s 
observation that, “[w]hen, however, mutual co-operation exists, man obtains 
food for his nourishment and weapons for his defense. God’s wise plan that 
man(kind) should subsist and the human species be preserved will be 
fulfilled”.382 Hence Ibn Khaldun makes the formation of society and government 
an act of faith, such that proponents of the din wa dawla position would jump 
upon. However, the place of the divine is yet to be deciphered, and will be 
interrogated more thoroughly as this section continues.  
Returning to the subject of state formation, the chapter must ask how 
individuals in the Khaldunian original position form their societies. For while Ibn 
Khaldun insists society is ‘natural’, such a statement provides little information 
on the composition of that society, or the way in which sovereignty is derived. 
Regarding the equality of persons in Ibn Khaldun’s conception of society, the 
egalitarian nature of Islam is as chequered as that of political liberalism. While 
Islam freed people of the Middle East from the authority of kings hundreds of 
years before Europe did the same, it quickly reverted back to hereditary royal 
authority. Likewise, Islam provided an unheard of level of women’s and minority 
rights at its inception, though these rights seem stagnant and insufficient with 
the advent of social or democratic liberalism. But to hold up the record of 
historical Islamic governance with that of modern day liberalism is a fallacy, as 
liberalism too, has its dark periods. Domenico Losurdo points out, for example, 
that “[s]lavery is not something that persisted despite the success of the 
[eighteenth and nineteenth century European and American] liberal revolutions. 
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On the contrary, it experienced its maximum development following that 
success”.383  
Political liberalism has matured over hundreds of years yet even now is 
argued by Mark Duffield of having maintained large zones of exception across 
the world, which ensure ‘our’ liberties by denying ‘theirs’, whoever they may 
be,384  much in the same way that  “exception clauses”385  have allowed for 
‘liberal’ slavery and ‘liberal’ colonialism. All the above is to say, that despite the 
place of dhimmis (protected minorities) or women who were denied civic rights 
at various times and places in various classical Islamic polities, Islam has a 
strong egalitarian current that maintains that “[m]ost noble among you in God’s 
eyes is he who fears God most”.386 The Qur’anic verse is often used to show 
that there is no social distinction between Muslims, except that of piety. A more 
detailed analysis of the relationship between liberalism and Normative Political 
Islam forms the basis of the next chapter, Islamic Community and International 
Relations. The present chapter continues the discussion of sovereignty. 
In addition to the proposed equality of persons in political Islam, Khadduri 
highlights another recurrent theme in Ibn Khaldun’s work, that of authority. As 
Khadduri eloquently states, “[authority] is regarded as absolutely necessary 
since society without authority [is] impossible; for, though man is a social animal 
by nature, he is not a well-behaving animal”.387 This much has already been 
demonstrated in Ibn Khaldun’s thinking, but what remains to be discussed is 
how in a society of equals, a rational, that is, outcome maximising individual, 
might consent to be ruled by another. Further still, how does this rational 
individual consent to being ruled by God, as Muslim states must come to terms 
with chapter 5, verse 43 of the Qur’an when it states, “[k]nowest thou not that to 
Allah alone belongeth the dominion of the heavens and the earth?”388 
A Muslim sovereign, in the Sunni orthodox ideal, is constrained, to some 
extent, by God’s shari’a; for the Muslim sovereign to go against the shari’a is to 
lose legitimacy, and in this limited way respects the sovereignty of God. If 
                                            
383
 Losurdo, Domenico: Liberalism: A Couner-History, trans. Elliot, Gregory (London: Verso, 
2011), pg. 35 
384
 Duffield, Mark: Development, Security and Unending War, pg. 192 
385
 Losurdo, Domenico: Liberalism: A Couner-History, pg. 342 
386
 Qur'an, 49:13 
387
 Khadduri, Majid: War and Peace in the Law of Islam, pg. 5 
388
 Qur'an, 5:43 
112 
 
Normative Political Islam were to place shari’a in the position of natural rights 
and laws, perhaps in a similar way to inalienable human rights, what results is a 
sovereign that has the legitimacy of God, through respect of the shari’a. This is 
somewhat similar to John Locke’s social contract, wherein political authority is 
legitimised both by popular consent and that authority’s respect for the natural 
rights that individuals enjoyed in the state of nature.389  
That is not to say that the sovereign, as legitimised in Locke-style social 
contract, is always right in its actions. For Locke, even if a society gives their 
complete consent to a sovereign, it does not make the sovereign’s actions right 
if it does not respect the natural law.390 In effect, if individuals in a society 
governed by Normative Political Islam consent to actions that infringe their 
natural rights (their duties interpreted through shari’a), then these actions are 
morally wrong, though that is not to say that the action cannot be carried out. 
The space afforded by Locke to natural rights and natural law, which is an 
articulation of God’s will in his schema, seems to meld well with the notion of 
God’s sovereignty in Islamic society. 
Crawford Brough Macpherson’s socialist critique of Locke argues that 
Locke’s concept of human nature is intrinsically linked with capitalism. He refers 
to this human nature as “possessive individualism”. 391  An Islamic notion of 
sovereignty is far more communitarian in nature than the asocial individualism 
propounded by liberal thinkers. This is alluded to in the base assumption of 
liberalism that humanity by natural condition is free, while in Ibn Khaldun’s 
approach humanity by natural condition is social. Communitarianism argues 
that “people's private identity really is tied to certain [communal] ends”. 392 Sunni 
orthodoxy’s treatment of minority communities highlights the difference between 
the individualism practised by modern liberal states and the communitarianism 
of historical Islamic polities, wherein group tolerance was preferred over 
individual autonomy. The different minority groups in the Ottoman Empire 
(recognising that only the other Abrahamic faiths, the ahl al-kitab, were afforded 
such a status), for example, were “permitted to practice their religions and earn 
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their livelihood, as long as they deferred to Muslim authority and kept a low 
profile”. 393  This form of group tolerance did not respect the rights of the 
individual; while the group remained unmolested, the individual was not able to 
leave his community without being accused of apostasy, a crime punishable by 
death. In this regard Will Kymlica describes the Ottoman method of rule over 
minorities as “antithetical to the ideals of personal liberty”.394  
The debate on the extent to which an Islamic society might respect 
individual freedoms, and beyond that an analysis of the pros and cons respect 
for such freedoms would yield, is not integral to the present discussion on 
sovereignty. However, the conclusions reached on the matter of sovereignty will 
have direct impact on the nature of individual rights in Normative Political Islam, 
and is a subject that will be returned to in the next chapter. Currently, the 
chapter has reached a possible solution to the first part of the puzzle: a ruler 
can respect the sovereignty of God by obeying the shari’a. As seen earlier 
though, the shari’a can be very opaque when dealing with political issues, and 
as shari’a is a result of human interpretation, it has problems with legitimacy 
outside any particular orthodoxy. Shari’a represents theology, and injunctions in 
the source texts in and of themselves cannot provide enough guidance to 
Normative Political Islam. Khomeini’s political theory builds on theology with 
mysticism to develop an Islamic notion of politics. The approach of the mystics 
is derided by more orthodox Muslims as it vests exclusive knowledge of ‘the 
truth’ in an ‘elite’ or otherwise blessed few individuals, taking away from the 
egalitarian message of Islam. Moving beyond the sovereignty of God to 
justifying the sovereignty of a leader amongst equals, whilst simultaneously 
refining ambiguous theological guidance, is the remaining task for an Islamic 
exoteric method.  
Deriving Political Sovereignty via an Exoteric Method 
Majid Khadduri describes a dual agreement amongst the Muslims of Medina to 
explain the transition of sovereignty from the Prophet Muhammed to his 
successors. He explains that “[u]nder Muhammad not only the executive, but 
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also the legislative and judicial functions of Allah were united… In more precise 
terms we may argue that only the possession of sovereignty resided with Allah, 
while its exercise was delegated to Muhammad”. 395  During the Prophet’s 
lifetime, then, a single contract was needed to justify a Muslim’s loyalty to the 
Prophet Muhammed. As Muhammed’s authority was synonymous with God’s, 
granting sovereignty to one was tantamount to granting sovereignty to the other. 
With the death of the Prophet, those who had interpreted their contract to lie 
with Muhammed sought to reject the authority of Medina, the capital of the 
nascent Islamic polity. Those who interpreted their contract to lie with God were 
left to appoint a successor to Muhammed, “entrusted with the execution of the 
divine commands which were still binding upon the Muslims”.396  
Khadduri identifies the two contracts used to delineate sovereignty in the 
period of the rashidun and beyond to be: 
1. A contract between the Muslims, and God and Muhammed, represented by 
submission to Islam, the declaration of faith, shahadda. 
2. A contract between the Muslims and the Caliph (or approximate leader), the 
Muslims empowering the Caliph to enforce the divine law.397 
Related to the use of dual contracts to resolve the issue of God’s sovereignty 
next to the sovereignty of a temporal ruler, Pakistani journalist turned political 
writer, Abdul A’ala Maududi, identified a distinction between a ‘Muslim’ and 
‘Islamic’ state.398 These two concepts fall on the same lines as Khadduri’s two 
contracts, but Maududi articulated them in the form of two different kinds of 
sovereignty, political and legal. “Political sovereignty thus naturally means 
ownership of the authority of enforcing legal sovereignty”.399 Here Maududi has 
introduced a hierarchy to the dual contract. The one, pertaining to legal 
sovereignty, is superior to the second, pertaining to political sovereignty. Legal 
sovereignty is also referred to as the ‘Divine Code’ by Maududi, and in this way 
he finds space for God, through the shari’a, to legislate in the Islamic State. The 
political sovereignty he describes is that of a “vicegerent of God” and therefore, 
“the scope of its activities will naturally be restricted within the limits ordained by 
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the Almighty Himself”. 400  In this way he does not contradict the Qur’anic 
injunction on chapter 2, verse 229, “[t]hese are the limits ordained by God; so 
do not transgress them”.401 Such a stalwart belief in the shari’a however, fails to 
acknowledge the fact that it is created through human interpretation, not divine 
creation, as Maududi would believe. 
If Muslims, by virtue of their shahadda, automatically abide by the first 
contract with God and the prophet Muhammed, then does this reinforce the 
arguments of din wa dawla proponents? For such ideologues, the inseparability 
of politics from religion would mean no second contract were necessary, as 
adherence to the laws of God and His Messenger is all that is needed to form 
an Islamic state. Eickelman and Piscatori’s assumptions as to the nature of 
“sacred authority” are of great utility in the present discussion. The two 
assumptions the authors make is that firstly, sacred authority is one kind of 
authority amongst others. As not all authority is based on religion, then religious 
authority is not all-encompassing, as din-wa-dawla proponents argue; and 
secondly that sacred authority does not assume religion and politics are 
independent spheres of activity. They are separable and intersect according to 
context.402 The dual Islamic contract relies on the separation of religious and 
other forms of authority to function, but that will not do to silence din-wa-dawla 
ideologues. 
Ibn Khaldun, as alluded to earlier, also linked the formation of society 
and government to religious duty, though for him this was done in an attempt to 
incorporate the rule of Muhammed and the rashidun into his work; Lenn Evan 
Goodman claims that Ibn Khaldun “cheerfully admits that Muhammad does not 
fit within his model of leadership” 403  when in fact much of Ibn Khaldun’s 
argument applies solely to the prophet Muhammed and his immediate 
successors. In Ibn Khaldun’s description of the early years of Islam and the 
Islamic polity, a large emphasis is placed on religion. In this era, people had 
what Ibn Khaldun described as a ‘restraining’ influence within themselves. He 
talks about the asceticism of early Islam, and the rashidun in particular, as a key 
to the self-restraint that was indicative of this early caliphate. For Ibn Khaldun, 
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then, the predominance of the faith in the early period of Islam was the reason 
only one contract, the first shahadda contract, was needed to form government 
at that time. Such is not the situation today, and the shahadda does not bind the 
Muslim community in the way it once might have; the authority of the rashidun 
was “indistinguishable from the public body” 404  in their time, but under the 
Umayyad dynasty of the seventh and eighth century, authority became 
distanced from civil society. The death of the Prophet and an end to direct 
access to divine guidance meant the need for a second contract to legitimate 
authority in the Islamic polity was evident. This recognition of changing social 
and religious conditions in the story of Muhammed and the rashidun is what 
separates Ibn Khaldun from din wa dawla advocates. As Ibn Rushd’s rationalist 
tradition dictates, ‘truths’ for the rashidun and Muhammed, the need for one 
pact with society to legitimise sovereignty, do not transfer to social situations 
distinct from the one those ‘truths’ were conceived. Therefore, for those without 
direct access to the divine message, a feat achieved in Khomeini’s conception 
of Shi’ism, a second contract, while breaking from the tradition of the Prophet 
and the rashidun, becomes necessary. 
The second contract is an explicitly political contract when compared to 
the first, which being related to the Muslim’s declaration of faith, can be 
described as explicitly religious in nature. The second contract relates to life in 
the temporal world. The distinction between the temporal and the 
transcendental is one that recurs in Islamic discourse, and as recalled in 
chapter 1, much of the ambiguity about political guidance in Islamic source texts 
centres on temporal and transcendental aspects of the shari’a. For Ibn Khaldun 
an Islamic government, by which he is using the Caliphal paradigm of 
government, is a substitute for the role of Muhammed, “in as much as it serves, 
like him, to preserve the religion and to exercise (political) leadership of the 
world”.405 Therein lays the two aspects of Islamic leadership, which equate to 
the two contracts between government and the individual. The first is grounded 
in religion, and is an authority that “will be useful for life in both this and the 
other world”.406 The second is an authority that is based on an “intellectual 
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(rational) basis”,407  and is only of benefit to this temporal world. When the 
theoretical Muslim contractors of this thesis agree to the second contract, they 
are agreeing primarily to prevent anarchy, which would lead to the demise of 
humanity. As a secondary concern, they are empowering the Caliph to enforce 
the divine law as agreed in the first contract. 
 This second contract is built on the first, in the hierarchy that Maududi 
alludes to. The first, shahadda contract binds Muslims to the law, and “[t]he 
law… precedes the state: it provides the basis of the state”.408 Does this law, 
presumably the shari’a, restrict the ability of the polity to function? In adhering to 
the first contract, adhering to the tenants of Islam, an Islamic state might 
behave in ways that could be perceived as irrational (not self-serving), or be 
compelled to break the peace in ways a secular state could avoid. Khadduri’s 
historical account of the Islamic polity would seem to reinforce this view. He 
states that, “[t]he nature of such a [universal, Islamic] state is entirely exclusive; 
it does not recognize, by definition, the co-existence of a second universal state. 
While Islam tolerated Christianity and Judaism as religions, Islamdom and 
Christendom, as two universal states, could not peacefully coexist”. 409 Piscatori 
puts this point of view regarding religion and politics, one he is not an advocate 
of, succinctly when he writes, “religious zealotry of all kinds demands enemies 
to be eliminated”.410 The above view of religion and politics, and critiques of a 
political contract being somehow secondary to a religious contract, can be 
refuted in three ways.  
 Firstly the thesis argues that in certain circumstances the Muslim 
contractor, in agreeing to the second political contract, is not necessarily 
agreeing to the enforcement of divine law. In such circumstances the political 
authority has perhaps succumbed to the evils that can result from it, “such as 
tyranny, injustice, and pleasure-seeking”.411 If such a case was not possible, 
then for what reason does Ibn Khaldun expound upon a taxonomy of the 
various authorities in Muslim lands? In fact, there is a difference between a 
Caliph (or Imam, which Ibn Khaldun uses as an approximate term) and a Sultan 
or Mulk (king). The former satisfy both contracts with the Muslims, the latter only 
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the second in its purely temporal nature. Both are possible, and it is possible for 
Muslims to consent to both types of authority. For Ibn Khaldun history was 
cyclical, just because the period of the rashidun satisfied both Muslim contracts 
does not mean that Muslims must not deviate from this precedent. As Franz 
Rosenthal notes, “[i]n Ibn Khaldun’s orthodox Muslim environment, it was 
believed that human intellectual power was always constant and capable of 
producing the highest civilisation at any given time. Therefore, Ibn Khaldun 
could hardly have assumed that steady progress in human civilisation was 
possible or even necessary”.412 If a Muslim is able to practise their faith, then 
the first contract is upheld. That the second contract is not used to its full 
advantage, to uphold and enforce Islamic values in a given territory, does not 
mean that its lesser function, that of maintaining government, is not of value. 
Upholding government is necessary for Muslims to practise their faith, and 
functionally necessary to avoid the destruction of the species. 
 A second argument countering the admonition of religion blended with 
politics is that of Piscatori in his work, Islam in a World of Nation States. In it, 
Piscatori uses Qur’anic verse and historical precedent to show how Islam 
endorses a pluralistic political life, thereby nullifying the universalism of the faith 
in the realm of the political. Among many verses used by Piscatori to this 
end,413 the most poignant is chapter 42, verse 8, which states, “[i]f God had so 
willed, He would have made them one community”. 414  This verse lays the 
foundations for ideological and political divisions in Muslim territory and perhaps, 
even, territorial divisions. On historical precedent, Piscatori references the pacts 
made by Muhammed with the Jews of Medina, Christians of Aqaba and the 
polytheists of Mecca. After the period of the rashidun he points to the Umayyad 
relationship with the Byzantines, where one caliph established truce and tribute 
with the Byzantines, another accepted aid from them to decorate the Prophet’s 
Mosque and the Great Mosque in Damascus. “The Abbasids rather more 
routinely concluded treaties with foreigners”415, and during the Crusades several 
formal treaties were established between the Muslims and the European, 
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Christian kings.416 Piscatori concludes that, against the perceived universality of 
Islamic politics, “Muslim rulers found no difficulty at all in having formal 
diplomatic dealings with non-Muslims when it was necessary to do so”.417 So if 
the Sunni Islamic social contract does not always demand that political authority 
support the cause of Islam-as-faith, so long as that authority does not impinge 
on the Muslims, and the ideological, political and territorial universality of Islam 
are not as universal as once believed, there is one final reason to contest the 
idea that religion and politics cannot mix (in the case of Islam). 
 For this final point the thesis turns to Mohamed Arkoun, who makes 
reference to “secular religions” like Marxism and Fascism, and believes that 
secularism and religion have common features.418 John Gray talks further on 
these common features, and comments on the similarities between the religious 
fundamentalism of al-Qaeda and other Western, secular, political ideologies. It 
is not, for Gray, religion that is a cause of what is considered ‘irrational’ 
behaviour, rather the characteristics of political modernity. Al-Qaeda’s assertion 
that they can create a perfect order on earth is a peculiar myth shared by 
Nazism, Communism and Positivism.419 The only difference between religious 
brutality in the past and contemporary religious or ideological brutality is that 
previously damage was done to individuals and society for the sake of life after 
death, whereas now it is done for the sake of some idealised utopia that can be 
realised in the here and now. 420  There is nothing inherent in religion, and 
specifically in Normative Political Islam as it is defined in the pages of this thesis, 
that should be feared on the international sphere. 
Conclusions 
This chapter sought to engage Normative Political Islam with transnational 
Islam, which was identified to be the articulation of political Islam that exposes 
the most poignant sites of conflict with IR. The foremost challenge transnational 
Islam poses to IR was argued to be sovereignty, specifically the sovereignty of 
God.   
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Having demonstrated that the guidance in the Qur’an on politics is 
ambiguous, and building on the recognition of ‘kingly’ and ‘prophetic’ rule by ‘Ali 
‘Abed al-Raziq outlined in chapter 1, this chapter sought to refine and 
supplement this theological guidance, to arrive at a notion of Islamic politics. 
This was achieved by looking outside theology, to philosophy and mysticism. In 
the exploration of mysticism the chapter discussed the ways in which Ayatollah 
Khomeini utilised hekmat to give credence to the notion of a privileged 
knowledge of God and truth by Shi’a Imams. This esoteric knowledge allows for 
one person’s interpretation of religious texts to become the interpretation of that 
subject. In Sunni Islam it was established that one of the roots of law, ‘ijma, is 
used to prevent just such an appropriation of interpretative licence, explaining 
the reason that there is such theological resistance to the idea of one ‘true’ 
Islamic path in Sunni orthodoxy.  
Despite the resistance of religious scholars, Islamists show more and 
more their insistence that all guidance on politics can be derived from the 
shari’a, if correctly interpreted. The chapter looked then to the last strand of 
Islamic knowledge, philosophy, to supplement religious guidance on politics 
much in the way Khomeini attempted with mysticism. Tracing the exoteric, 
rational and demonstrative tradition in Sunni Islam, from al-Kindi through to al-
Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Hazm and Ibn Rushd, the chapter arrived at Ibn Khaldun’s 
Muqaddimah as a means to operationalise the abstract notions of rationalism to 
the domain of politics and sovereignty. 
The chapter concluded that a theory of sovereignty that is centred on a 
dual agreement, as propounded by Majid Khadduri421, adequately resolves the 
need for Muslims to recognise God’s sovereignty as well as the sovereignty of 
temporal leaders. Muslims, by virtue of their declaration of faith, agree to the 
moral precepts of the shari’a, and in doing so respect the sovereignty of God. A 
second agreement with a temporal authority is also established, but in order for 
the polity to be considered ‘Islamic’ as per Normative Political Islam, the 
temporal authority must also respect that same commitment to the first 
agreement.  
Two major implications of this dual agreement were explored. First was 
the notion that a Muslim is perfectly capable of adhering to the first contract in 
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territories that do not govern in accordance with the declaration of faith. In other 
words, respect for God’s sovereignty, given the ambiguous guidance on politics 
in religious source texts, does not imply a government wherein God is sovereign. 
Such a conclusion respects the differentiation between rule over territory and 
rule over people; if Muslims are bound by God’s commandments with respect to 
Islam-as-faith, then that is true regardless of the territory in which the Muslim 
lives. Secondly, the agreement that relates directly to the temporal world is one 
that is based on rationalism and human ingenuity, and so the need to derive all 
models and theories of politics from theological sources is avoided. Such a 
method answers the pleas of Moroccan philosopher ‘Abed al-Jabri, who calls for 
a return of Aristotelian logic to Arab and Islamic thought. 
 The ways in which this notion of sovereignty might interact with the 
international system remains unexplored, and is the subject of the next chapter. 
In it, the chapter will investigate what the focus on community, rather than the 
individual, might mean in the context of IR. The notion of communitarianism that 
has been touched upon in this chapter will be more thoroughly explored and 
related to the concept of political modernity and the idea of ‘multiple 
modernities’. In such ways, the following chapter will deal primarily with the 
secondary research question: What challenges does the umma, as an 
alternative to the state, pose to discipline of international relations? 
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Chapter 4: Islamic Community and International 
Relations 
L. Carl Brown summarises the importance of community when he states that 
“Islam has – for all its cultural and territorial diversity – maintained among its 
adherents a communal solidarity”.422 Given the many forms in which the umma 
might be articulated in the international sphere,423 it is not inevitably the state 
which represents the locus of friction with Normative Political Islam. The state is 
an adjunct to and derivative of the wider processes of political modernity. 
Commitment to the umma does not necessitate abandoning the state in practice 
or in theory. While chapter 2 argued that the umma is an alternative, not 
equivalent, of the state, it does not follow that these alternative methods of 
governance (rule over territory and rule over individuals) cannot co-exist. As 
Sohail Hashmi argues with regards to the pan-Islamic movement, umma might 
be articulated as thick or thin. Thick conceptions are represented by dar-al-
Islam or individuals linked through transnational organisations; “[a]ccording to 
this vision, the umma has a life apart from the state or states”. Alternatively thin 
conceptions of umma see it as an internationalist enterprise, perhaps an 
interstate society.424 While Hashmi is making explicit overtones to the English 
School of international relations, the summary is befitting the Constructivist view 
point of the thesis that, if “anarchy is what states make of it”,425 so too is the 
umma what Muslims make of it.  
This chapter argues that conceptions of the umma are constrained by the 
assumptions of the European Enlightenment project that spawned the concepts 
of political modernity, including the state. These assumptions, broadly, are 
linked to the insistence on abstracting individuals out of the social conditions 
which they live to find a rational concept of how one should govern and consent 
to be governed, to find ‘the good life’. In abstracting away from social realities, 
Enlightenment philosophy was attempting to find a universal concept of the 
good life, and here in is the central issue with a Normative Political Islam. 
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Normative Political Islam finds it necessary to locate its practices in cultural 
values in order to account for the sovereignty of God. This was achieved using 
a rational, exoteric method, so that the familiar charge of theocracy would 
struggle to find purchase with Normative Political Islam. Rather, it is notions of 
individual liberty, as distinct to communitarian values, that will challenge this 
conception of sovereignty specifically, and the umma more generally; as Peter 
Mandaville puts it, “according to conventional accounts of modernity, religion 
has been relegated to the domain of the private. By reasserting itself in public 
space, Islam is hence disrupting the modernity which lies at the root of the 
state”.426 If this challenge is couched in the liberal/communitarian divide, an 
exploration of this schism will help the thesis to assess whether Normative 
Political Islam can operate in the schema of the Enlightenment, and what the 
implications are if it can, or cannot. Before that, the chapter will discuss the 
ways in which Islam might interact with community more thoroughly. First, a 
note on what is meant by community, and why.  
Acknowledging that Muslims in the Middle East represent and construct 
community, and relate this to faith, in different ways from Muslims in South East 
Asia, for example, it is necessary to focus on specific Muslim communities in 
the coming section. As the thesis must narrow down the Islam discussed to 
Sunni orthodoxy, so it follows that the thesis must narrow down its discussion of 
Muslims and community to a specific context, in this case, (Sunni) Muslims 
residing in the MENA region that was formally part of the Ottoman Empire. 
Being specific in this regard helps us to avoid essentialising some ‘Islamic’ 
society as a unifying essence of Muslims the globe over. As Sami Zubaida 
articulates, “[c]ulture is a process, part of the historical flux, and cultural patterns 
are not fixed but reproduced at every generation in relation to different 
situations and conjectures”.427  
Does it now follow that each different Muslim community might develop a 
different relationship with the international sphere (thick or thin conceptions of 
the umma, for example)? Perhaps so, and the heterogeneity of positions 
created poses important questions about the applicability of different 
conceptions of community co-existing in the same geographical space. For 
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example, some British Muslim communities might associate themselves with a 
thin conception of umma, perhaps articulated through a supra-national body like 
the OIC, but of course the United Kingdom is not a member of the OIC. In 
another case, a Baluchi Sunni community in Iran might seek a thick conception 
of umma centred on transnational solidarity with scholars at Al-Azhar in Egypt. 
How such a community would negotiate their obligations to the state verses 
their obligations to transnational solidarity, and how the state might react to 
those obligations, are pertinent questions to ask. The chapter will make some 
head way in answering these types of questions, but that is not the main 
purpose of the argument presented here. Instead, it is the challenge that this 
particular community holds to IR that preoccupies the chapter. That a Middle 
Eastern Sunni Muslim community is the one specified, does not take away from 
the ways it challenges IR to account for any community. A similar challenge 
could be posed by communities in Europe, Shi’a communities, communities in 
Africa and others, in so far as these communities necessitate a stance on the 
international sphere. An international community of Star Trek fans, in contrast, 
would likely not engage in discussions on how their community should engage 
with IR.  
Islam as Community? Islam as Citizenship? 
Civil society, as distinct from the political order, is described as “voluntary 
associations of individuals… outside the realm of the state”.428 This type of 
society, argues Zubaida, does not exist in Arab states. Instead, “political 
society”429 is a more appropriate term. Individuals in political society do not 
relate to the state as citizens, but as groups staking a claim on rights and 
services the state provides, the claim being that “in much of the Arab world, the 
politics of citizenship are often eclipsed by the politics of community”.430 Nazih 
Ayubi refers to Hisham Sharabi’s theory of neo-patriarchy to make a similar 
statement: “[I]n it [modern Arab society] the individual has no individuality: 
he/she is lost if he breaks with the family, tribe or the sect... The individual’s 
sense of morality is collectivist and applies only within his primary group but not 
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in the larger society”.431 Mandaville too makes a similar point when he states 
that Islam presents “circumstances in which political identities and processes 
configure themselves across and between forms of political community”.432 The 
citizen as established from the ‘Western’ model derives their rights and duties 
as a citizen by an abstracted rationality, universally applied, as opposed to 
being derived from the community they live in. Such a method of deriving 
citizenship is intimately tied to liberal epistemology and very much derived from 
a method and practice that is typified by the Enlightenment. That liberal 
epistemology does not, as noted in this section, necessarily transfer seamlessly 
to Arab and Islamic communities, calling into question either the nature of those 
communities as ‘backward’, or the universality of Enlightenment rationality. The 
remainder of this section will explore which of the preceding two statements can 
be substantiated. 
The practices that constitute an Islamic community are as contested as 
the discussion on what might constitute an Islamic polity. On the one hand, Amr 
Sabet is very critical of social theory’s ‘reduction’ of Islam “from a meta-narrative 
to middle ranged categorizations based largely, though not exclusively, on what 
different Muslim adherents are perceived to say or do”.433 The idea that different 
communities might conceive of their Islam differently is not acceptable for Sabet, 
who stresses that “[w]hen one talks about Islam, one is referring to the universe 
and cosmology of revelation as uniquely represented by primary texts and 
scriptures. Hence there is only one Islam, and not many Islams”.434 A similar 
view, or in this case fear, about Islam’s supposed ‘singular vision’ for society is 
seen in Andrew March’s attempt at folding in Muslims living in liberal 
democracies into John Rawls’ ideal of liberal citizenship. March states that 
Islam “offers a single vision for uniting the individual quest for virtue with the 
social goods of justice and solidarity”.435 The thesis has already argued that 
such positions do not sufficiently account for the agency of Muslims in 
interpreting what may well be static source texts. Fazlur Rahman shows the 
relationship between Islam and community in a more dynamic way when he 
talks of the source texts as primarily a source of moral practices. Rahman notes 
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than “Muslim law books are full of moralising themes”436 and that this moral and 
religiously ethical centre, while it may struggle to be an authoritative guide to 
communities, it is still “alive with a keen sensitivity to right and wrong… [which is] 
in any age better for humanity than an expediently clever and effective law”.437  
Such differing interpretations of this moral code leads to the “diverse and 
prolific assortment of Islamic ideologies, actors, political parties, and 
organizations… grouped under the umbrella of Islam”.438 This diverse range of 
positions might even include interpretations which deny any political meaning 
Islam might bring to a community; Mohamed Arkoun talks of the “silent Islam” of 
“true believers who attach more importance to the religious relationship with the 
absolute of God than to the vehement demonstrations of political 
movements”.439 
Both March and Sabet emphasise the challenge for an Islamic liberalism 
to consist of reconciling a liberal order “which at the same time preserves and 
consolidates Islamic principles of religiosity”.440 Conceivably this religiosity is 
expressed by the ‘truth’ these authors claim to exist in the way Islam interacts 
with the community. As long as nothing is metaphysically ‘superior’ to Islam 
then there is no contradiction for Muslims to accept a liberal concept of 
citizenship. The problem arises with the neutrality of the liberal citizen who, “in 
establishing no collective goals that require adherence to a controversial 
metaphysical doctrine”,441 must afford an equal status to all faiths, including 
even, for example, Pastafarianism, a faith founded in 2005 to challenge the 
teaching of intelligent design in US schools.442 Sharing the same ontological 
space with the Flying Spaghetti Monster (the deity of Pastafarianism) is not a 
matter of rhetoric, as March argues, which the state could manipulate to make 
sure Muslims are not “asked to profess something contrary to Islam or even 
endure quietly the glorification of a contrary truth”. 443  Rather, it assumes a 
common commitment to liberal neutrality which cannot be taken for granted in 
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all Muslim communities. This is teased at by Mushir Ul-Haq, who makes a 
separation between a secular state, which for him is permissible by the 
historical precedent of Islamic governance,444 and secularism as a doctrine, 
which he considers incompatible with Islam.445 The distinction is subtle, showing 
in the first instance a procedural acceptance of being neighbours with people of 
different faiths and avoiding conflict on account of that difference (faith in the 
case of secularism, but faith can be broadened to community for the purpose of 
the present discussion). The second instance, secularism as a doctrine, 
involves accepting a transcendental truth about the nature of all religions as 
uniformly equal in worth, and a distinction between the public and private 
spheres.446 While subtle, this distinction between secularism as practice and 
secularism as doctrine proves a highly salient point.  
The distinction of secularism as a doctrine and secularism as a practice 
rests once more on the notion of an abstracted value. Secularism as a doctrine 
is applicable to all peoples by virtue of its universal validity. This is in contrast to 
secularism as a practice, which is based in the experience of individuals 
embedded in a community (in this case a multi faith community). This is not a 
unique observation. Tibi goes to great lengths to firstly identify a similar problem 
as was argued in the last chapter, namely, the decline of a rational tradition in 
Islamic thought, and then to argue for its revival through a whole-hearted 
embrace of the Enlightenment project. On diagnosing the problem, Tibi states 
that “the major problems of contemporary Muslim civilization are related to the 
eclipse of rational discourse since the decline of the Islamic rationalism of the 
medieval age. In this context, I reiterate the call of al-Jabri for a return to 
rationality as the ultimate way out of this unsatisfactory position”.447 While the 
starting point is evidently similar with the current discussion, Tibi emphasises 
the need for Islam to reform and embrace modernity, which is viewed by him to 
be universally applicable and attainable. 448  Such a position belies a 
developmentalist and essentialist position, two positions that according to 
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Zubaida are separate categories to analyse ‘compatibility arguments’ (Islam’s 
compatibility with modernity).  
Developmentalism assumes that “there are systematic processes of 
historical development in stages which apply to all societies”.449 This position is 
reflected in Tibi’s belief in a universal concept of modernity. The essentialism 
perpetrated here is not one of Islam, which in fact is conceptualised in a similar 
way as Normative Political Islam is presented in this thesis; Tibi states that for 
him “Islam is conceptualized as a cultural system that is always in flux, and is 
therefore placed in a historical and social context”. 450  Tibi’s essentialism is 
related to his presentation of political and cultural modernity. The ‘West’ 
achieved some wondrous marvel in political modernity, and this is now 
something all other cultures can access given the right reforms. Recalling 
Hobson’s non reductive Orientalism presented in chapter 2, Tibi’s assertion 
here represents the West’s pioneering agency, of which Tibi’s ‘East’ does not 
posses. Instead, Tibi’s Islamic societies are reduced to emulating the path 
already travelled by an enlightened West. In this way, the Orientalism displayed 
by Tibi is not tied to racism, as he is not stating that the East is unable to 
achieve this modernity without the West’s tutelage, only that the West got there 
first (and indeed, the end point reached by the West is the only legitimate end 
point for societies, due to the ‘universal’ nature of modernity). The idea that the 
Enlightenment and the modernity it spawned was and is contested is not in 
question for Tibi. As John Gray summarises: “Western societies are governed 
by the belief that modernity is a single condition, everywhere the same and 
always benign… Being modern means realising our values – the values of the 
Enlightenment, as we like to think of them”.451 Tibi’s unquestioning acceptance 
in the existence and virtue of this singular Enlightenment modernity 
complements his argument that a rejection of universality cannot be compatible 
with Islamism, which itself is universal.452 Here is the familiar argument that an 
Islamic politics is engaged in a zero-sum competition with the politics of the 
Enlightenment and the ‘West’. In presenting such a relationship, Tibi, who 
earlier is so careful to avoid essentialising Islam, is forced to do so in describing 
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the “face of Islamism” as uniformly totalitarian (preceding the Islamic reform he 
argues is necessary for Islam to embrace modernity).453 
 While Tibi seeks to ‘modernise’ Islam, Sami Zubaida’s Beyond Islam 
seeks to dis-embed Islam from discussions of politics in the Middle East. While 
Tibi struggles to disassociate Islam-as-faith from Islam-as-politics, and in so 
struggling, he talks of universal Islamic politics, Zubaida makes the distinction 
between Islam and political Islam very prominent. He argues that “there are 
many Muslim societies, and that the range of their variation is comprehensible 
in terms of the normal practice of social and political analysis, like any other 
range of societies”. 454  While Zubaida’s approach seems to find a lot of 
resonance with Normative Political Islam, there is still the issue of modernity. 
For Zubaida this is a term that is not subject to the same nuance as Muslim 
society, instead presented as a singular truth, much as in Tibi’s work. When 
religion is devoid of political meaning, except that which individuals choose to 
place into it, Zubaida sees no impetus to engage with the notion of modernity. 
He insists that “[m]odernities are not alternative: they are ideologically 
contested”,455 implying once more the singular conception of a political future for 
all peoples. It follows that if a religion interacts with politics in a way constructed 
by that religions’ adherents, as theorised with Normative Political Islam, then the 
same is true with a concept of political modernity. If modernity is evacuated of 
the Enlightenment’s propensity for universalism, it too takes meaning in ways 
constructed by the participants of that modernity. What needs to be revived and 
cultivated in any discussion of Islam and political modernity is the notion of 
community.  
As shown in this section, Muslim community as a referent object for 
deriving politics is often at odds with an abstracted and, most relevant for the 
discussion here, faithless individual (though that individual is also genderless, 
raceless, classless etc). This is most clearly seen with regards to the state as a 
method of governing people and secularism as an inherent doctrine of that 
governance. Both instances, state and secularism, can show insensitivity to 
communal practices and lives, justifying that insensitivity through a belief in a 
universal notion of justice derived from the abstracted individual. It is at the level 
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of analysis of the community (indicative of al-Jabri’s call to Aristotelian principles) 
and the individual (indicative of the liberalism of the Enlightenment) that is the 
crux of the issue with regards to Normative Political Islam’s engagement with 
modernity. Accounting for community seems to reaffirm Mohammed ‘Abed al-
Jabri’s conclusion that “[a]s for the human legacy in general, with its universal 
attributes, a nation always experiences it within its own tradition and not outside 
it”.456  
The next section of the chapter will explore the debate between 
liberalism and communitarianism. Doing so will highlight the ways in which 
modernity is not a fixed concept but one that is debated and challenged by 
those even within the ‘West’ who supposedly ‘possess’ this modernity. This 
discussion overlays with the discussion of Normative Political Islam’s emphasis 
on values derived from specific cultural contexts; values which inevitably will 
impact on politics. Through the coming discussion the thesis hopes to discover 
if the rationality of Normative Political Islam can interact with the rationality of 
the Enlightenment, or if there is a zero-sum relationship between the two, as 
Tibi argues.  
Liberalism and Communitarianism 
Alisdair MacIntyre, whose powerful critique of Enlightenment philosophy the 
chapter will return to later, characterises what he refers to as ‘the Enlightenment 
project’; this project is a “systematic attempt to discover a rational justification 
for morality”.457 This rational justification of morality took the form of liberalism, 
and its attempt “to identify a universal conception of human needs or human 
rationality, and then… [invoke] this ahistorical conception of the human being to 
evaluate existing social and political arrangements”. 458  However, to paint 
liberalism in such broad strokes is to do a disservice to the tradition. Richard 
Bellamy identifies two general liberal traditions; one is based on “a doctrine 
which is neutral between different conceptions of the good”, and the other 
“avowedly communitarian in nature: that is, as linked to a definite type of society 
and presupposing a shared understanding of its values”.459 Within both ‘forks’ in 
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this liberal trajectory there are many further distinctions to be made regarding 
the very nature of justice, narrow and wide concepts of liberal neutrality, thick 
and thin conceptions of community etc. It is not necessary here to account for a 
history of ideas, be they communitarian or liberal. Rather, the thesis here 
adopts much the same position of Philip Petit when he states: “I occasionally 
deal in general, ideal-typical characterization of the past, as in discussing the 
Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment, but I hope the lines I take will be 
more or less uncontroversial”.460 It suffices for this argument, then, to talk about 
liberalism in reference to its universal aspirations and assumptions about 
neutrality, which are explored in more detail presently. 
Liberal Universalism? 
Maureen Ramsay asserts that “[i]t is not an exaggeration to say that the whole 
of the Western political system was founded on and shaped by liberal principle 
and values”. 461  The pervasiveness of this ideology justifies the initial 
characterisation of the Enlightenment project as more than MacIntyre’s rational 
justification for morality, but rather a universal rational justification for liberal 
morality. This rational universality is achieved, as mentioned earlier in the 
chapter, by abstracting the individual out of their social situation in such a way 
that “the liberal individual has her own independent conception of the good”.462 
This independence is a matter of contention for Normative Political Islam in 
much the same way it is contentious for communitarians, that is, if Islamic 
politics (for Normative Political Islam) or notions of justice (for communitarians) 
are derived from communal understandings, then there cannot be such a thing 
as ‘universal’ values. Michael Sandel, a critic of the universal liberal position, 
caricatures the liberal individualist perspective and it is worth quoting at length 
his description to grasp fully the communitarian critique of that position: 
 
Freed from the dictates of nature and the sanction of social roles, the human 
subject is installed as sovereign, cast as the author of the only moral meanings 
there are. As participants in pure practical reason, or as parties to the original 
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position, we are free to construct principles of justice unconstrained by an order of 
value antecedently given. And as actual, individual selves, we are free to choose 
our purposes and ends unbound by such an order, or by custom or tradition or 
inherited status. So long as they are not unjust, our conceptions of the good carry 
weight, whatever they are, simply in virtue of our having chosen them.
463
 
 
Here one can see the allusions to neutrality and universality tied up with the 
notion of an unbounded rationality, unrelated to social context. If societies and 
cultures do not embrace liberal values, it is because they are not ‘rational’ 
enough. The concept of rationality, and hence liberalism, is considered as value 
neutral; John Rawls for example, is keen to show that his famous notion of 
‘justice as fairness’ is not dependent on certain philosophical claims, “for 
example, claims to universal truth, or claims about the essential nature and 
identity of person”.464 
 The communitarian critique of this position sees a universal theory of 
justice as unattainable; “[t]here is no such thing as a perspective external to the 
community, no way to step outside our history and culture”.465 Such a position 
has resonance with al-Jabri’s claim that human legacy is experienced “within… 
[a nation’s] own tradition and not outside it”. 466  With regards to Normative 
Political Islam’s interaction with communitarianism, an immediate concern 
arises in the notion of no perspective being held externally to community. 
Clearly, the Islamic message necessitates submission to the external will of 
God, and the notions of justice derived therein. Here the distinction made 
between Islam-as-faith (where claims of universality can be located) and Islam-
as-politics (which is argued in chapters 1 and 3 to allow a plurality of competing 
claims), can aid the current discussion. Talk of how one should be ruled is 
different from how one should worship; if indeed there is a singular conception 
of Muslim worship, the thesis has established that there is considerable 
variance in how one should be ruled in the Islamic tradition. Accepting such 
plurality does not take away from the ontological problem of transcendental 
‘truth’, which is something Islam-as-faith lays a claim upon, while the 
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communitarian approach that will be expanded upon presently, and the 
poststructural position on ontology that the thesis has hitherto embraced, both 
deny that such a truth exists. This is a problem returned to in the next chapter, 
for now the present section continues with an analysis of communitarianism and 
liberalism, aware of the limitations of engaging Normative Political Islam with 
the former. 
 When discussing justice it has been noted that liberalism assumes a 
position whereby ‘rationality’ determines the goods which are to be distributed, 
and to whom. Communitarian positions, like liberal ones, cover a range of 
divergent positions on the nature of community, and respect given to communal 
practices. Communitarian positions, in general terms, sees autonomy as 
dependent on social context. More pertinent for the present discussion is the 
moral claim that an individual, in being a member of a community, is “included 
within moral calculations”,467 as opposed to developing those considerations 
outside of the society in which they develop. Put another way by Emanuel Adler, 
“[r]ationality lies less in the act of instrumental choice between alternatives on 
the basis of true theories than in acting in ways that ‘stand to reason’ given 
people’s background expectations and dispositions”.468 It is not the purpose of 
this chapter to show which and what type of politics is most appropriate for 
Normative Political Islam. Rather, if the assumptions of this thesis about the 
plurality of competing claims about justice, as derived from differing social 
contexts, is correct, then the search for ‘the politics of Normative Political Islam’ 
is a futile one. Normative Political Islam merely allows individuals and 
communities to construct their structures of government in ways they find 
appropriate for them to achieve their communal ends.  
Such an approach, however, is not a justification for social conservatism 
or cultural relativism, a criticism often levied against communitarianism. As 
Michael Walzer argues, “pluralism does not require us to endorse every 
proposed distributive criteria or to accept every would-be-agent”. 469  The 
relativism critique implies communitarian based politics is always contingent 
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and contextual, whereas the rationality of liberalism is universal. Indeed, Veit 
Bader laments that communitarian positions dilute the meaning of morality:  
 
If communitarianism, for all its versions, pretends to be an identifiable position in 
practical philosophy, then it must mean that in all hard cases the particularist 
requirements of community must trump the universalist ones of justice… 
Universalist principles and rights should not only trump prudentialist utility but also 
the ethics of particular communities.
470
 
 
Bader’s position clearly highlights a notion of justice that is universally 
applicable. Such a position is intimately tied with the ideas of ‘progress’ 
indicative of the Enlightenment. If a universalist ethic trumps communally based 
ones, a notion of developmentalism is introduced whereby it is acceptable to 
enforce a universal ethic as it is more ‘advanced’ that justice derived from 
community. The thesis has argued that in fact the universalism of liberalism is 
contingent on a specific understanding of community. In addition, politics that 
derive from community need not be ‘irrational’, seen in the theory of deriving 
sovereignty in Normative Political Islam via an exoteric method.  Universal 
applicability and interaction between different notions of justice is a theme 
returned to later in the chapter when it overlays the present discussion upon the 
international sphere and Islamic IR. Before looking at communal theories of IR, 
the chapter will continue by exploring what communitarianism might offer to 
Normative Political Islam. Such an exploration is necessary as later it will be 
seen that talk of community in international relations, especially in the English 
School, builds upon, often in an unconscious manner, the debate being 
presented here between liberalism and communitarianism. 
Communitarianism and Normative Political Islam 
Michael Walzer’s communitarian argument in Spheres of Justice argues for an 
inherent plurality in the notion, or better put, notions of justice; there is no set of 
criteria to decide on who gets what.471 Speaking directly to the atomism of 
liberalism, he claims that “[w]e cannot say what is due to this person or that until 
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we know how these people relate to one another through the things they make 
and distribute. There cannot be a just society until there is a society”. 472 
However, Walzer’s communities and societies are idealised, generally culturally 
homogenous and deny the historical and contemporary violence needed to 
create these communities.473 There is a conspicuous lack of recognition that 
societal structures perpetuate themselves sometimes not through consenting 
agents, but rather “mirror the balance of power of the various groups within 
them and the conventions and customs of the economic and political practices 
in which their members are engaged”.474 Bader highlights that Walzer is over 
reliant on the state to provide a sense of ‘closure’ to his community, preventing 
the splintering of people into smaller and smaller groups. The state, for Walzer, 
is “necessary and legitimate to defend shared meaning, values, and ways of 
life”. 475  Such an argument, however, “clings to the superposition of ethnic, 
cultural, and national identities and citizenship”.476  
So there is presented on the one hand liberalism’s universalism which 
denies cultural or ‘lived’ truths, while on the other hand there is presented a 
communitarian perspective which alludes to a community that bears little 
resemblance to multicultural realities. If it is true that “[j]ustice is relative to 
social meanings”477, then operationalising that dictum is proving difficult. For 
example, when an individual considers a practice unjust within the community 
they are a part of, does that infer that the individual is no longer part of the 
community? Such a view would see gradual splintering of ‘community’ to “a 
thousand petty fortresses”. 478  Normative Political Islam has avoided this 
problem somewhat by the emphasis on a dual contract between the individual 
and government.  
Recalling the dual contract in the style of Majid Khadduri,479 argued for in 
the previous chapter; one contract is between Muslim and God through the 
declaration of faith (shahadda) and a second between the Muslim and a 
temporal authority. Such a separation of sovereignty allows for Muslims to live 
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in non-Muslim territory, as long as the temporal authority does not impede upon 
the individual’s ability to fulfil the first contract. Likewise in Muslim territory, any 
method of government is acceptable and does not contravene God’s 
sovereignty, in so far as the Muslim temporal power respects the commitment to 
the first agreement.  
Connecting the discussion of liberalism and communitarianism to 
sovereignty derived from Normative Political Islam, it is noted that the first 
agreement, between the Muslim and God, resembles the universalism of liberal 
notions of justice in two ways. Firstly, just as liberalism is a broad and contested 
tradition, a Muslim’s concept of what constitutes their agreement with God in 
their declaration of faith is not pre-determined in scripture. Secondly, both 
liberalism and the shahadda, while contested, assume a certain agreement in 
what constitutes the core tenants of those terms. The extent of this agreement 
may well be thin, and certainly does not extend to separate ‘doctrines’, be that 
between the market-liberalism of Friedrich Hayek and the communitarian-
liberalism of John Rawls, 480  or the Sunni-Shi’a divide. The meaning of a 
commitment to liberalism, or the Muslim’s declaration of faith, share a 
universalist tendency that tries to give both concepts meaning detached from 
the social context in which they are used. The second of Khadduri’s contracts, 
between the Muslim and the temporal ruler, resembles much more the 
communitarian commitment to deriving meaning from social context. As 
Muslims need not be bound by any transcendental commandments about 
political life (the difference between Islam-as-politics and Islam-as-faith), it is up 
to human ingenuity to develop a model for politics.  
The thesis finds great difficulty in trying to accommodate both the 
universalism of the shahadda and the specificity of the different cultural and 
religious practices of Muslims. Islam-as-faith can be interpreted to rest on 
certain truths, though it has been argued that these do not necessarily translate 
to Islam-as-politics. The truths of Islam-as-faith can be broadly understood as 
the universal pretensions of Khadduri’s first contract (with God), in other words, 
divine truths that exist independent of social context. On the other hand, the 
interpretivism of Islam-as-politics broadly maps onto the cultural specificity of 
communitarianism and is inherently bound to and reliant upon social context. 
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While separating the two notions in a dual contract allows the resolution of this 
tension theoretically, in practice these Muslim contractors are asked to at once 
embrace universalism and particularism, and to keep the two conceptually 
separate as they go about giving life to Normative Political Islam. The 
incongruence between the two positions of the dual contract is one that will be 
repeated when the notion of communitarianism is applied to IR in the following 
section of the chapter. After having articulated this same problem in the 
international sphere, the next chapter will attempt to frame the problem fully and 
attempt to resolve this incongruence.  
Having established the thesis’ critique of universalism as a hallmark of 
rationalism, this chapter has argued that Normative Political Islam’s exoteric 
method is capable of constructing notions of justice that derive from or in some 
way reflect the societies in which that notion of justice is to hold sway. The 
chapter has so far teased at the possibilities of engaging with this debate, and 
foreshadowed a prominent incongruence with applying both universalism and 
particularism in deriving an Islamic notion of sovereignty, and now will take a 
similar dialectic and apply it to IR. In doing so, the remainder of the chapter will 
examine the prospects for Islamically derived, communal relations on the 
international sphere. Thinking back on this chapter, consider replacing the use 
of the word community with the word umma and the possibilities for engaging 
the debate between communitarianism and liberalism at the international level, 
to give agency to the umma, becomes clear. 
Communitarian International Relations 
Communitarian international relations, according to Emanuel Adler, is a focus 
on knowledge “that gives meaning to material reality and consequently helps 
explain the constitutive and casual mechanisms that participate in the 
construction of social reality”.481 For this thesis such an approach is intertwined 
with the Constructivist framework outlined previously, and the Aristotelian 
perspective of Normative Political Islam, deriving values from social contexts. 
Constructivism and communitarianism might not seem entirely in synthesis with 
each other; while both share an emphasis on the social aspect of existence, 
Constructivism places a focus on the individual’s place in constituting their 
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surroundings. In IR, however, referring to the community gives it actor qualities, 
taking away from the individual’s agency in some regard. The interaction 
between individual and community happens at one level of analysis, identified 
here as the domestic level. Much of the discussion in the previous section 
would occur at this domestic level, discussion over the nature of justice, the 
place of values in relation to the individual and the community etc. It is not the 
purpose of this thesis to resolve these multitude questions for Normative 
Political Islam at the domestic level as indeed, if such questions are dependent 
on societal circumstance, then it is erroneous to attempt to prescribe a form of 
governance in an abstract sense.  
At the international level, as has been discussed in an earlier chapter, 
there is an antipathy towards the notion of religious politics. Recalling Joseph 
Van Ess’ caricaturisation of popular opinion to Islamic politics as “repellent and 
strange... The notion commonly associated with it is the Sharia... which would 
seem to be incompatible with the rules of enlightened reason”.482 This particular 
tension with Islam is exacerbated by a more general resistance to religion in the 
discipline, in what Elizabeth Hurd calls a secular bias, reviewed in chapter 2. 
This bias, for Hurd, reveals that “[c]onventional understandings of international 
relations, focused on material capabilities and strategic interaction, exclude 
from the start the possibility that religion could be a fundamental organizing 
force in the international system”.483 Normative Political Islam must overcome 
both these perceptions at the international level if it is to give agency to the 
notion of umma.  
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, articulating the umma on 
the international level could happen on a scale from ‘thick’ conceptions, 
between individuals transcending the state, and ‘thin’ conceptions, reliant on 
interaction between Muslim states, perhaps in a transnational organisation.484 In 
accordance with the framework of the thesis, it would be presumptuous to claim 
that it is possible to create a conception of the umma abstractly, and then apply 
this to all Muslims. Even while it has been stipulated that the thesis is working 
within the confines of Sunni Islam, it is up to the community that defines itself as 
such to conceptualise the umma. What will be attempted here is not a 
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prescriptive account of Normative Political Islam’s IR, but an exploration of the 
two poles of thick and thin conceptions of the umma. In so doing the thesis 
maintains its engagement with second order IR theorising, “making explicit and 
critiquing the foundational assumptions that structure research agendas”.485  
Thin conceptions of the umma  
Locating the umma within the state and in transnational interaction as would be 
posited by a thin conception of the umma is problematic for a number of 
reasons. In the first place, the umma does not necessitate any concept of the 
national at all, though it often includes it. Another problem rests with Muslim 
minorities in non-Muslim countries, who would still need to feel part of any 
institutionalised conception of the umma. Even the term ‘Islamic state’ is 
problematic for many as it is unclear who, if anyone, can authoritatively define a 
state as Islamic. The concept of transnationalism also does not sit well with the 
locating politics in individuals or communities. As the nation can be entirely left 
out of the schema of the umma, to call it a transnational organisation is 
somewhat of a misnomer. At this point, then, it becomes necessary to truncate 
the definition of umma being used; as other transnational institutions, like the 
EU, are based upon the states that comprise it, so too would a theoretical thin-
umma be based upon Muslim states, as doing so allows such a concept to work 
with the term transnationalism. The disadvantages of conceptualising a state 
based umma are significant: Such a structure would not be representative of the 
‘whole’ umma as it would not include substantial numbers of Muslims living as 
minority populations in non-Muslim states; Muslim communities not affiliated to 
the state, NGOs and charities, for example, are also not represented. In 
addition, developing criteria for what constitutes a ‘Muslim’ state is not easy. 
These are very acute problems with a state based conception of the umma, for 
sure, but the discussion continues, as it has so far, not looking to solve the 
operative problems associated with the umma, but here looking to explore the 
problems with religious based identity in IR. In order to do this, the chapter 
proceeds by placing this religious identity and the thin conception of umma, 
however arbitrarily, in the vessel of states.  
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 Transnational institutions can engender a communal identity, for example 
the EU’s attempts at creating a European identity. Going by the earlier appraisal 
of the units constituting the international system, for the EU to exist in the 
international sphere it must behave like a state. Turning to Ian Manners’ 
problem with EU studies, which broadens out to IR more generally: the EU as a 
super-state entity is shaped by norms which lead to “a willingness to disregard 
Westphalian conventions”.486 The EU is able to disregard these conventions as, 
unlike a state, the EU is not constituted by the Westphalian example. Returning 
to Manners for a concise summary of the EU’s challenge to more traditional IR: 
 
The creative efforts of the European integration process have changes what passes 
for ‘normal’ in world politics. Simply by existing as different in a world of states and 
the relations between them, the European Union changes the normality of 
‘international relations’. In this respect the EU is a normative power: it changes the 
norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from the bounded 
expectations of state-centricity.
487
 
 
Manners is not arguing that statism is undermined, but rather changed. It is 
evident that the EU is reliant upon the states that constitute it, but the 
relationship between states and the super-national institution that is born out of 
them can be related to the Constructivist notion of co-constitution. Naveed 
Sheikh makes a similar point when commenting on the OIC. Sheikh states that 
“as an intergovernmental organization, the idiosyncrasy of the OIC is 
categorical, for whilst adhering to the secular logic of multistate functionalism, 
its… purpose is guided by a single imperative, that of… ideational subscription 
to a unification, or integration, of Muslim peoples”.488 The approach of the OIC 
or EU, in pursuing integration across state boundaries, seems to share a similar 
purpose with that of the thin-umma; such an approach could be adopted by 
Muslim states to engender some form of Islamic solidarity which is currently 
missing from the international relations of these states,489 representing a source 
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of illegitimacy vis-a-vis their domestic populations.490 It has been observed that 
the plans that Islamists visualise “have not been tested by the realities of power, 
nor have they themselves had to organize and staff ministries, meet budgets, or 
implement policies”.491 Beyond these tests of power, it is also true and perhaps 
more troublesome for Islamists, that they lack the theoretical framework for 
such religious transnationalism in the secular world of nation states.  
How are such claims about political Islam’s lack of framework 
substantiated when the OIC’s existence is testament to the interaction between 
pan-Islam and the state system?492 Naveed Sheikh’s study, The New Politics of 
Islam, addresses this concern in the manner of first order theory, that is, in an 
empirical investigation into the workings of the OIC, its main actors and so on. 
Sheikh’s study concludes that the OIC is more an arena for states vying for 
power and less an instrument for achieving the politics of the umma. He argues 
that “[w]hile the very theorem for the establishment of the OIC was the 
transnational body of believers, the OIC remains, in fairness, a secularized 
association of states rather than an international society”. 493  The notion of 
secularism that Sheikh draws upon betrays the way in which the OIC has been 
socialised into existing forms of IR. The OIC, the thesis posits, is the result of an 
attempt to give saliency to Islamic IR without first challenging the basis of IR as 
it is commonly understood. Recalling the two stage analysis of the thesis, the 
OIC is an attempt at the second stage of analysis, the construction of Islamic IR, 
without the first stage’s analysis of the unspoken assumptions in the discipline. 
That is not to discount the achievement of establishing a religiously based 
international organisation; indeed as Sheikh points out, the OIC’s existence as 
an Islamic organisation is “an ontological achievement”.494 It is possible that in 
the construction of a thin-umma in this chapter, an institution will be created that 
resembles the OIC in whole or part. However, the chapter is not attempting to 
solve the OIC’s operative problems. If the thin-umma described in this chapter 
results in a resemblance to the OIC, then that will be coincidental. It is the focus 
on a meta-theoretical thin-umma that the chapter returns to now. 
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The transnationalism represented by the EU is not so easily replicated in 
the umma as there is resistance to the notion of Islamic, religious solidarity, as 
Thomas Risse-Kappen demonstrates when he warns that “there is no reason to 
assume that transnational relations regularly promote “good” causes”. 495 
Unfortunately, the supporting example of a “bad” cause for Risse-Kappen is an 
ill-defined Islamic fundamentalism.496  
Recalling the universal aspirations and rights based approach to 
community inherent in liberalism, versus the geographical and historical 
specificity of community afforded by communitarian and Constructivist theory. 
The lack of clarity with regards to the extent and nature of unity amongst 
Muslims resonates with this liberal/communitarian division. On the one hand, a 
popular and in some senses ‘classical’ understanding of Islamic IR, siyar, bears 
much resemblance to the universality of liberalism. Ahmed Bsoul Labeeb tries 
to emphasise exactly this when he states that, “Islam is a universal message 
and its rulings cover and refer to all people without distinction and without 
favouring one group or race over another. Islamic law aims to establish one 
society under one system”.497  
The quintessential Islamic reformer, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, also alludes 
to this universality, but betrays a naivety in the power he affords religion in this 
instance. For al-Afghani, Islamic solidarity is at least comparable to nationalism 
and he believed that by being loyal to their faith, Muslims can put sectarian 
considerations aside in the creation of their umma.498 Much as liberalism is 
imbued with Eurocentric allusions about the ‘neutrality’ of such a position, so too 
is al-Afghani’s reference to broad Islamic universalism laden with essentialism. 
This is a position criticised at length by Aziz al-Azmeh, who notes that Islamists, 
“claim to speak for a univocal body of legislation which is not grounded in the 
vast historical experience of Muslims”.499 He argues that generalisations made 
about social groups in terms of religion incorrectly overwrite socio-economic 
factors, when in fact “religious difference underwrites and does not 
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overdetermine social exclusivism”.500 In moving away from the idea that some 
pre-political consensus exists amongst Muslims, perhaps al-Azmeh goes too far, 
denying the co-constitutive relationship of religious ideas on the behaviour of 
actors, instead arguing that behaviour is already determined by socio-economic 
factors and subsequently given legitimacy through religious discourse. Using 
Constructivism as a middle ground, how can Normative Political Islam better 
relate the religious urge for some kind of Muslim solidarity, represented through 
the umma? 
While the Constructivist method opens space for the study of identity, the 
secular bias in IR identified by Hurd ensures that religious identity is under-
theorised (as was noted with Barnett’s and Telhami and Barnett’s studies in 
chapter 2). Abdul Latif Tibawi pre-empted some of the conclusions of Hurd’s 
study when he wrote in 1964 that without understanding Islam as it is 
understood and experienced by a believer, scholarly work is ensured to be 
disconnected from the realities of Muslim people. 501  As Mandaville asserts, 
“[e]ven if Muslim identities remain primarily nationalized, this does not mean 
that it is not possible for them to make common cause with co-religionists 
elsewhere, or to sympathise with “Muslim” issues”.502 
Despite the problems with current Constructivist study (or omission) of 
Islam’s relation to identity, Constructivism still holds much potential for 
theorising the umma. The often heard slogan of din-wa-dawla, the inseparability 
of religion and politics, is again not representative of the realities of Muslims, 
nor an appreciation of Islamic texts.503 As argued previously, there is little about 
the faith of Islam that predisposes its believers to a specific political order; this 
being so, the scope for developing a framework for common identity is huge. 
The problem, of course, is deciding on what norms are to constitute 
Muslim identity. ‘Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman’s study into the content of an 
Islamic IR makes a first attempt at deciding what these norms should be. For 
Abu Sulyman, self-determination, justice, peace, self-exertion, and a respect for 
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and fulfilment of commitments represent the normative basis of Islamic IR,504 
which could be adapted to form the basis of Muslim transnational identity. 
Which norms constitute Muslim identity is not clearly defined; even Abu 
Sulayman’s norms are ambiguously tied to Islamic texts. The OIC, the almost 
thin-umma example, is testament to the problems involved in deriving ‘proper’ 
Islamic norms; rather than a consensus of opinion on the nature of Islam-as-
politics - a kind of civilizational behemoth - “the case of the OIC vividly illustrates 
that the dynamics of trans-national, or pan-national alignment, fall in a spectrum 
from utilitarianism to hedonism”. 505  But other transnational identities, like 
European identity, for example, are not derived from some essential European 
character; there are no ‘European source texts’ that bind Europeans through 
time and space. Rather, the identity is constructed in the here and now, in a 
geographically and temporally specific instance. So too can Muslim identity be 
formed and relevant to Muslims now rather than all Muslims throughout time, as 
is so often the urge for Muslim thinkers. Being more concerned with what binds 
Muslims together in the now rather than throughout time, would go some way to 
account for the broad spectrum of positions that Muslim states take within the 
OIC, for example. Similarly, it is not contradictory for EU states to take differing 
positions on key issues, they do not betray some ‘essential’ European character 
when divergent opinions within the Union appear. Rather such divergence 
signals the on-going processes of delineating what being ‘European’ means in 
the international sphere. So too could a thin-umma support divergence in the 
views held by its members, as part of an on-going appraisal of what be ‘Muslim’ 
means in the international sphere. 
What is seen in theorising a thin conception of the umma is that the state 
system places considerable constraints on the nature of the community. 
Constructivism allows a desire for greater solidarity between Muslims to come 
to fruition through the mechanisms of an international organisation. However, 
such an organisation would have to be geographically limited by the states that 
constitute it, and therefore compromise much of what makes the umma unique 
and desirable for Muslims, namely, a sense of solidarity with individual Muslims, 
regardless of the territory they live. But as an example of religious based 
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identity, the state conception of the umma serves; indeed, the OIC is testament 
to the Islam-as-faith’s “secularization-resistant profile… in international 
society”.506  
The chapter will proceed by looking at how to move to a thicker 
conception of the umma, which would allow for a greater solidarity exclusive of 
territorial limits, incorporating diaspora and non-state groups.  
Moving from thin to thick conceptions of the umma: The English School 
of International Relations 
The debate which this chapter is engaged with, between universalism and 
particularism, between liberal autonomy and societal values, has many 
similarities with a debate found in the English School of international relations, 
namely, the relationship between the international system, international society, 
and world society. Broadly reflecting Martin Wight’s three traditions of IR, 
representative of the ideas of Hobbes, Grotius and Kant, Barry Buzan offers an 
explanation of each of these three key English School terms: International 
system “puts structure and process of international anarchy at the centre of IR 
theory”; international society “puts the creation and maintenance of shared 
norms, rules and institutions at the centre of IR theory”; world society “puts 
transcendence of the states-system at the centre of IR theory”.507 The terms 
international system, international society and world society, when used 
hereafter, refer to these concepts as they are explained in the English School. 
Further still, “English school theory has a lot to offer those interested in 
developing societal understandings of international systems”, 508  and this 
chapter wishes to avail itself of this framework as a stepping stone for 
articulating community in IR. 
International society for this thesis represents a local or communal 
rationality that is argued to be representative of the umma and communitarian 
notions of deriving value from community. As Rengger stresses about 
international society, it rests on notions of “common interests and values, 
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common rules and institutions”.509 In so far as international society is heavily 
dependent on states, so it resembles a thin conception of umma. World society, 
in contrast, resembles the universal tendencies of Islam-as-faith, or the 
liberalism of the Enlightenment project. The relationship between world society 
and universalism is made as world society implies global pacifism through 
globally applicable notions of justice; Andrew Linklater highlights a tension 
similar to that between communitarianism and liberalism when he states that, 
“[t]he analysis of the expansion of international society [into a world society] 
raises large questions about the relationship between moral and legal 
universals and support for respect for cultural differences”.510 Broadly speaking, 
the thick-umma is engaged somewhere between the notions of international 
society and world society, though this is somewhat problematic, as will now be 
explored.  
International society is “built around the state as the defining unit”,511 
justified by an empirical statement about the “historical sociology of international 
relations”.512 This emphasis on the state’s neutral, yet unchallengeable place 
the state system poses problems very similar to the thin-umma, expanded upon 
in the previous section. Indeed, the thin-umma is quite comparable to a 
‘regional society’ as is shares the assumptions that constitute an international 
society as Hedley Bull understands it, that is, “common interests and values”.513 
However, the English School makes a distinction between society and 
community, reflecting the sociological categories of gesellschaft (society) and 
gemeinschaft (community). Society “focuses on patterns of interaction 
structured by shared norms and rules”, while community “focuses on identity 
and ‘we-feeling’”.514 The thin-umma seems far more concerned with identity and 
so is more applicable to ‘community’ rather than ‘society’. However, the 
relationship between society and community is complicated and contested. 
Even among the English School, two prominent theorists of this paradigm 
disagree on whether community comes before the development of international 
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society (the position of Wight), or if society is necessary to develop a sense of 
community (the position of John Vincent). 515  This thesis therefore adopts 
Buzan’s approach of abandoning the gesellschaft/gemeinschaft distinction, 
viewing them as ideal types, intertwined in some way, though ambiguous as to 
the nature of their relationship.516 Such an ambiguity allows the chapter to talk 
of thin-umma constructions, even ones that are concerned more with identity 
than procedure, as regional societies or regional communities interchangeably. 
Regardless, the regional society of the thin-umma is insufficient in giving the 
umma agency, as highlighted above with regards to the geographical limitations 
of the state compromising the sense of solidarity with individual Muslims. So, 
can world society help develop a thick conception of the umma, a conception 
that allows for this solidarity between persons? 
Hedley Bull saw some potential in the world society concept, in so far as 
it could be more inclusive than international society. While society is defined by 
states, those who are outside the state system would never be granted equal 
treatment. If the move were made to a society of peoples then a more inclusive 
order might be achievable. 517  Using the term society of peoples seems to 
overlap quite nicely with the concept of the umma. There is however a 
prominent disconnect between the two concepts: The world society is universal, 
linked to the universal liberal aspirations outlined earlier in the chapter, while an 
umma is demarcated by differing belief systems. However, if Islam-the-faith is 
believed to one day encompass the entire globe and all peoples, then the 
universalism thus far criticised is applicable to both world society and umma 
concepts. Furthering the similarity, it is observed that universal or no, both world 
society and umma would begin with an otherwise particular society. It would 
seem then that world society has much to offer in giving credence to a thick-
umma. Unlike the thin-umma, the world society model would revolve around 
people, not states, and so encompass Muslim minorities in whatever country 
they may live. Broadly put, while the thin-umma, centred on the English School 
concept of international society, appears more congruent with the prevailing 
structure of IR but less congruent with traditional articulations of the umma, then 
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the thick-umma, centred on the concept of world society, is the opposite; the 
thick-umma is more consistent with the umma but less so with the way in which 
IR is predominately articulated.  
Articulating the umma in this way, as has been mentioned briefly already, 
relies on settling questions of values and justice between a diverse range of 
peoples. Such a move bears more than a passing resemblance with the liberal 
universalism critiqued earlier in the chapter, especially if the way universal 
human rights are used in IR is approximated to the way the thick-umma would 
operate. In this way, the world society concept in the English School is shown to 
be based on liberal thought; Hobson explains about the English School as a 
whole, that “it rests on fundamental liberal foundations comprising Lockean or 
Grotian liberalism (as the ‘pluralist’ wing) and cosmopolitan liberalism (as in the 
‘solidarist’ wing)”. 518  The implication of comparing the English School and 
liberalism is to note the connection that the abstracted notion of rationality has 
with what passes for ‘civilisation’ in IR theory and history, as is presently 
explored. 
Taking the example of liberal universalism as implying a consensus of 
values derived abstractly, one can glimpse at the way in which this assumption 
is problematic in IR. David Boucher states that “when natural law and its 
derivative rights are deemed to be universal, their application is often 
oppressive”. 519  The idea of oppression will be dealt with in the following 
paragraph; presently a link between natural law and liberal universalism is 
made, to make Boucher’s criticism relevant to the present discussion. While 
liberal universalism does not always rest on the concept of natural laws, 
abstracting values and applying them to all peoples regardless of their societal 
circumstances can take the place of natural law in Boucher’s criticism; both 
concepts, natural law or abstractly derived values, imply a pre-political 
consensus which in actuality cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, the notion of 
universality implied by liberalism has changed with time, highlighting the 
inconsistency in claiming it is a pre-political, abstractly defined value system. 
When relating the changing goal posts of an ostensibly universal liberalism to IR, 
the thesis equates the ‘standard of civilisation’ to liberal values. Indicative of 
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Hobson’s non reductive Orientalism, the ‘standard of civilisation’ is a measure of 
defining ‘self’ (civilisation) and ‘other’ (barbarism),520 and the thesis argues that 
liberalism is a prominent marker of that civilisation in IR. Having made this 
conceptual move, the chapter can lean on Edward Keene’s analysis of the 
changes in this ‘standard of civilisation’ as it has been applied in IR, to highlight 
its oppressive role in the history of colonialism.  
For Keene the ‘standard of civilisation’ changes during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century from “a certain level of economic, 
political and judicial advancement”, to the idea that “every nation has a right to 
self-determination”.521  The former served to separate the international order 
along racial lines, justifying the imperial attitude of Europe abroad while 
protecting its liberal character at home. The latter became far more inclusive, 
“the concept of civilization increasingly began to separate Europeans from each 
other, and came to be seen in terms of an ideological divide rather than a racial 
one”. 522  This example of the changing standard of civilisation, and the 
oppression that can derive from universality, serves to demonstrate the dangers 
of abstracted universal values, liberal values or otherwise. Rather, the liberal 
values claimed to be ‘universal’ both during the colonial era and afterwards are 
in fact tied to societal circumstances, which accounts for their change over time. 
The divergence between the universal aspirations of liberalism in IR and the 
non-universality of its creation and perpetuation presents an explanation for the 
incoherency of human rights in IR, as Boucher summarises: 
 
Universal rights always were, and remain, conditional and all sorts of pretexts may 
be invoked to suspend their application, from the promotion of better trading 
relations, which made world leaders quickly forget Tiananmen Square, to the desire 
for order over justice, in which justice is traded for truth.
523
 
 
MacIntyre would relate this incongruence, that is, the divergent ends of pursuing 
order and justice at the same time, to the ‘Enlightenment project’, as noted 
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earlier in the chapter. For MacIntyre it has not been shown that an impersonal 
or abstract notion of morality exists,524 so returning the thesis once more to 
societally derived values in the place of this abstraction. The implications of 
socially derived values in IR will be examined more thoroughly in the next 
chapter, Pluralism Not Polarisation while presently the current chapter will relate 
the discussion of the ‘liberal-neutral’ foundation of world society to an 
articulation of a thick-umma.  
 The thick-umma, in relying on a pre-political consensus similar to that 
required by liberal universalism, shares the same problems outlined above. 
Piscatori argues that any search for ‘proper’ Islamic values, upon which a thick-
umma would be based, “is bound to fail, even as the general idea proves to be 
durably attractive”.525 Indeed, “[t]o talk of Islamic authority in the abstract would 
be to reify something that is largely contingent on social relations of culture, 
power, and history across a wide variety of contexts”.526 The argument that 
Islam-as-faith does not provide enough guidance on its own to inform Islam-as-
politics necessarily implies that Normative Political Islam, or indeed any 
articulation of political Islam, cannot rely on a pre-political consensus on values 
to be the basis of the world society articulation of umma.  
 The thesis dubbed its variant of political Islam as Normative Political 
Islam, but the norms necessary for its articulation in a thick-umma are not 
coherent with the framework employed to give agency to the concept. To create 
space for Normative Political Islam in IR a poststructural critique of IR was 
employed which broke down various dominant claims around the discipline, like 
secularism and the centrality of the state; currently, however, if one were to 
embrace a thick-umma in the mould of world society, one would need to create 
a series of value claims that are just as susceptible to that original poststructural 
critique. If the norms of Normative Political Islam are to apply to the world over, 
then the geographical and cultural specificity necessary to construct these 
norms in the first place will have to be removed. In essence this would create a 
paradox, similar to the problem outlined in the discussion of communitarianism 
and liberalism earlier in the chapter, regarding a simultaneous embrace of both 
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universalism and particularism in the development of Islamic sovereignty. 
Abdullahi An-Na’im alludes to a similar problem in his work Islam and the 
Secular State. An-Na’im states, in much the way done in this chapter, that to 
use shari’a as a universal normative basis for Islam-as-politics is problematic. 
He states that: 
 
[T]he so-called basic objectives of Shari’a are expressed at such a high level of 
abstraction [to be applicable to all Muslims] that they are neither distinctly Islamic 
nor sufficiently specific for the purposes of public policy and legislation.
527
  
 
To create norms applicable to Muslims is to embrace societal and cultural 
specificity, but to create norms applicable to all Muslims in a world society is to 
deny the specificity required to give these norms any purchase in the first place. 
In this way, both liberal universalism and the thick-umma are shown as flawed 
when used to create a world society. Embracing the specificity required by 
Normative Political Islam, while at the same time giving credence to the idea of 
solidarity with co-religionists, otherwise put, to resolve the paradox outlined here, 
is what will be explored in depth in the final chapter. 
Conclusions 
Having augmented the religious (theological) guidance on Islamic politics in the 
previous chapter with Islamic exotericism, developing a theory of Islamic 
sovereignty in the process, this chapter has attempted to apply those ideas to 
the international sphere. Focusing on the articulation of the umma in IR, the 
chapter argued that the foundations of dominant IR interpretations upon the 
liberal universal legacy of the European Enlightenment prove a severe 
impediment to any articulation of the umma. Engaging with the debate between 
liberalism and communitarianism, it was argued that liberal universalism derives 
its values from an individual abstracted from their societal circumstances. 
Accepting the abstracted values of liberalism would undermine the distinction 
between Islam-as-faith and Islam-as-politics. An abstracted value system would 
fold the two together, so that the principles that are capable of being 
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universalised, Islam-as-faith, would override the principles derived from societal 
circumstance, Islam-as-politics. Alternatively, principles derived from within a 
specific society might retroactively be given universal appeal, resulting in one 
notion of Islam-as-politics overriding competing conceptions, trying to veil itself 
as Islam-as-faith. If a move accepting universal values in the mould of the 
Enlightenment project were made by Normative Political Islam, it would create a 
zero-sum discourse within (‘our Islamism is the only Islamism’) and without 
(liberalism vs. Islamism) the Muslim world.  
 Communitarianism, on the other hand, was argued to be capable of 
giving agency to various forms of Islam-as-politics, Normative Political Islam 
included. Embracing the societal basis of value systems allows one to accept 
the liberalism of the Enlightenment as linked to the community it was derived 
from, resisting the urge to apply it globally. The umma then, is indicative of 
whatever the Muslims that constitute it will it to be. However, relating these 
conclusions to the dual contract method used in the previous chapter to develop 
a notion of sovereignty for Normative Political Islam, revealed an incoherency 
around the simultaneous embrace of universalism and particularism. The first 
contract between the Muslim and God involves a commitment to the 
transcendental and universal aspects of Islam-as-faith, while the second 
contract between Muslims and temporal authority embraces the particularism of 
the society the Muslim might find themselves in. Asking Muslim contractors to 
embrace both particularism and universalism, and to neatly demarcate the two 
in their minds as they go about deriving their version of Islam-as-politics, is a 
problematic expectation. The incoherence of a position embracing both 
universalism and particularism was also explored when moving the debate 
between liberalism and communitarianism to the realm of IR. 
 Giving agency to the umma in IR, the chapter examined two extremes on 
a spectrum, the thin and thick-umma. The former was argued to represent a 
form of solidarity vested in states, articulated by an international organisation 
similar to the EU. However, what was demonstrated was that investing in the 
state system compromises much of what makes the umma desirable in the first 
place, specifically, solidarity with individual coreligionists. Moving to a thick-
umma that would be located in individuals, the chapter examined the problem in 
assuming too much agreement between and amongst Muslims. In essence, a 
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thick-umma has to make abstracted and universal claims about the nature of 
the connection between individuals, much in the way liberalism does. In doing 
so, it begins to deny the constitutive element of Normative Political Islam being 
vested in society, and instead places that constitutive element in those abstract 
and universal values, presumably vested in theological guidance (though it is 
entirely possible these values might be based in rationalism, much as the liberal 
tradition is). How to resolve this problem of at once respecting the truth 
associated with divine revelation, however thin that truth might be, while 
simultaneously arguing that cultural specificity is the best method to derive 
Islam-as-politics, is the problem that the following chapter takes up.  
This chapter has demonstrated that the IR of the umma would entail 
multiple and competing notions of Islam-as-politics, Normative Political Islam 
representing only one approach amongst many. If Islam-as-politics is indeed 
embedded within societal practice then an attempt to abstractly dictate a 
singular paradigm for the articulation of that politics is futile. Abandoning the 
idea that a singular conception of Islam-as-politics is achievable leads the thesis 
to a discussion of how and to what extent can IR embrace pluralism, or, does 
pluralism inevitably lead to conflict between competing value systems? This is 
the question that guides us into the final substantive chapter of the thesis, 
Pluralism or Polarisation. 
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Chapter 5: Pluralism Not Polarisation 
This chapter will continue to explore the notion of communitarian IR. While the 
previous chapter attempted to apply the principle of the umma in IR using a 
communitarian perspective, with varying degrees of success from thick to thin 
conceptions of Muslim solidarity, this chapter investigates the implications of 
Normative Political Islam embracing that communitarian perspective, with a 
specific focus on interaction with other states or communities in the international 
sphere. Such a discussion is linked to the secondary research question: What 
challenges does the concept of the umma, as an alternative to the state, pose 
to the discipline of international relations? The chapter will begin by noting the 
similarity of the argument of the thesis thus far with Samuel Huntington’s Clash 
of Civilisations. Specifically, the chapter will compare the way in which both the 
Clash of Civilisations and the arguments of this thesis rest upon the basis of 
incommensurable differences in the values of different peoples. 
 While the chapter will show that there is indeed some similarity between 
this thesis and Huntington’s ideas, in the way in which conflicting values are 
accepted as unavoidable in IR, the chapter will demonstrate the considerable 
difference between the argument of the thesis and Huntington’s to lie in the way 
in which both invoke pluralism in IR. The chapter argues that Huntington’s use 
of pluralism is incoherent as he embraces a multi-polar and pluralistic 
international order, while at the same time maintaining that different ‘civilisations’ 
are engaged in a zero-sum contest that cannot be mediated. The issue is not 
the zero-sum nature of conflict, as indeed this thesis embraces the idea that 
values cannot be rationally reconciled but may be inherently at odds with each 
other. The issue with Huntington is the use of pluralism in his argument. For him, 
as will be seen in this chapter, pluralism is an empirical statement about diverse 
locations of power in the international sphere. If it is possible for values to never 
be reconciled, as Huntington himself argues, then the notion of pluralism is an 
embrace of this competition in humanity’s relations with one another, not, as 
Huntington would see it, evidence that one set values must triumph over the 
others as a matter of survival. 
 The chapter moves on to unpack an understanding of pluralism distinct 
from Huntington’s. Specifically, the chapter asserts the connection between 
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poststructuralism and pluralism. This connection is made as the poststructural 
position on ontology removes the possibility of universal truths, including 
universal norms or values, to manage the international sphere (like liberalism, 
for example), and pluralism is an attempt to manage the competing values that 
result, in this instance, from a poststructural position on ontology. After 
demonstrating the synthesis between the two concepts the chapter will proceed 
in attempting to answer two questions: 1) To what extent can one conceive of a 
pluralistic IR? And 2) Relating the argument thus far to Normative Political Islam, 
can one be a postmodern Muslim? The second question was foreshadowed in 
the previous chapter with regards to an embrace of the universalism of Islam-
as-faith at the same time as accepting the particularism of Islam-as-politics, 
relating this question to the secondary research question: To what degree is 
there a synthesis in poststructural and Islamic critiques of IR? 
 To answer the first question the chapter will further frame the discussion 
of pluralism in IR by looking at poststructural studies in IR as well as area 
studies, in an attempt to highlight the Enlightenment rationality embedded in 
dominant IR paradigms that insist on a singular conception of ‘the good life’. 
The chapter will then provide a working definition of pluralism and point to 
modus vivendi, agreeing to disagree, as the way in which conflict that cannot be 
resolved between competing values might be managed. In applying modus 
vivendi to IR, the chapter will identify English School and Realist paradigms as 
potentially indicative of value pluralism in IR, but will note that the concept of 
pluralism is under theorised in the field.  
 To answer the second question regarding the poststructural Muslim, the 
chapter seeks to resolve the inherent problem associated with a Muslim 
believing in absolute truth (God) and poststructuralism’s rejection of meta-
narrative simultaneously. To do this, the chapter will argue for a notion of 
bounded poststructuralism and bounded Islam (as-politics). As demonstrated in 
chapter 3, Islam’s exoteric tradition places boundaries on Islam-as-politics, 
preventing it from becoming universally applicable. This chapter will attempt to 
make a similar argument with regards to poststructuralism. Following this, the 
chapter will turn once more to value pluralism as the method to ‘resolve’ the 
question of the postmodern Muslim, arguing that the two positions of 
poststructuralism and belief in God are rationally unresolvable. This being so, 
156 
 
value pluralism and the management of inevitable friction is the method 
forwarded to ‘resolve’ the problem of the poststructural Muslim. 
Communitarianism and the Clash of Civilisations 
Before continuing, it is worth summarising the constitutive elements of the 
argument thus far presented in the thesis, that is, the later chapters which were 
concerned with what forms Islamic IR might take, rather than the earlier 
chapters which discussed the deficiencies, such as they are, in ‘traditional’ IR 
theory vis-a-vis Islam. During this summary similarities will be recognised with a 
different conception of IR. Unfortunately it is a conception of IR that, if the 
association is accurate, spells some dire conclusions for Normative Political 
Islam. The conception referred to, as mentioned in the introduction to the 
chapter, is Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations,528 and this section will 
explore the similarities, and their consequences for the thesis. 
Chapter 3, Sovereignty and Normative Political Islam, argued that 
Normative Political Islam builds upon the distinction between Islam-as-faith, that 
is the elements of faith which concern an individual’s relationship to God, and 
Islam-as-politics, which refers to an individual’s relationship with other people. 
The former is transcendental, the latter is far more mundane. In explaining the 
virtues of detaching Islamic discussion of politics from “the burden of history”, 
Rashid al-Ghannoushi describes a situation which is equally applicable to the 
distinction between Islam-as-faith and Islam-as-politics; al-Ghannoushi explains 
that “Islam is a space and not a point. You can move within this space, it is not 
a prison, contrary to the dominant perception among Muslims”.529   
The boundary between Islam-as-faith and Islam-as-politics is not a solid 
one, and many of the ways in which a Muslim might interact with others might 
be argued to derive from God’s commandments, as interpreted from Islamic 
source texts. Likewise, one might argue that the way in which government 
power is exercised might help bolster citizens’ relationship with God. Despite 
the imperfection of the distinction, the thesis saw that one of the implications of 
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making the split between Islam-as-politics and Islam-as-faith is the recognition 
that Islamic guidance on politics, specifically in the form of political affiliation and 
IR, is not explicit in the Islamic source texts. This is the ‘space’ that al-
Ghannoushi described, within which it becomes possible for Muslims to 
articulate any variety of theories about the state or the international sphere. 
These possible articulations, like Normative Political Islam, are Islamic in the 
way in which they derive from and respect key tenants of Islam-as-faith, but 
cannot claim to be Islam, as these theories do not constitute part of the faith’s 
dogma. 
The thesis noted how it is possible to derive a notion of Islamic 
sovereignty from the exoteric and rational (as distinct from spiritual or legal),530 
aspect of the Islamic message. Such a notion of sovereignty was respectful of 
the doctrinal stipulations laid out in Islamic source texts regarding the 
sovereignty of God, as was explored in more depth in chapter 3. What was also 
seen was that such a notion of sovereignty, in escaping the need to derive 
theories from an immutable source text, was also able to create communally 
sensitive conceptions of IR. The idea of communitarian articulations of IR leads 
inevitably to the idea that there can exist multiple notions of IR, each sensitive 
to and derived from different communities. 
Chapter 4, Islamic Community and International Relations, explored the 
implications of communitarian IR. The discipline of IR discipline was argued to 
inherit much of its ontological and epistemological foundations from the legacy 
of the European Enlightenment. One such inheritance, especially with regards 
to political liberalism, is the notion of the abstracted individual and resulting 
abstract values, as distinct from communitarian values. The abstracted 
individual allows for some level of universalism, while communitarianism implies 
some limits to the applicability of values in any given society. Furthermore, the 
concept of the umma presents one of the more pressing challenges to the way 
in which IR is conceived by the dominant paradigms of the discipline, as the 
umma is a distinct and different unit of analysis from the state. It was argued 
that while it is possible to consider a thin conception of the umma, such a 
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conception would truncate the meaning of community in such a way that it may 
not be acceptable to the Muslims who would seek to give meaning to the umma 
in the contemporary world. Rather, thick conceptions of the umma might be far 
more desirable for the Muslims who would constitute it, but it would truncate the 
importance of the state in IR. Regardless of which conception of the umma is 
more acceptable for Normative Political Islam, an important point to consider is 
that both thick and thin ummas find a place for religious observance and 
expression in IR, be it through a religious solidarity through an EU type structure, 
or through a Muslim ‘world society’ in the context of the definitions found in the 
English School. With this summary in mind, the chapter can move on to the 
comparison with the Clash of Civilisations. Acknowledging Ken Booth’s 
description of Huntington’s work as “the worst book on world politics I have read 
for a long time”,531 the thesis has nothing to add to the many thorough critiques 
of the Clash of Civilisations offered in the years since its publication.532 Rather, 
this section identifies those aspects of Normative Political Islam’s rendering of 
IR that resonate with the Clash of Civilisations, and examine the implications 
thereof. 
Where the language of multiple communities has been used in this thesis 
to derive different conceptions of IR (IR as a specific component of ‘the good 
life’), Huntington used the language of ‘civilisations’ to talk about competing 
notions of the good life. It is interesting to note that difference, for Huntington, is 
equated to (violent) competition, while the thesis has thus far used difference to 
point to pluralism as a political virtue, not a threat. Writing in 1993, Huntington 
stated that it is “symbols of cultural identity” that will shape post-Cold War IR, 
symbols “including crosses, crescents, and even head coverings, because 
culture counts, and cultural identity is what is most meaningful to most 
people”.533 Here Huntington, like many IR scholars identified in the literature 
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review, equates religion with culture in such a way as to fit religion more easily 
into pre-existing analytical categories. Huntington states that “religion, however, 
is the principal defining characteristic of civilizations”; the conflation of culture 
and religion into the term ‘civilisation’ is problematic for the reasons outlined 
earlier in the thesis, namely the way in which it rejects the ways believers 
themselves may see their faith. Nevertheless, the idea of Huntington’s 
civilisations being religiously delineated furthers the comparison with Normative 
Political Islam.  
Giving space to religion, even through the back door of ‘civilisation’, 
echoes the discussion of religious values permeating the erstwhile secular 
discipline of IR. It is not, as Huntington would have it, that with the great battle 
between competing secular ideologies over, religion returns to the fore. Rather, 
as Mona Kanwal Sheikh notes, a preoccupation with Cold War competition and 
secular ideologies betrays “biased narratives representing the rejection of 
religion as the conditions for peace, order and even the state-system”.534 In 
other words, religion was always present in the lives and narratives of the actors 
in IR, it never went away and so is nothing ‘new’ to contend with. Despite the 
differences in explaining the high visibility of religion in IR, what is key is that 
that Huntington, like us, sees religion as an important factor in understanding 
contemporary IR. 
The thesis argued that the values derived from within the Islamic tradition 
do not represent Islam in totality but represent one of many interpretations of 
Islamic source texts. Huntington, conversely, is fixated on broad civilizational 
categories which rely on singular interpretations of a cultural/religious tradition. 
Booth refers to this as a caricatured depiction of actors in world politics; he 
writes that: “On the one hand he [Huntington] makes them (‘Western’, ‘African’, 
‘Islamic’, ‘Sinic’, ‘Orthodox’, etc) more distinct and conflictual that they have 
been and are; on the other hand he exaggerates the degree of intra-
civilisational cohesion.”535 Huntington tries to acknowledge the disparate voices 
within the Islamic ‘civilisation’, but claims this is due to no single, strong ‘core’ 
state to steer the global Muslim population to a singular goal. At once he is 
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finding a place for religion in IR, a very prominent place, but also essentialising 
and abstracting the meaning of religion from those who identify with faith. 
Because Libyan Shi’as are Muslim they must naturally defer to the rising ‘core’ 
state of Wahhabi Saudi Arabia, after all they are both ‘Muslim’. Likewise, do 
Argentine Christians defer to the dictums of the Christian European or American 
‘core’ of that ‘civilisation’?  
Having found a place for religion in IR, however problematically by 
folding religion in with the label ‘culture’, Huntington uncritically accepts the 
classification of religion being irrational. He claims that: 
 
Differences in secular ideology between Marxist-Leninism and liberal democracy 
can at least be debated if not resolved. Differences in material interest can be 
negotiated and often settled by compromise in a way cultural issues cannot… 
Cultural questions… involved a yes or no, zero-sum choice.
536
 
 
Here too the argument of Normative Political Islam is differentiated from the 
Clash of Civilisations. Huntington here is a representation of the secular bias in 
IR. While describing reactions to political Islam specifically, Elizabeth Hurd’s 
comments on this secular bias apply to religion in IR more generally, and the 
point of view propounded by Huntington. In Hurd’s description, “Political Islam is 
interpreted… as a divergence and/or infringement upon neutral secular public 
space, as a throwback to premodern forms of Muslim political order, or as a 
combination of all of these features”. 537  Huntington is doing exactly that, 
equating religion to a kind of Enlightenment teleology wherein ‘progress’ is 
made only when religion is confined to the private sphere. The idea of an IR 
which is sensitive to religion is one that, according to Huntington, must also 
become more sensitive to conflict, as religion leads us to zero-sum relations 
between ‘civilisations’.  
Huntington’s description of conflict in the IR of ‘civilisations’ creates a 
curious predicament: On the one hand, Normative Political Islam has argued for 
a particular Islamic discourse around IR, but on the other hand, the interaction 
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of such a model of IR with other, perhaps religious, perhaps secular 
conceptions of the international sphere has not been examined. In recognising 
religious IR or, to be specific, the IR of Normative Political Islam, is it true that 
different groupings are bound to conflict over the way in which they conceive 
the international sphere? Such conflict is integral to Huntington’s conception of 
post-Cold War politics, and managing that conflict is the key feature of his 
theory. However, here is another ostensible similarity, that in fact points to 
another departure between Normative Political Islam and Clash of Civilisations: 
universalism. 
The thesis has used poststructuralism’s rejection of meta-narrative and 
universalism to critique the way in which IR is prone to making such claims over 
truth. This was tied heavily to the legacy of the European Enlightenment, 
specifically around the ideas of secularism and liberalism. The use of 
poststructuralism helped to create a ‘space’ for alternative theories in the 
discipline, specifically, religious theory. This is not a novel approach for Muslim 
theorists. Tamara Sonn points out that “[t]he actual process of questioning texts 
[of modernity], which is a hallmark of post-modernity, is something that I think 
contemporary Islamic thinkers have in common”.538 Indeed, Huntington is also 
critical of universal pretensions: “For the first time in human history global 
politics is both multipolar and multicivilizational; modernisation is distinct from 
Westernization and is producing neither a universal civilization in any 
meaningful sense nor the Westernization of non-Western societies”. 539  He 
continues, curiously, to invoke a type of pluralism when he says “[a]voidance of 
a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and 
cooperating to maintain the multicvilizational character of global politics”. 540 
Huntington’s ontological justification for this pluralism is unclear, and likely 
derives from empirical data, the way in which much of his argument is derived. 
There is an incongruence in his method however, for while he advocates the 
nature of the system as multi-polar and pluralistic, he infers that the discourse 
between ‘civilizations’ is a zero-sum competition. Faiths that are engaged in a 
zero-sum competition are expected to put that competition aside to maintain a 
multi-polar world, yet how that is to be achieved is not discussed. For Normative 
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Political Islam and its poststructural critique of Enlightenment universalism, 
there is ostensibly no zero-sum competition between competing values, as 
these values are socially constructed and embedded, rather than abstractly 
conceived and universally applied. However, one is perfectly capable of socially 
constructing and justifying proselytising values. Take the Islamic concept of 
da’wah (the call to Islam), for example. Additionally, the acceptance of socially 
constructed values may be problematic for Muslims who would derive their 
social conduct from transcendental guidance rather than the other way around.  
Borrowing the language of Abdulkarim Soroush, Muslims, generally, are 
certain about the central elements of faith (Islam-as-faith), but sceptical about 
the practicalities of Muslim conduct of IR (Islam-as-politics). Normative Political 
Islam seemingly resolves this combination of certainly and scepticism by 
delineating the different spheres Islam-as-faith and Islam-as-politics, but 
whether this is a successful manoeuvre or not has yet to be argued conclusively, 
something that will be attempted in the remainder of this chapter. Soroush 
articulates this dilemma when he puts forward the question: “Can we be certain 
in scepticism”?541 As this chapter explores the answer to this question, it will 
also touch upon the remaining and indeed only real comparison between 
Normative Political Islam and the Clash of Civilisations, that is, the inevitability 
and management of conflict between competing values. To begin, the chapter 
will explore further the ramifications in synthesising an anti-universalist 
perspective with the IR of Normative Political Islam. This will be done by looking 
at a body of work that is somewhat liminal in IR, poststructuralism, and a body 
of work that falls outside of the disciplinary realm of IR, area studies. Both 
poststructuralism and area studies make similar claims about the problem in 
uncritically applying IR paradigms to non-Western societies but both, as will be 
seen, differ from Normative Political Islam in their prescribed solutions to this 
problem. Following this ground work, the chapter will have a critique of IR that is 
somewhat parallel with the argument put forward by Normative Political Islam. 
At that point the chapter will be in a position to compare and contrast the 
assumptions put forward by the poststructural critique of IR, with the 
assumptions that underline Normative Political Islam. Doing so will hopefully 
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shed light on whether one can be a postmodern Muslim, an individual “certain in 
scepticism”.542 
The Foundations of the ‘Problem’ in IR 
The ‘problem’ described previously is the idea that “Enlightenment rationalism 
and universalism appear as a metaphysically disguised Eurocentrism”.543 This 
being the case, William Brown, when talking about the application of IR to Africa, 
describes aptly the symptoms of this problem; “[a]t best, we are told, ‘IR theory’ 
misrepresents or misunderstands African reality, at worst it participates in an 
exercise of neo-colonial theoretical hegemony”.544 With regards to Islam, the 
thesis has identified other symptoms of the problem, such as the fear of and 
rejection of religious rationality. Rejecting religion as an analytical category in IR 
has led to it being subsumed by other, more tangible factors. In this sense IR is 
also misrepresenting the realities of Muslim peoples, especially those who are 
sympathetic to a supra state identity (the umma). Such sympathies contribute to 
Raymond Hinnebusch’s irredentism in the Middle East, a “dissatisfaction with 
the incongruity between territorial borders and “imagined communities””.545  
However, as the thesis is embarked on second order theorising on the 
questions and assumptions that underpin IR, the chapter will not here dwell on 
the symptoms of the problem. Rather, the chapter will analyse the foundations 
of the problem in order to highlight different or alternative paths in IR, not to 
supplant or replace existing paradigms, but rather to compliment them. Taking 
Islam, and more broadly religion ‘seriously’, that is, studying it on its own merits 
and not subsuming it into pre-existing or convenient analytical categories, would 
result in greater understanding and avoid Huntington’s caricature of “Muslim 
bellicosity and violence”.546 Douglas Lemke demonstrates a similar perspective 
when he suggests that small changes in interpretations of existing IR paradigms, 
specifically neo-Realism, could yield increased understandings of areas of the 
world suffering from irredentism. In Lemke’s Congolese example, he does this 
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by shifting focus away from states, which he admits do not have the saliency in 
Africa that they have other parts of the world, to “autonomous political 
entities”.547 Such a move shows reflexivity on the part of Lemke, and allows the 
study of African realities in IR by acknowledging those realities do not fit neatly 
with the existing boundaries of IR; that Lemke’s Congolese examples do not ‘fit’ 
within these boundaries does not mean that they are not ‘IR material’, but rather 
that IR in this instance needs to adjust to accommodate non-European realities. 
As the implications of liberal universalism at an abstract level were explored in 
the previous chapter, this chapter will now examine the implications of that 
universalism for IR. 
Sadik Jalal al-‘Azm argues that “[i]n the West, the historical process may 
be moved by economic interests, class struggles and socio-political forces. But 
in the East the ‘prime mover’ of history is Islam”.548 How does this dynamic 
apply to IR? Turan Kayaoglu ‘Westphalian narrative’ was discussed previously 
in the thesis, and it is worth returning to this concept to talk about what he 
describes as interpretative dualism. For Kayaoglu, the interpretative dualism 
stemming from the Westphalian narrative leads to the positive behaviour of an 
in-group (the West) to be attributed to the in-group’s character (Protestant work 
ethic, separation of church and state, etc). Conversely, the positive behaviour of 
the out-group (the Islamic world) is attributed to external conditions (interaction 
with and influence of European powers in the Ottoman Empire). The in-group’s 
negative behaviour, however, is attributed to external conditions, while the 
negative behaviour of the out-group is attributed to their inherent character 
(Islam). That this dualism exists is not to deny that in-groups and out-groups do 
not interact and constitute each other, rather, it points out that privileging one 
aspect of this co-constitution leads to analytical shortcomings in IR theories. 
Establishing categories of self and other in such a way relates to what Larry 
Swatuk describes as “the scientific method”, which he explains as being 
responsible for obscuring subtlety, “if it is not ‘true’ then it must be ‘false’”.549 
Take as a prime example the problem the English School suffers from in 
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struggling to account for colonialism as a consequence of the ‘expansion of 
international society’; if international society is ‘good’ then its expansion must 
also be a ‘good’ thing. Acknowledging subtlety and abandoning dualisms would 
help establish the co-constitution of international society and would allow 
exploration of the darker aspects of European expansion (such as colonialism) 
which is currently missing, by and large, from English School literature.550 
Tandeka Nkiwane summarises well the incoherence of liberalism’s 
universalism when she writes, “[i]n the case of liberalism, Eurocentric assertions 
are too often represented as fact. This assertion as fact is used to dismiss an 
entire continent [Africa] as irrelevant to a theory that expounds a ‘universal’ 
message”. 551  Nkiwane explains that if liberalism is forced to acknowledge 
African realities, it must concede that ‘universal’ liberalism can in fact lead to 
imperialism.552  Liberals of the colonial era used a kind of social Darwinism 
creating a ‘superior’ liberal loving society and the ‘inferior’ colonised peoples, a 
reference to the racialised ‘standard of civilisation’ of Hobson’s non-reductive 
Orientalism. At the time, the killing of these peoples was considered regrettable, 
but justified as necessary to expand the zone of freedom.553 Such an approach 
necessitates polarisation. Be it civilisation and barbarism, order and disorder, 
rational and irrational, poles are established to justify and explain the 
domination of one group over another. Does the opposite perspective, that of 
pluralism, prevent this domination and violence?  
Pluralism may not create opposing poles, but would imply a diverse 
range of positions. In is conceivable that of the many positions presented, some 
would be entirely incompatible. In this sense, pluralism does not solve the 
problem of disparate and opposing positions. In-groups may still see 
themselves as ‘civilised’ and their respective out-groups as ‘barbarians’. 
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However, as pluralism necessarily denies universalism, the impetus to ‘civilise’ 
the out-group is removed. ‘Progress’ in this instance is not an ordering and 
taming of the unknown world,554 but rather the ability to co-exist with competing 
value claims. Because a certain set of values exists and may be considered, by 
those that possess them, as being superior to different values held by other 
groups, does not mean that these ‘superior’ values have any purchase in 
different social condition and heritages.  
Pluralism satisfies the Constructivist stance of this thesis on the source 
of communal values, specifically those that constitute Islam-as-politics. Abstract 
universalism cannot suffer competitors, and it cannot be the case, as has been 
argued, that Islam-as-politics derives from a transcendental universal message, 
which is the domain of Islam-as-faith. However, Normative Political Islam, as 
one possible articulation of Islam-as-politics, does derive from and respect 
certain elements of the transcendental message of Islam-as-faith. To 
accommodate the religious world view in IR it was necessary to ‘make space’ 
by critiquing a different universal discourse, that of secularism in IR, and other 
assumptions deriving from the European Enlightenment. In doing so, the thesis 
embraced a poststructural position on ontology about the nature of truth, finding 
it necessary to be sceptical about foundational claims, instead accepting that 
such truths are only ever true within specific temporal and geographical limits. 
Accepting this poststructural position on ontology, the thesis was able to accept 
that a secular discourse in IR might work for some, but there is no reason it is 
the only example of how to conduct IR, leaving space for alternatives like 
Normative Political Islam to develop. In the end what is left is pluralism within 
Islam-as-politics and pluralism in IR. It is becoming clear that pluralism is doing 
a lot of work for the thesis, and further discussion about the substance of and 
operation of that pluralism is required. Specifically, the chapter must continue its 
discussion of the remaining problem from the comparison with the Clash of 
Civilisations; does a position of pluralism which might still create incompatible 
worldviews, avoid violent resolution of these differences?  
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Value Pluralism and IR 
If the communitarian position argued for in the previous chapter can be 
defended, it must explored how value pluralism might sustain an international 
order, and whether that international order would result in ‘clash’ based politics, 
as Huntington has argued. The point of departure of this section of the chapter 
is Huntington’s reasoning for the inevitability of conflict, the idea that cultural 
and religious differences are zero-sum choices.555 
 The idea that zero-sum choices are inevitable when talking about values 
is in fact one that is entirely reasonable, expected even, when talking about 
value pluralism; Stuart Hampshire elucidates, “[t]he ideals of the monk and the 
soldier, of the revolutionary and the poet, of the aesthete and the politician, 
seem incurably at odds with each other, even as ideal types, and even more so 
when individuals of these types are inserted into a particular historical 
setting”.556 For Hampshire, the difference between the virtues of a good soldier 
or a good monk are incompatible, at some point in an individual’s life they must 
make a choice to become one or the other, or neither. Gray makes a similar 
point in stating that “[a] life of risk and adventure and a life of tranquillity and 
contemplation cannot both be lived by one person across an entire lifetime”.557 
When Hampshire describes “deep-seated spiritual antagonisms” as the 
“essence of humanity”558 there is, as with Normative Political Islam, a similarity 
with the Clash of Civilisations in the inevitability of conflict. How then does 
pluralism propose to resolve these inevitable conflicts? Spending time 
developing a more specific definition of pluralism is the first step. 
 Susan Mendus articulates pluralism “as a doctrine about the sources of 
value. It holds that those sources are many and not one and, as such, it stands 
in opposition to monism, or to a Platonic search for unity”.559 Gray proposes that 
there is a distinction between strong and weak pluralism, both variants accept 
Mendus’ underlying definition, but strong pluralism applies a more stringent 
criteria. For Gray, strong pluralism makes three claims: 1) an “anti-reductionism 
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about values. The goods of human life are many. They cannot be derived from 
or reduced to any one value”; 2) a “non-harmony among values”, the idea that 
goods may be incompatible; 3) “[t]he diverse types of flourishing of which 
humans are capable are not only often uncombinable; sometimes they are 
rationally incomparable. Let us call this value-incommensurability”.560 Of note is 
the final of the three claims, that of value-incommensurability. Accepting that 
competing values might not be rationally resolvable marks strong value 
pluralism from weaker forms, such as liberalism; liberalism acknowledges non-
harmony between values, but insist they can be rationally resolved. How does 
Normative Political Islam compare with these definitions of pluralism? 
 There is a lot of resonance between strong value pluralism and the 
pluralism advocated by Normative Political Islam, as it does not forward any 
particular conception of the good, but rather represents a framework within 
which Muslims might construct and articulate communally derived values about 
IR. Such a position is necessarily pluralistic, rejecting the idea that there is a 
unifying substance to Islamic politics derived from Islamic source texts (the 
Platonic search for unity). That is not to deny that the substance of Normative 
Political Islam is not derived from the transcendental sources of the Qur’an and 
Hadith, only that such transcendental guidance is not conclusive and unifying 
for different Muslims who might interpret those sources in different ways. In this 
manner, Normative Political Islam goes some way towards satisfying Gray’s first 
strong pluralist claim, anti-reductionism about values. However, anti-
reductionism implies there is no unifying value from which conceptions of the 
good life derive. Does that mean Muslims can accept that there are other 
sources for deriving moral values distinct from Islamic source texts, or God in 
general? Yes, in some sense, in that Christian and Jewish transcendental 
guidance is perfectly applicable to people of those faiths, affording a group 
tolerance to those groups (acknowledging that in practice this tolerance waxed 
and waned through time).561 Beyond other Abrahamic faiths, one can point to 
the ijma’ al-fi’l (consensus of action, understood as historical precedent) of 
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Piscatori’s Islam in a World of Nation States to see Muslim rulers’ capacity for 
peaceful relations with non-Muslims.562 
Even by pointing to these examples of toleration, theoretical or doctrinal 
rivalries or antagonisms have not been resolved. For example, recall the 
example in the previous chapter of liberal pluralism necessitating Islam and 
other religions to share the same ontological space as Pastafarianism and the 
Flying Spaghetti Monster. Such a position assumed a commitment to liberal 
neutrality which in practice might not be applicable in all Muslim communities. In 
other words, while Muslim communities living in the United Kingdom, for 
example, might acknowledge that their religion is granted the same rights and 
privileges as Paganism, it does not mean they accept, respect or value 
Paganism as a source of the good. As Mendus explains, “insofar as pluralism 
holds that values are many and not one… it is denied by many moderns, 
specifically by those of a religious temperament who believe that there is but 
one source of value – God”.563 Does such a position towards paganism, for 
example, fall short of the idea, central to pluralism, that conceptions of the good 
cannot be reduced or derived from one value? Not when considering the 
second criteria of value pluralism, non-harmony among values. The value of 
submission to God, or more basic still the belief in God, central to a Muslim’s 
conception of the good, is incompatible with, for example, humanistic notions of 
the good. It is not necessary for Muslims to accept that non-belief might yield a 
good life for anyone, or for the humanist to conceive of a life believing in God to 
be in any way fulfilling. In fact, such perspectives would undermine the notion 
that different values might be entirely conflicting. Despite this, Gray is clear that 
universal religion cannot integrate with value pluralism. He states: 
 
Strong pluralism denies that universal values are fully realizable only in one way of 
life. It repudiates the central claim of universalist religions to have identified the right 
or best way of life for all humankind. It rejects the secularization of this claim in the 
universalist moralities of the Enlightenment.
564
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Gray concludes that “[s]trong pluralism is a subversive truth. It cannot coexist 
with the articles of faith of any universalist creed”.565 It is here that a certain 
paradox opens up in his argument. If value-pluralism represents a truth for all of 
humankind in a manner which Enlightenment rationality or religion cannot be, 
then there must be an addendum to value pluralism along the line that: ‘there 
are innumerable conceptions of the good, except those versions of the good 
that consider themselves applicable to all mankind’. Rather, the conflict 
between universal and plural values is necessarily one of the many ways in 
which different values are incompatible; it does not subvert the ‘truth’ of value 
pluralism, rather it affirms it in the most emphatic manner. However, what is to 
say that different states, operating along different conceptions of the good, say 
Muslim and Christian values, would not enter into conflict over these competing 
and, for the sake of argument, incommensurable values? Put another way, how 
can societally derived values, which are pluralistic in that they are multiple, non-
harmonious and incommensurable, avoid conflict?  
 Isaiah Berlin, in the tradition of value pluralism sketched out above, is 
clear that such conflict cannot be avoided; “[b]ut the collisions, even if they 
cannot be avoided, can be softened”.566 He argues that “[t]he best that can be 
done, as a general rule, is to maintain a precarious equilibrium that will prevent 
the occurrence of desperate situations”.567 Gray, building on the ideas of Stuart 
Hampshire, refers to this equilibrium as modus vivendi, the willingness to ‘agree 
to disagree’. 568  Such a perspective is explicitly considered in IR only very 
marginally. The reason for this, in broad strokes, is related to the third criteria of 
Gray’s strong value pluralism: value-incommensurability. The idea that values 
cannot be rationally compared runs against the grain of “subject-centred reason 
that dominates much of ‘modernist’ [IR] language and forms of social 
organization and understanding”.569 Richard Ashley and R.B.J. Walker talk of 
such a perspective representing “disciplinary standards”, 570  though this is 
perhaps an unfair characterisation of IR, which has seen the proliferation of 
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much interpretivist scholarship in recent years.571 Never the less, the focus on 
rationalism and “the progressive ‘ordering’, or rendering knowable, of the 
chaotic, untamed, and previously unknown world” 572  has been a recurring 
feature of the theories engaged with in this thesis; a focus which MacIntyre 
suggests stems from the European Enlightenment.573  While Realism and the 
English School paradigms in IR inherit elements of that problematic 
Enlightenment tradition, they might also be exemplars of value pluralism, as will 
be discussed briefly now, dealing first with the English School.  
The English School’s distinction between solidarism and pluralism in 
some senses mirrors the debate between value pluralism and universalism, but 
is deficient in two regards. Initially there is the problematic way the English 
School accounts for religious rationality which, as discussed in chapter 2, Islam 
in International Relations Scholarship, is a problem shared with much IR theory. 
If value pluralism holds true, then the critique of a secular, state based order is 
not so damning as to seek to change that system in totality. Instead, it is the 
claims of universal applicability of that system that cannot be defended, 
particularly in the face of societally based, religious rationale. This much has 
been well stated in the current and preceding chapters. The second broad 
deficiency with the English School’s pluralist/solidarist divide, despite its 
apparent similarity with the discussion of value pluralism and universalism, is 
that it presumes the existence of an international society, perhaps even a global 
one, and that the units of this society are states. This is very much related to 
notions of universal applicability mentioned in the first point, but the friction 
between religious articulation, in the form of the umma, and the ways in which 
such a conception might interact with the state system is a less abstract 
example of the ways in which competing values or conceptions of the good 
might collide.  
Regarding Realism, it shares with the English School the criticisms 
briefly highlighted above (indeed the English School draws much of its 
epistemology from Realism); Realism both does not deal with religion on its own 
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merits, and overemphasises the state’s actor qualities in the international 
sphere. However, notions of power are silent on conceptions of the good, so in 
some way Realism allows any number of socially embedded values to be 
articulated; a Muslim nation need not accept or respect the values of another 
nation to coexist and tolerate it using the virtues of realpolitik. Crucially however, 
the idea of realpolitik relies on a notion of abstracted rationality, similar in its 
construction if not content, as the abstract liberal rationality discussed in the 
previous chapter; it implies a rationality that applies to any people, anywhere, 
anytime. Such a notion runs counter to the communitarian, Aristotelian 
perspective which Normative Political Islam leans on to give agency to its 
particular blend of the divine and the mundane. If the communitarian 
construction of values does not apply to the power politics of Realism, which are 
in fact universal, what other universal value competitors might appear and 
justify themselves by abstract reasoning; one can argue back to premises 
(justice/Marxism vs. survival/Realism, for example), but cannot make a moral 
argument about the premises, as “each premise employs some quite different 
normative or evaluative concept”.574 So Realism, like liberalism, might qualify as 
weak value pluralism, as neither endorse value-incommensurability; for Realism 
and liberalism value conflicts are rationally resolvable by the yard stick of 
personal freedom or realpolitik respectively.  
IR has not engaged sufficiently with value pluralism, though there is great 
potential in that concept for giving credence to concepts and peoples otherwise 
marginalised by Enlightenment rationality. If poststructuralism is often 
caricatured for its ability to deconstruct, and its inability to propose alternatives, 
this thesis suggests that more work is taken to integrate the value pluralism in 
IR. Chantal Mouffe has already made inroads into this debate from a 
poststructural perspective. She diagnoses the contemporary ills of IR when 
writing that: 
 
It is the fact that we are now living in a unipolar world where there are no legitimate 
channels for opposing the hegemony of the United States which is at the origin of 
the explosion of new antagonisms which, if we are unable to grasp their nature, 
might indeed lead to the announced ‘clash of civilizations’. The way to avoid such a 
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prospect is to take pluralism seriously instead of trying to impose one single model 
on the whole world.
575
 
 
Referring to Mouffe’s position as agonistic pluralism, Elaine Stratford et al note 
that such a position “acknowledges the productive potential of conflict”,576 and 
this thesis argues that more work is done to recognise the necessity and, 
hopefully, the value of conflict in society and in IR. Value pluralism presents an 
epistemology that synthesises well with that of poststructuralism, namely, a 
profound scepticism of universalism. As such, it might represent a method 
through which poststructuralism might construct alternative understandings of 
IR, much as Mouffe has demonstrated with agonistic pluralism, rather than 
focus on critique or fall into relativism. Jim George and David Campbell some 
20 years ago referred to postmodernism as representing “the great skepticism 
(but not cynicism) of our time”. Without a focus on the constructive elements 
made possible by the poststructural position on ontology in IR, poststructuralism 
may well be considered cynical. It is hoped that value pluralism and Normative 
Political Islam relieve some of that cynicism. But even if it is accepted that 
poststructuralism is not the great cynicism of our time, it undoubtedly remains 
sceptical (of universalisms), and scepticism, as highlighted earlier in the chapter, 
does not sit well with the certainty of Muslim belief in God. It is here that the 
chapter turns to the final question of the chapter: the conundrum of the 
postmodern Muslim. 
Certain in scepticism? Postmodernism and Islam 
Reconciling belief in the transcendental and the use of societally derived values 
was highlighted as problematic in the previous chapter. It was explained that 
this problem broadly mapped onto the way in which sovereignty is constructed 
in Normative Political Islam, namely, the dual contract method. In the first 
contract explicit deference to God by way of the shahadda was required, which 
was then supplemented by a second contract which built upon the split between 
the transcendental Islam-as-faith and the societally derived Islam-as-politics. 
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This second contract was between the Muslim and government, but being 
distinct from Islam-as-faith, the nature of this government could take numerous 
forms. Chapter 3 argued that the rational, exoteric tradition, much maligned in 
Sunni Islam, provided the tools to derive Islam-as-politics from these differing 
social circumstances in a way the theological guidance of Islam-as-politics was 
unable to do so. Applying a hierarchy between the two contacts further 
distinguished Islam-as-politics from Islam-as-faith, but the distinction appears 
more and more arbitrary when considering what it is that binds individual 
Muslims in an umma. Recalling the ‘paradox’ offered in the last chapter, it was 
noted that it is the transcendental fealty towards God and the Prophet that 
forms the basis of the solidarity between Muslims in the umma; at the same 
time, however, it is the transcendentalism in IR which was criticised in the first 
place to make space for alternative conceptions of IR, such as that posed by 
Normative Political Islam. Applying the same poststructuralist and anti-
foundational critique to the transcendentalism of the umma and belief in an 
absolute God will in turn negate the argument forwarded thus far. In this final 
section the chapter will attempt to resolve this problem, and ask if it is possible 
to be a poststructuralist Muslim? 
 Framing the question another way it is necessary to quote at length 
Soroush when he says: 
 
[A]s far as I can understand and articulate, in the classical period, or in the medieval 
period, we had an age of the dictatorship of religion, the dictatorship of religious 
institution. Then in the phase of the Enlightenment, we had the age of the 
dictatorship of reason. That was the age of modernity, properly speaking the 
dictatorship of reason. Now in the post-modern era, there is no dictatorship 
whatsoever; there is no god, according to the post-modern philosophers. Reason 
has become much more humble. Religion has become much more humble, and 
now it is time for these two to reconcile, to be recombined, to come to terms with 
each other. That is the post-modern era, and that is the occasion, the opportunity to 
try to reconcile again a humbler reason and a humbler religion.
577
 
 
For Soroush, the discussion should revolve around boundaries, acknowledging 
the limits of both religion and reason. This much has already been achieved in 
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the attempted fusion of Islamic exotericism and communitarianism. The problem 
for this thesis is one step removed from Soroush’s outline. Where Soroush 
identifies postmodernism, the notion that in the contemporary world one is 
unable to make universal claims, as the explanation for reason’s ‘humbling’, this 
thesis instead based its argument on poststructuralism. Recalling the 
differentiation between postmodernism and poststructuralism made in chapter 2, 
the latter is not rooted in a specific time or event, but rather is an ontological 
statement about the nature of knowledge. Such a position on ontology was 
used in the first step of the analysis and the critique of dominant IR paradigms 
and their treatment of religion; so, for this thesis the problem is that 
poststructuralism does not result in a humbler religion and humbler reason, as 
Soroush claims postmodernism does. Rather, poststructuralism severely 
cripples religion’s capacity to inform the behaviour of its adherents, leaving 
reason somewhat intact (in so far as it is reason that is ‘doing’ the humbling in 
the first place). As Bryan Turner comments, poststructuralism “threatens to 
deconstruct all theological accounts of reality into mere fairy tales or mythical 
grand narratives”.578 
 Turner notes a similar problem with regards to competing universal 
religions when he asks how religions like Christianity and Islam are able to be 
contained in the same environment.579 His observation needs amending as this 
section proceeds; the question is how to contain, within a single global 
environment, universal religious positions and pluralist positions. It is in fact 
value pluralism, as summarised earlier in the chapter, that is capable of 
containing both absolutism and particularism in the same global environment. 
More than a global environment however, for this thesis the question is how to 
maintain these two positions of universalism and particularism within the same 
tradition, namely, Normative Political Islam. As the discussion continues first the 
incompatibility between Islam-as-faith (represented in the first contract of 
Normative Political Islam’s notion of sovereignty) and poststructuralism must be 
outlined more clearly. 
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 Tibi is emphatic that a rejection of universality cannot be compatible with 
Islamism; he quips that “[t]he Western cultural relativists overlook the totalitarian 
face of Islamism and Islamists hide their contempt for these “unbelievers”. An 
alliance of strange bed fellows emerges”. 580  Tibi is caricaturing popular 
conceptions of Islamism or otherwise is grossly essentialising ‘Islamism’. The 
idea that Islamism, what has been referred to in this thesis as Islam-as-politics, 
is inherently totalitarian is not substantiated given the separation of Islam-as-
faith and Islam-as-politics; the latter is not necessarily committed to any 
particular political persuasion. Islam-as-politics, if societally derived, might 
develop a totalitarian leaning, just as European political traditions emanating 
from the Enlightenment’s ‘modernity’ might do. As Sami Zubaida states in 
rebuttal to such essentialism, it was not written in Germany’s history that Hitler 
would take control of the state, and similar arguments are offered by Zubaida 
for the Russian revolution and the Iranian revolution.581  
 Amr Sabet articulates the incompatibility with Islam-as-faith with more 
clarity when he states that poststructuralism “perpetrates an act of violence 
against Islam, both in its revelatory and jurisprudential/thought components”.582 
Sabet believes that there can be only a singular Islam, “referring to the universe 
and cosmology of revelation as uniquely represented by primary texts and 
scriptures”. 583  Such a position, as commented on consistently in previous 
chapters, neglects the role that human interpretation plays in the understanding 
of source texts. However, it is also true that heterogeneous interpretations of 
these same source texts do not take away from the feeling and belief of 
Muslims in the singular truth of their revelation. Whether a Muslim feels they are 
correctly interpreting the source texts, or acknowledge that their interpretation is 
a fallible endeavour (as Sunni orthodoxy acknowledges), the core belief is that 
there is a divine truth to be understood somewhere, somehow. To deny this in 
the analysis of the thesis is perhaps the act of violence that Sabet refers to, 
equivalent to accusing Muslims of believing in fairy tales and myth. 
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Acknowledging the Truth of Islam, or Essentialising a Diverse Tradition?  
There needs to be a more nuanced take on the idea of Islam’s ‘truth’ than the 
current discussion, especially of Islamism, allows for. This thesis is not the first, 
and indeed will not be the last, to grapple with the truth of Islam’s revelation 
(Islam-as-faith) versus the diverse social construction of Islam’s practice (Islam-
as-politics). The chapter will therefore be drawing on the positions of many 
others as it proceeds to its conclusion.  
The guiding question here is whether one is capable of accepting the 
truth of Islam, or if doing so requires us to essentialise diverse readings of the 
faith. Otherwise put, is essentialism creating a myth of a singular Islam, a type 
of Orientalist understanding of the other’s belief system? Turning to Zubaida 
once more, his definition of essentialism claims that Islamic societies share 
some core elements which “determine or limit the possibilities of their social and 
political development”.584 It can be observed, from the outside in, that there is 
certainly a ‘core’ element that Muslims share with each other, a kind of lowest 
common denominator that gets lower the wider one defines ‘Muslim’. For 
example, the lowest common denominator amongst Sunni Muslims is not as 
low as the commonality between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. Additionally it can be 
understood, from the inside out, that the Muslim’s belief in God and the Prophet 
(at the very least) is a common, perhaps defining feature of Muslims.  
As argued previously this ‘core’, however it is defined or conceived, by 
the believer or the analyst, is related to the transcendental elements of Islam 
and not to the political possibilities of Muslim societies or Muslim minorities. 
John Esposito describes positions that would claim that any such limitations 
exist as romanticism, he states that “[t]he sacrosanct nature of tradition in Islam, 
based upon a romanticized understanding of Islamic history… serves as an 
inspirational reality for traditionalists and, at times, as a major obstacle for 
modern reformers”. 585  Rather than any theological or divine community of 
believers, Zubaida asserts that “diverse Islamic currents tend to converge, at 
least in sentiment, on one front: anti-imperialism, and specifically antipathy to 
the US”.586 Such a cynical take on the nature of Islamic unity is capable from 
the analyst’s point of view, from the outside looking in, so to speak. What this 
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view does not consider is the perspective of the believer, and this is something 
the chapter will return to shortly. As far as a loosely defined ‘core’ of Islam 
relates to politics historically, Piscatori notes that such a core has not prevented 
ideological, communal, political and territorial divisions among the wider Muslim 
community.587 In light of this historical record, one cannot assume that the likes 
of Tibi and Sabet can be referring to a common truth of Islam that encapsulates 
or limits social or political development, as per Zubaida’s definition of 
essentialism, as these arguments are so easily refuted. What, then, is the ‘truth’ 
that poststructuralism commits violence against Islam?  
Ali Hassan Zaidi is emphatic with regards to the question posed above, 
he states that: 
 
[E]mpirical diversity does not mean that Islam or modernity simply dissolve into a 
plurality of local Islams and local modernities. Despite the multiplicity of Islamic 
discourses and despite their polysemic origins, there remains, not an 
undifferentiated unity, but a holism to those discourses which, although dismissed 
by anti-essentialist theorists, remains palpable for believers.
588
 
 
The notion of holism is important, and the chapter continues to use it to talk 
about what has until now been referred to as an ill-defined 
unity/truth/core/lowest common denominator of Islam. The holism that Zaidi 
refers to as palpable for believers, is the one that he argues is incompatible with 
poststructuralism as it “compels Muslims to deprive the Qur’an of its ontological 
status as a sacred revelation”.589 If the thesis has arrived at a term that refers to 
the truth of Islam, that is, holism as experienced by the believer, then this term 
now needs to be unpacked and the relationship between poststructuralism and 
holism needs to be examined further to enquire as to whether they are indeed 
as conflictual as Zaidi argues. 
 If holism refers explicitly to the transcendental aspect of Islam, as it is 
experienced by believers, then what exactly is referred to by ‘the 
transcendental’? Previously the thesis has referred to the shahadda as 
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representative of the holism experienced by believers, that is, the declaration of 
belief in God and the Prophet Muhammed. God and prophethood is clearly a 
commitment to the transcendental, but the interpretation of that commitment is 
not clear. The chapter posits that the concept that satisfies the idea of the 
holism, the transcendental and universal, is moral realism. David Boucher 
describes moral realism as a “point of view that maintains that there are 
objective standards of truth and morality, independent of what we may wish or 
think”. 590  In reference to Islamic holism and the shahadda, these objective 
standards would derive from God and the Prophet. Moreover, however, it is not 
just the case with Islamic holism that there is an objective standard, but that this 
standard is universal. Poststructuralism, as already demonstrated, would 
contest this Islamic holism as the notion of universal objective standards is one 
that has been criticised throughout this thesis, especially with regards to 
secularism in IR, for example. As Boucher goes on to conclude: 
 
[W]hen natural law and its derivative rights are deemed to be universal, their 
application is often oppressive. They are the expression of the mind of a culture, the 
articulation of the values, and morality expected of its member. When applied to 
other cultures, their members are almost invariable likely to fall below those 
standards in crucial respects.
591
 
 
The problems of oppression elaborated on with regards to universal 
Enlightenment rationality and its relationship to colonialism are equally 
applicable to a universal natural law encapsulated in Islamic holism. However, 
the extent of this universality is questionable, as there is a measure of 
interpretation needed to derive values from the Islamic source texts. There is 
certainly not enough in Islam-as-faith to derive Islam-as-politics without needing 
to turn to human ingenuity and turn away from any such holism. The chapter 
argues therefore that the distinction between Islam-as-faith and Islam-as-politics 
remains intact. With this distinction in mind the holism of Islam is encapsulated 
in Islam-as-faith, leaving Normative Political Islam and other variants of Islam-
as-politics to embrace anti-foundational concepts without hesitation. Even with 
this being so the paradox of the poststructural Muslim has not been escaped, as 
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the thesis is still relying on the poststructural Muslim to neatly keep their anti-
foundational critiques in a separate conceptual ‘box’, never allowing it to meet 
the holism of their faith for fear of deconstructing it into fairy tale and myth. 
Bounding Expectations: Islamic Rationalism and Poststructuralism 
Moral realism, the objective criteria by which one measures their actions is, in 
the common interpretation of Muslims, dictated by God. However, one of the 
major breaks made by this thesis with a majority of other analyses of (Sunni) 
political Islam, is to bring rationalism back in. Recalling the exoteric tradition, al-
iman, of the Islamic revelation (in conjunction with the theology of al-islam and 
the gnosticism of al-ihsan), which was discussed at length in chapter 3, one can 
glimpse at a way out of this poststructural predicament.  
 The rationalism of Sunni Islam’s exoteric tradition is an attempt, perhaps, 
at taking morality out of God’s hands and away from the transcendentalism of 
moral realism. In this way, God’s prohibition against killing, for example, is not 
the reason that killing is frowned upon. Rather, because killing is bad, God 
forbade it.592 The implication of this move is that there are multiple ways to 
arrive at the conclusion that killing is bad, one of which could be rationalism, 
and another could be unquestioning adherence to God’s commandments. 
Therefore, bringing rationalism back in undermines the position of Sabet and 
others who bemoan poststructuralism’s act of violence against monotheistic 
religions. Such positions are undermined as the thesis is not denying that there 
is a universal notion of value; indeed, the shahadda says there is a universal 
value vested in the belief in God and the Prophet. Rather, by accepting the 
limits of human beings in comprehending this value one can accept plural 
derivations of this singular belief. As Aziz al-Azmeh states eloquently, “[t]here is 
no guarantor for the validity of translation and interpretation [of Islamic source 
texts]”.593 If there is no guarantor for differing interpretations (a position eerily 
similar to the poststructuralist perspective of morality), does this necessarily 
mean that there is therefore no transcendental or objective truth? In order to 
give credence to the believer’s sense of holism, the thesis must answer no; not 
having the capacity to comprehend a truth does not mean that such a truth does 
not exist. As Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im states: 
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The separation of Islam and the state [comparable to the distinction between Islam-
as-faith and Islam-as-politics] does not prevent Muslims from proposing policy or 
legislation stemming from their religious or other beliefs… Citizens must be able to 
make counterproposals through public debate without being open to charges about 
their religious piety.
594
 
 
In making this move towards moral realism the thesis has allowed for the holism 
of Muslims, but has not quite settled the paradox of the poststructural Muslim; 
while the Muslim is happy, the poststructuralist may well be frustrated by the 
concession that an objective truth can exist.  
However, the poststructuralist cannot claim emphatically that no 
objective truth exists. To do so would in itself be a truth claim, abstracted from 
people’s experiences. Rather, truths do exist, but geographically and temporally 
limited in their applicability. The issue in accepting any notion of moral realism, 
in this case the Muslim’s belief in God, is not the belief per say, but the idea that 
such belief is applicable to all peoples, universally. In bringing rationalism back 
into conceptions of Islam-as-politics, the thesis is able to avoid making such 
grandiose claims about universal applicability; the rationalism explored in 
chapter 3 demanded an acceptance of societal (and therefore geographical and 
temporal) limitations in any construction of Islam-as-politics, Normative Political 
Islam included.  
Here a subtle difference can be marked between the philosophical level 
at which the thesis has been using poststructuralism, and the more empirical 
level at which the thesis invoked value pluralism to manage conflict between 
competing values. Belief in God and the anti-foundationalism of 
poststructuralism are incommensurable values, they are rationally unresolvable. 
The poststructural Muslim paradox centred on the idea that a Muslim wanting to 
articulate Islam-as-politics in the way done with Normative Political Islam cannot 
be expected to wield a poststructural critique of IR whilst not using that critique 
on the transcendental elements of their own faith. Embracing value pluralism is 
the solution to this paradox. Poststructural critique does not mean accepting 
there is one way to construct value: poststructuralism. When critiquing 
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Enlightenment philosophy the thesis is not stating that it is worthless, but that 
the worth it carries has boundaries to its applicability. Likewise, the rationality 
encapsulated by the Enlightenment, or the holism of Muslim belief, places 
boundaries on poststructuralism, preventing it from assuming the role of a meta-
narrative, or a poststructural ontology. The term ontology does not fit well with 
poststructuralism, especially arrived at through Foucault. A poststructural 
ontology would imply a truth claim about the nature of knowledge, when in fact 
poststructuralism makes no such claim to knowledge, but rather is sceptical of 
any such claims. Recalling the same argument outlined in chapter 2, where the 
‘poststructural position on ontology’ was employed to avoid confusion over a 
poststructural ontology, here the chapter purposefully uses the term ontology to 
describe an unbounded poststructuralism, a poststructural ontology therefore 
becomes representative of Soroush’s “dictatorship of reason”.595 
Accepting difference however, “cannot serve as a blanket concession to 
the immutability of religious sentiment”,596 doing so would be to return to “the 
dictatorship of religious institution”.597 Rather, these two positions hold each 
other in check. The fact one must accept the boundaries between these 
different traditions is a tacit acceptance that they are not compatible with each 
other. As per the dictums of value pluralism, they will clash, and that does not 
mean it is unreasonable to ask Normative Political Islam to use 
poststructuralism to make a space for itself in IR while holding onto a belief in 
God. Likewise, it is not unreasonable to ask poststructuralism to hold onto an 
anti-foundational perspective while accepting the holism of Islam-as-faith. Both 
examples accept the limits of their respective claims on knowledge. That an 
individual can neatly demarcate between the two in their conception of the world 
is in fact testament to the competing values individuals hold within themselves 
at any one time, and by way of conclusion the chapter turns to Stuart 
Hampshire’s explanation of this point:  
 
The perpetual clash and friction of divisive attachments and of memories and of 
emotions in conflict seems to me to make up the internal life of a person, and the 
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perpetual clash and friction of ethnic loyalties and religious loyalties and cultural 
loyalties and class loyalties make up the life and development of societies, cities 
and states.
598
 
 
 Conclusions 
Building upon the articulation in the previous chapter of communitarian IR and 
the umma, this chapter argued that value pluralism has the capacity to manage 
competing value claims in the international sphere. Value pluralism escapes the 
pessimism of Clash of Civilisations and instead sees the necessity of, and 
perhaps virtue of conflict. If Islam-as-politics (as well as other notions of politics) 
are derived from societal setting, regardless of the pretensions to abstract 
universalism some political ideologies might have, then it is reasonable to 
expect some of them to conflict with each other. It is not, however, a 
reductionist explanation about Islam’s ‘violent nature’ that ensures this conflict. 
Rather, values within and without different traditions will always conflict with 
each other.  
 Resolving this conflict is a false errand, as it is only achieved by the 
dominance of one set of values at the expense of the other. This chapter 
instead argued that the management of conflict and the ‘softening of blows’ is a 
more appropriate response, both for Normative Political Islam’s interaction with 
other polities and vice versa. Such a position requires the acknowledgement not 
only that values might conflict, but that they are also irreconcilable by logic or 
rational argument. This addendum to value pluralism distinguishes it from ‘softer’ 
forms such as liberalism, wherein diversity of values are respected unless those 
views challenge the underlying logic of liberalism (individual autonomy provides 
examples that often pit the Ottoman millet system against modern notions of 
liberal tolerance). 
 When translating value pluralism to IR, it was noted that the English 
School’s pluralist/solidarist divide represented a similar schism as that between 
pluralism and universalism respectively. However, like liberalism, this is a ‘soft’ 
version of pluralism, as it relies on the universalism of Enlightenment rationality, 
relegating religiously derived politics to some ‘backward’ era, as is endemic in 
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IR theories at large. Secondly, the notion of international society which the 
English School leans on also universalises the institution of the state into a 
necessary building block of IR. Realism, like the English School, also seems 
placed to enact value pluralism in IR as the realpolitik it propounds appears 
somewhat ‘value neutral’. However, it shares problems much in the same way 
that the English School does with regards to religious rationality and the 
primacy of states.  
 The chapter argued that poststructuralism with its anti-foundational 
perspective is well placed to overcome the short comings outlined above, but is 
often caricatured as being overly focused on critique and unable to pose 
alternatives. Poststructuralism is fertile ground for the enacting of and theorising 
about value pluralism, and it is in their combination that pluralism in IR can be 
developed. Chantal Mouffe’s concept of agonistic pluralism was argued to 
encapsulate the opportunity that the synthesis of poststructuralism and value 
pluralism hold for IR. 
 With all the above being so, the chapter was left to consider the way in 
which the hypothetical Muslims of Normative Political Islam could possibly 
embrace poststructuralism in the critique of IR, while not applying the same 
critique to meta-narratives in their own tradition, namely, belief in God. Turning 
once more to value pluralism to ‘resolve’ this issue, the chapter argued that it is, 
in fact, unresolvable. As such, the incoherence between poststructuralism and 
belief in God represents another example of irreconcilable values, and so 
synthesising the two is not a reasonable proposition. Rather, managing the 
friction that these conflicting positions represent is a way to keep each of them 
in check, preventing poststructuralism from accidentally becoming a meta-
narrative in its own right, otherwise put: ‘there is no truth except the truth of the 
fact that there is no truth’. Likewise, the conflict between poststructuralism and 
belief in God stops the latter from overwhelming the sensibilities of believers 
into forgetting the societal basis that different notions of value derive from. For 
these hypothetical Muslims, such a position can even affirm the Qur’anic 
commandment: “Do not exceed the limits of your religion”.599 
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Conclusion 
The thesis has contributed to the debates in IR scholarship  that attempt to 
frame ‘religious resurgence’ not as the problem of stubborn religions that refuse 
to accept ‘enlightened’ values, but as the problem of a discipline that arbitrarily 
removes religion from the realm of politics. Barak Mendelsohn summarises the 
above position when he writes that: 
 
Unlike the international society, which allows for multiple ‘truths’ to coexist, in a 
religious order the course of authority is one, and it demands exclusivity, denying 
the existence of any other truth but its own (although religious doctrines might 
acknowledge that other faiths hold partial truths).
600
   
  
While Mendelsohn is referring here to radical Islam, it can also be noted that he 
quite problematically asserts that international society allows for multiple truths 
to exist, while this thesis has argued that there are certain truths that remain 
‘beyond’ debate. Mendelsohn’s example of distinguishing ‘self’ from ‘other’ is 
indicative of claiming that ‘civilisation’ rests in certain institutions (Westphalia), 
so delegitimising alternative voices. That is not to say that one cannot, or should 
not criticise radical Islam but, as this thesis shows, criticising radical Islam on 
the grounds of exclusivity is somewhat akin to holding double standards, as the 
Westphalian system also demands exclusivity with regards to secularism and 
liberal individualism.  
 The thesis also contributes to the literature on political Islam, filling a gap 
in regards to how political Islam might operate with regards to IR. Previous work, 
as noted in chapter 1, deals primarily with defining what political Islam is not, 
rather than what it is for. In this respect the thesis has studied the topic using 
the inverse approach of Piscatori’s Islam in a World of Nation States; where 
Piscatori attempted to show what Islam could offer IR by way of compatibility, 
this thesis has attempted to show what IR can offer Islam, focusing on two 
primary instances where it falls short: secularism and liberal individualism. 
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Secondary Research Questions 
The introduction to this thesis presented 3 secondary research questions, each 
moving towards answering the overall thesis question, which will be answered 
in the final section of this conclusion. Currently, each of the secondary research 
questions will be summarised and answered, one at a time. 
The first secondary research question asked how extensive the guidance 
offered in Islamic source texts is with regards to IR. Chapter 1 examined the 
theological guidance offered in this regard and found it to be somewhat lacking. 
This is not to the detriment of the Islamic source texts, which offer themselves 
as guides rather than hard and fast rules for behaviour. Instead, as shown in 
chapter 3, it would be rather unreasonable to find guidance on all aspects of life 
in only one aspect of revelation (theology). In this respect bringing al-iman, 
exotericism, into the analysis allows one to ‘fill the gaps’ of theological guidance 
on politics. So while the guidance in Islamic source texts is somewhat 
ambiguous, that guidance still finds a place in the form of the first of Khadduri’s 
dual contracts that legitimate Muslim sovereignty. If such theological guidance 
is interpreted as the lowest common denominator of faith, most likely 
represented by the shahadda, declaration of faith, then this would represent the 
first contract, between the individual and God. The second contract uses 
exotericism to derive an agreement between the individual and temporal 
ruler/institution/constitution. 
 The second of the secondary research questions asked what challenges 
the umma, as an alternative to the state, poses to IR. Chapter 1 discussed in 
detail the many IR treatments of the Middle East to discern how they treat 
religion. Uniformly, these studies did not interpret religion on its own terms, but 
rather subsumed it into pre-existing categories of analysis. Constructivism, 
however, displayed an ability to interpret religion as the believer might do, and 
for this reason it was adopted as a method to articulate Normative Political 
Islam. The primary problem that the politics of the umma represents to IR, 
indicative of political Islam in general, is the fact that it is explicitly religiously 
derived (to some degree). IR has a secular leaning which, as seen in chapter 1, 
stems from Enlightenment philosophy and ideas of inexorable progress. In this 
way, Westphalia created the international system, and all this was the effort of 
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European character, innate, and spontaneous,601  categorised as ‘pioneering 
agency’ in Hobson’s non-reductive Orientalism. So, when bringing alternative 
concepts of IR to the fore, these alternatives challenge dominant narratives in 
the discipline, asking that these narratives be re-evaluated. When such re-
evaluation is completed the ‘immutable’ nature of concepts like secularism are 
removed, allowing for engagement with, in this case, Normative Political Islam.  
Chapter 4 gave shape to this engagement in the form of community, and 
here noted the second primary challenge to IR, liberal individualism. Liberal 
individualism implies an abstract, universal rationality. Translated to IR, this 
abstract rationality sees assumptions about the nature of shared values, that is, 
a shared normative world, on the basis of empirical findings. For example, the 
fact that different states affirm and participate in the state system, for the 
English School, is taken as read that these states share the same values when 
it comes to IR. In fact states may affirm the system, even the notion of an 
international society, based on different assumptions, deriving from their 
societal circumstances; European states may want to encourage the idea of 
universal values in IR as this obfuscates the fact that many of these values 
derive from Europe’s own history. At the same time, the circumstances at the 
end of colonialism may have led former colonies to advocate for their 
independence through the language of states, not because of the universal 
applicability of that concept, but because the language of states was the most 
powerful at the time with regards to achieving independence. When universal 
applicability is challenged, values that derive not abstractly, but from within the 
societies which individuals live, are put forward as an alternative. Chapter 5 saw 
that this alternative can lead to competing values that cannot be adjudicated 
between. That being so, a final challenge to IR is the idea of value pluralism, 
challenging the purpose of IR to not to be the spread of one form of 
international politics, but the management of various, competing value claims. 
In this sense communitarian, value pluralist IR resembles the pursuit of 
‘order/pluralism’ in the schema of the English School’s pluralist/solidarist divide. 
With all three challenges to IR put forward, secularism, liberal individualism and 
pluralism, it can be noted that they are not specific to Islam. Each challenge 
represents on going debates in IR and as such Normative Political Islam, and 
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Islam-as-politics more generally, is not an anomaly on the fringes of the 
discipline, but could help explore these debates as they become more central to 
how IR is perceived. 
The final secondary research question asked to what extent there is a 
synthesis between poststructural and Islamic critiques of IR. Chapter 2 outlined 
the preoccupation of Islamic critiques on ‘modernity’, during and after 
colonialism. Accounting for what Muslim leaders increasingly viewed as the 
stagnation of the Islamic world, led some to embrace the principles and political 
models of their former colonial masters, while others critiqued these principles 
and sought to achieve prosperous societies without embracing the principles 
that found their origin in the European Enlightenment. Advocating the latter of 
these approaches, the umma’s challenges to IR, secularism, universal 
rationality and value pluralism, as outlined above, derive from this 
‘Enlightenment rationality’. In this way, the discussion about political Islam, and 
the discussion over ‘religious resurgence’ more generally, stems from the 
contestation of what constitutes political modernity. These themes are very 
similar to those of poststructuralism, which also sees the truths that became 
embedded in society after the Enlightenment as problematic, a 
“straightjacket”602 on social science. Poststructuralism uses scepticism of meta-
narrative and universal truths to argue that behind the ‘universals’ of the 
Enlightenment project lie a reliance on a specific set of values derived from 
specific historical and cultural traditions. In this way, there is nothing inherently 
legitimate in the spread of these values into foreign traditions. What the above 
affirms is that there is significant synthesis in the two approaches of 
poststructuralism and Islamic critique; the former disregards the ‘universal’ 
philosophy of the Enlightenment, allowing the latter to articulate its notion of 
‘modernity’ in its own way. This does not mean that engagement between 
competing value systems is redundant simply because they are understandably 
different. In fact, the acknowledgement that there exist different, legitimate value 
systems is the very reason engagement and dialogue is so important.  
Enlightenment philosophy would claim that there is but one way for 
societies to develop, translating broadly to positivism in IR. Accepting a more 
interpretivist understanding of the world, as presented in this thesis, there must 
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be dialogue and an attempt to understand the other, rather than seek to convert 
them. In this sense, chapter 5 demonstrated that the synthesis between 
poststructuralism and Islam comes to an end after the ‘common opponent’ of 
Enlightenment philosophy is dealt with, as both have the potential to harbour a 
missionary zeal with regards to delegitimising the other, based on claims to 
universal truths (belief in God, and the insidious ‘there is no truth but the fact 
that there is no truth’). At this point value pluralism was sought out once more to 
make sense of how both positions could be held in the same theory, that is, for 
Normative Political Islam to use poststructural critique on the structures of the 
international sphere but not use that same critique on its own universal truth 
claims. While there is synthesis in the critique of IR, the construction of 
alternatives leaves poststructuralism and Islam at loggerheads. However, given 
the fact that there are values that are not rationally resolvable (such as those 
vested in poststructuralism and Islam respectively), it is no incoherency to 
embrace the two simultaneously; it is in fact an affirmation of value competition, 
in the abstracted realm of second order theory within which the thesis is located. 
To What Extent is an Islamic Notion of International Relations 
Tenable? 
The IR of Normative Political Islam, as rudimentary as it may appear in the 
pages of this thesis, clearly disturbs the equilibrium of IR more generally; it is 
derived from communal sources, not abstract reason; it centres on rule over 
people, not rule over territory; it blurs the boundary between sacred and profane. 
Moreover, the friction outlined throughout the course of this thesis serves to 
reinforce the idea that what might otherwise be accepted as value neutral 
propositions do in fact have a societal heritage, specifically a 
European/Christian heritage. This thesis has dealt with two such propositions, 
secularism and liberal individualism, concepts which have been ‘universalised’, 
and are expected to find purchase in a diverse range of settings outside of the 
environment those concepts were created. Secularism and liberal individualism 
are reflected in the way IR is conceived, and as such, limit the exploration of 
any alternative conceptions. 
 One such alternative conception is an Islamic one. To talk of ‘Islam’ as a 
political persuasion or ideology is somewhat of a misnomer. There is in fact a 
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distinction between Islam-as-faith and Islam-as-politics, the latter being the 
broad umbrella under which Normative Political Islam is oriented. Accepting this 
distinction, Normative Political Islam was developed not from theological 
guidance, but by reviving the exoteric tradition of Sunni Islam. This exotericism 
leads to the articulation of the umma through communitarian principles, which 
found strong resonance with the exoteric tradition discussed. Embracing 
communitarianism in IR however, proved more difficult than its synthesis with 
Normative Political Islam. Articulating community, Islamic or otherwise, 
challenges dominant interpretations of who the actors are in the international 
sphere. Such a challenge is not new, and it is not uniquely posed by the umma; 
transnationalism and debates over the EU, for example, serve to show a 
comparable debate about the actors in IR. However, while community can be 
vested in and across states in an international organisation (such as the EU or 
the OIC), it is not the only way to conceive of community, and indeed is not the 
dominant way Muslims conceive of the umma.  
 In pushing back the ‘universal’ concepts of liberal individualism and 
secularism in IR, it was demonstrated that there is considerable compatibility 
between Islamic and poststructuralist critiques. However, this compatibility is 
limited by the fact that these two perspectives can and will move to critique 
each other once the universalisms of IR are made more humble. While such 
competition (between Islam and poststructuralism) might be viewed as zero-
sum, in that one must inevitably win out over the other, the thesis has shown 
that this is not necessarily the case. Inevitable conflict is in fact a normal and 
expected component of one’s existence, and managing these conflicts is more 
important that resolving them (as some conflicts cannot be resolved).  
 The IR of Islam-as-politics, therefore, is one that is only achievable given 
an internal shift in Muslims who might wish to constitute it; the need to revive 
exotericism is paramount, as it furnishes Muslims with the tools necessary in 
constructing notions of politics that at once abide by broad theological guidance, 
but can be sensitive to and take their cue from the societies they wish to 
represent. As such, it allows Islam-as-politics, and Normative Political Islam 
specifically, to abide by the “conviction that there is no need for a detour 
through the labyrinths of Western history, before one can arrive at a vision of 
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the good life and a just order”.603 Moreover, IR practitioners require a more 
reflexive understanding of the ideas they use to explain non-Western examples, 
identifying where the tools they are using are not as value neutral or ‘objective’ 
as otherwise assumed. Questioning the limits of one’s own tradition helps to 
better appreciate the traditions of others, finding, in this instance, a more 
satisfactory place for religion in IR. That is not to say that every instance of 
religious reasoning need be accepted at face value, but rather it must be 
understood when religion is playing a more substantial role than simply an 
articulation of ‘culture’ or ‘socio-economic factors’. Only with this double move, 
one on the side of political Islamists, and the other on the side of those who try 
to explain their behaviour, do Islamic, or indeed any number of other alternative 
notions of IR, have any chance of being conceived. Once conceived though, as 
Normative Political Islam has been in the pages of this thesis, the case for 
articulating it is another, separate project. This separation points back to the 
distinction between first and second order theorising, for while the thesis has 
made a conceptual space for Normative Political Islam, the empirical space has 
yet to be explored; such exploration is the task of future, first order theory. 
  
  
                                            
603
 Sayyid, Bobby: A Fundamental Fear, pg. xxii 
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